JPRS 79189

13 October 1981

West Europe Report

No. 1829

THE TENTH SPANISH COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESS, 28-31 July 1981

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PRESS FORESEES PROBLEMS FOR PCE, CARRILLO AT CONGRESS

Main Issues Identified

Bilbao EL CORREO ESPANOL-EL PUEBLO VASCO in Spanish 26 Jul 81 p 26

[Article by Mariano Guindal: "Problems and Factions Within the PCE"]

[Text] The 10th Congress of the PCE will go down in history as one of its most factious and without doubt as a turning point in the party's strategy and even ideology. For the first time since the Sixth Congress in 1960, when Santiago Carrillo was elected secretary general, various circles have called for his resignation. Nevertheless, his reelection is considered a sure thing, although his powers will be substantially cut back. People are saying that with this congress Carrillo will begin to pave the way for a successor, who will emerge in late 1983. It will thus be a gradual succession. On paper the assertion is that the big winners will be the soft-line "Eurorenovators" in perfect harmony with the men of the "apparatus," while the "pro-Soviets" are being regarded "a priori" as the big losers.

Spanish Communists face five major problems at this congress: an ideological definition or a search for distinguishing features; a generational turnover in central leadership bodies; adapting the internal structure to the new government model of the autonomies; internal democracy, a new internal PCE organization, and a new labor union approach.

These five problems have given rise to four currents of opinion within the PCE: the men of the "apparatus" or the "Carrillo supporters," the "Eurorenovators" or the "anti-Carrillo forces," the pro-Soviets or "Afghans" and the federalists. These four factions analyze the work of the Central Committee from different perspectives.

Ideological Definition

At its Ninth Congress, held in Madrid from 19 to 23 April 1978, the PCE abandoned its traditional description as "Marxist-Leninist" and chose a somewhat ambiguous formula in the eyes of a large segment of the party. Article 2 states: "The Communist Party is based on revolutionary Marxism. It learns critically from the experiences of the socialist revolutionary process that the October Revolution led by Lenin initiated and of the labor and liberation movement."

To a large segment of the party this new formula was like losing its identity. On the one hand, Eurocommunist ideology is still poorly developed, and on the other, the new ideology is not consistent with the PCE's current approach of not allowing organized factions and of maintaining democratic centralism.

There are three stands on this problem. First, the official position is that the legalization of factions is not synonymous with internal democracy but rather with corridor compromises, which is tantamount to annulling the decision-making power of the rank-and-file. At the same time it defends the "old guard," arguing that if it had not been a renovator, the PCE would not be Eurocommunist and would instead be similar to Portugal's Communist Party. Second, the "Eurorenovators" contend that the party has to have new leaders who can assimilate the ideological change, develop it and acknowledge the organized factions. Thirdly, there are the "pro-Soviets," who feel that Eurocommunism has no potential in the current cold war era because its political space is occupied by the Socialists and who defend Marxism-Leninism as a doctrine that is perfectly compatible with humanist socialism, as the PCF has demonstrated. They also want legalized factions, more as a strategy than out of ideological conviction.

Changing of the Guard

In practice, the new generation began taking over in 1977, as the members of the Old Guard who occupied the secretariats general were "promoted" to presidents, as occurred with Santiago Alvarez, Gregorio Lopez Raimundo, Horacio Fernandez Iguanzo, Ramon Ormazabel, Manuel Benitez Rufo...But the process stopped when it got to the secretary general of the PCE, when the time came to replace Santiago Carrillo, who felt that it was not yet time for him to become "president" of Spanish Communists and for whom there is no clear-cut replacement for the time being. Carrillo realizes, however, that he cannot continue along this line for much longer and has come up with an original prescription for getting through the 10th Congress, the establishment of two deputy secretariats general. Tamemes reacted by stating that "this is not the time to create dauphins," and a wideranging segment of the party is calling loudly for Carrillo to step down. This has triggered a sharp internal struggle for power in the PCE, and this problem has given rise to the "Euro-renovator" faction, which among other things advocates retirement from political posts at age 60.

Internal Structure

The strategy of an underground party with an iron-like internal structure based on democratic centralism, is of no use to a party of the masses. The issue is further complicated by the shift from a centralist government to a government of autonomies. The party has to adapt to the country's new democracy. At the Ninth Congress, Carrillo tried to get ahead of himself and made a serious mistake that he now has to acknowledge and rectify: the regionalization of the PCE. In the underground, Communists organized themselves in neighborhood, factory and university cells and formed professional associations. At Carrillo's initiative, the party was organized into regional federations in which an attorney worked side by side with a blue-collar laborer, which led to

a loss of the capacity for theoretical debate. At this congress, Carrillo has to do an about-face and recognize professional organizations along with regional federations. But this will come too late, when many professionals have already left the PCE.

The government of autonomies also necessitates a federalization of the party. The question now is whether the PCE is going to become a collection of Communist parties grouped together in a federal party, as is the case with the PSUP, or a centralist party that gives a certain degree of autonomy to its provincial organizations. The Communist parties in the Basque Country, Valencia and Aragon are marked by internal strife, and this problem has given rise to the "federalist-renovation" faction.

Union Battle

The fourth and last major problem is the party's union policy. This is perhaps one of its most important problems. The controversy revolves around the PCE's approach to the workers statute, which has placed Marcelino Camacho at odds with Santiago Carrillo, who is supported by Nicolas Sartorius. Camacho advocates a "boycott" of the UCD [Democratic Center Union]-PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] pact and is forcing CCOO [Workers Commission] not to sign the AMI [Framework Collective Bargaining Agreement]. This policy, which Carrillo regards as "vanguard," brought the CCOO one of its first defeats, as it remained on the sidelines in the 1980/81 collective bargaining while the UGT [General Union of Workers] made major gains and, in fact, pulled even with the Communist-backed union.

The "pro-Soviets" are banding together to tackle this problem and are using labor leaders in Catalonia to make their strength felt. The "hard-line" faction made its presence felt at the Second CCOO Congress by putting 13 members on the Federal Committee. The men of the "apparatus" are deeply worried about this problem, which is why they are promoting young moderate labor leaders for PCE leadership positions, in order to offset the strength of the "pro-Soviets" in the labor movement.

PCE Must Adapt

Madrid DIARIO 16 in Spanish 28 Jul 81 p 2

[Editorial: "The 10th Congress"]

[Text] Spain's democratic process has traversed the highways of history at undeniably supersonic speeds, and over the past 5 years the country has made major, frenzied strides and covered decades in barely 2 weeks time. Not even the Communist Party has been immune from the influence of this dizzying pace, as it faces one of the most critical moments in its history with the start of its 10th Congress today.

The fact is that never in the history of Spanish communism has there been a congress with such a buildup of expectations and with such a heavy barrage of criticism and censure of its formerly all-powerful and almost supernatural secretary general, Santiago Carrillo.

At the very beginning of the transition, with its revolutionary euphoria, the PCE, harvesting the fruits of its silent, solitary and self-sacrificing efforts to resist Francoism both here and abroad, rightly became the vanguard of leftist forces in our country.

This situation lasted only a short time, however, and from its initial enthusiasm the party went through successive periods of anguish, tedium and disenchantment, prompted mainly by the displacement of the young leaders who headed up the resistance to Francoism here at home and by the poor results at the 1977 and 1979 elections, less than 10 percent of the vote.

Given this state of affairs, Carrilloo's trials and tribulations on the eve of the 10th Congress have been caused by the apocryphal bloc of renovators and "Afghans" who are challenging him from diametrically opposed stands.

It could be said that the Communist leader is faced with a very difficult, if not insoluble dilemma: either to renovate the party and adapt it to as exuberantly young a country as ours, or to remain faithful to his political and ideological ancestors, to his longstanding comrades in the JSU, who control all the workings of the Communist machine and who have been an impenetrable, airtight Pretorian Guard for the past 25 years.

Ramon Tamemes is probably right when he stresses that the PCE cannot be renovated with Carrillo as its leader, and therefore we regard this congress as an timely occasion for him to retire. What doubt can there be that the entire Eurocommunist program would be much more credible and attractive to the younger generations of Spaniards if it were headed up by a man like Nicolas Sartorius, who is much more immersed in today's sensitivities!

But if the party does not take advantage of this opportunity to replace him, we feel (and this is our contingency approach) that Carrillo ought to put an end to his longstanding public vicissitudes, make an effort to be honest with himself and his comrades and acknowledge that on the basis of his Eurocommunist ideas he should take up most of the proposals of the renovation faction, which ultimately embodies the vitality that will enable the party to survive the political demise of its current leader.

Carrillo Praised

Madrid DIARIO 16 in Spanish 28 Jul 81 p 2

[Article by Alberto Cardin]

[Text] Answering the steady stream of attacks that have been leveled at Santiago Carrillo in recent days, Alberto Cardin raises his voice in defense of the Communist Party's secretary general, although "praising politics when it is getting such bad press throughout the world and specifically praising the trickiest and most merciless of politicians, as dissidents and ousted former members describe him, might almost sound like a challenge."

It is not because I want to contradict everyone else, but praise can be proclaimed from several perspectives. The unfaithful steward in the Gospel was praised by his master not because of his loyalty and honesty but rather for his knowledge "of the things of this world." And it is quite obvious that even the biggest criminal or the most incompetent bureaucrat can be praised for his perfect technique, whether in pilferage or in "pulling strings."

The fact is that praising politics when it is getting such bad press throughout the world and specifically praising the trickiest and most merciless of politicians, as dissidents and ousted former members describe him, might almost sound like a challenge.

Politics

There are several misconceptions in vogue about politicians. One is that they have to be original; there is no reason for this to be the case because the fact is that their task is to express the goals of their voters, which itself entails a restraint on any boldness.

Another is that they have to be virtuous, which is contradicted by any theory of social interaction, which asserts that the conscious goals of many individuals wind up eclipsing each other when they meet head on. There would be no reason for a politician to have a more clear-sighted or virtuous disposition than his particular constituency; rather, his ought to be more efficient, which rules out any moral hierarchy of the ends.

Another final misconception is that they have to be upright and "moral." La Pasionaria already gave an answer to this, when Felipe Gonzalez made his moral gesture, by noting that if he were so ethical, he could not be a good politician. This could be turned around and expressed as follows: inasmuch as he is still a politician, he cannot be that ethical. And in the case of Carrillo, Santiago is without doubt the most complete of politicians.

Slogans

Everyone seems to be agree on this last point, albeit with some degree of pejorative reluctance. If we leave aside the routine and by now somewhat forgotten accusations against him, his cruelty towards Wenceslao Carrillo, or the Paracuellos incident, or whether or not he turned in Grimau, Carrillo has been the epitome of a politician throughout the transition period and, therefore, a target for all criticisms leveled at politics.

There is, for example, a consensus that the Duke of Suarez was an upstart and a bungler, that Felipe Gonzalez is both clever and good, that Fraga's poor personality gets the best of him even though he is a great legislator, or that Areilza is a very cultured gentleman and democrat even though he was mayor of Bilbao in 1937. The clever notions about these men have accumulated over time, or they are accorded a halo of respect and self-denial.

In contrast, the only thing that people acknowledge about Carrillo, and not without a certain degree of malice, is his cleverness in throwing the "transitional" police off the track by wearing a wig. Everything else having to do with him involves lobbying, "ukases," betrayals, manipulation and repetitions.

Cristina Almeida says that the PCE is "party of slogans" and she could have added that Carrillo, a veteran virtuoso, is the man who best recites these slogans. What she does not realize or does not tell us is that discernment is the opposite of sloganeering and that it inevitably goes beyond parties, even if to the Apocalypse of the future that never arrives, the hell that will never come.

Moral

If we had to transfigure Carrillo philosophically, he would no doubt come out looking like Lin-Piao did in a book that was late in coming to Spain but that is very instructive, "The Angel, Ontology of the Revolution I." We would have to emulate this title: "Carrillo as Will and as Representative."

Yes, will, everyone will say, the will to hold power and perpetuate himself. But representative? Of what? A representative of all those who are fond of politics and those who go beyond it.

Those who are fond of politics because Carrillo, in spite of all his trickery, is prepared to die with the PCE, when it longer has a constituency and when all of the "organic" intellectuals have gone over to "the government alternative." Those who go beyond politics because Carrillo will always be a landmark to them of how far a political animal can go. Carrillo neither copies nor philosophizes nor manipulates in politics. He simply "is" politics. And that's about as far as you can go.

Carrillo Criticized

Madrid YA in Spanish 29 Jul 81 p 5

[Editorial: "The Utopias of the 10th Congress"]

[Text] It is not enough to listen to Santiago Carrillo. He must be read and underlined. His tone puts one to sleep. In contrast, when you read carefully what he has to say, he can arouse enormous curiosity and usually leads to in-depth reflection. Carrillo himself read the 180-odd pages of his report to the 10th Congress of the Communist Party yesterday. His parliamentary skills were once more highlighted. We chose to read it very carefully and we have found in the report not only what he said but also what he omitted.

The last few paragraphs of the document summarize it quite well. "We need a PCE that will democratize and regenerate itself continuously, without losing

its distinguishing features, capable of acting as a genuine revolutionary Marxist vanguard of the creative masses and critical within the historical bloc that we must forge, and of its political, social and economic forms; a party in which there is a broad circulation of ideas, but a homogeneous policy, not a conglomeration of subparties competing for the votes of a passive rank and file; leadership teams within which various comrades can express themselves differently, but within the framework of mutual cooperation and loyalty; a party whose aim is to win over the people, which is not the same as a party shaken by the pressures of society's ruling strata or by the powers of this world."

Why that's nothing at all that Carrillo is asking for! It's the same old sham and utopia! Because although it is true that the Spanish Communist Party could assume an identity consistent with the summary that Carrillo has outlined, even in the event, which is impossible, that it managed to create that image, and even in the event, which is also impossible, that it succeeded in developing that legion of men possessing all those virtues, we would be looking at a group whose relationship with social realities would not be viable. The fact is that when the PCE's secretary general criticizes the party and its leadership, he is confirming that this is impossible. It is not consistent. It cannot be, because the gap between a party anchored in the past ("our distinguishing features also stem from an unconditional defense of the great October socialist revolution in Russia," he says at one point in his speech) and the social realities that they are endeavoring to relate to is patent and cannot be bridged.

All of his statements, except the strictly political ones (the ones aimed at achieving power), turn out to be that contradictory. When he accuses the UCD administration of not heading off the ruin of small and medium business, he forgets to say that the stubbornness of the Communist union itself has often contributed to that ruin. When he tries to justify the party's ineffectiveness in public life by citing the dispersion of its cadres when it became legal, he overlooks the fact that the party has no cadres because the underground demanded only leaders of the masses and an iron-like command that still persists. When he asserts that during this period many associations "fulfilled, along with their own specific functions, other functions involving party organization in the anti-Franco struggle," he refuses to acknowledge that later on these associations (the neighborhood groups, for example) were stifled because they were no longer of any use as shock troops and could outstrip the party itself in their grievances. When he proclaims that these groups have to be revitalized, he refuses to admit that elitism has taken over the party and that the PC's leaders have forgotten that it is a party of the masses. Therefore, when he says that the rank and file are coparticipants, he is just grandstanding, because Carrillo knows perfectly well that as in the other parties, they are simply voters and people to be rallied. Loss of membership is merely a consequence of such a policy. It is not surprising that when he broaches Eurocommunist policy "in the near future" in his report, he merely formulates a series of vague remarks. What really matters to him is to make it quite clear that the PCE's structure is

still monolithic, that Lenin did the same thing with historical factions, that even the party's bank account ought to be joint and managed by the Central Committee, that it is a good idea to promote young leaders but without sweeping away the "old guard," that Communists are patriots, but that the "patriotism of the party" must be clearly established, that the party "apparatus" has to be bolstered because it does not exist today, that the Central Committee has to be strengthened...

There is a contradictory duality to all of Carrillo's statements in his report. Deep down, he is talking about utopia, the protagonism of reality and the antagonism of the ideal party. There is no desire for democracy because the issues are raised on the level of the impossible. This might be useful to Carrillo. To us it is worrisome.

Congress Cool to Carrillo

Madrid YA in Spanish 29 Jul 81 p 9

[Article by F.L. de Pablo: "The Critics Will Make Themselves Heard in the PCE"]

[Text] The 10th PCE Congress began amid the same climate of internal discord that characterized the preparations for it: discord in the struggle for power and in replacing its current leadership cadres. At the opening plenary session debate on congress rules, the proposals drafted by the presidents and secretaries of delegation were subjected to a series of amendments only one of which, but a major one, achieved a majority (488 to 450). Under it, amendments that get one-fourth of the votes in the committees debating the position papers can be discussed at the plenary session of the congress.

This is a change from the one-third vote used in the regional groups in debating the papers. This will enable the critical factions to make themselves heard at plenary sessions, although it will lengthen the congress, which is also encountering the difficulties connected with the scattered sites at which it is being held. This will make it hard for the critical factions to coordinate, which will enhance the machine's control.

Of course the congress's initial session went overtime because of Carrillo's lengthy report, a 180-page speech that he read in the most refined Cuban style, thus depriving the delegates of their meals. Carrillo had to push his voice at numerous junctures to elicit applause from the congress, whose delegates followed the advance printed copy while the secretary general read it.

Carrillo began by justifying the policy of democratic concentration and of consensus in drafting the constitution. One of the few times that he reaped a round of applause was when he referred to the estrangement between the Armed Forces and democratic Spain in pointing out that the army should not be legitimately proud of its victory in the Civil War and that "patriotism should move us all to place it in its proper historical place as a painful episode that is not to be repeated." He pointed out later on that the anti-

democratic propaganda being voiced in the barracks can hardly help the Armed Forces to overcome the ideological vestiges of the Civil War, which delays their identification with the nation.

In referring to the unity of the Left and the cooperation that the PSOE is lending the administration, Carrillo wondered why the PSOE does not yet have a broad parliamentary majority or cabinet ministers. Carrillo intelligently brought up the in-depth self-criticism of mistakes in the party's leadership and activities as the delegates were beginning to look for a place to eat. Nevertheless, he did arouse the enthusiasm of part of the congress when he mentioned the detachment of the party's cadres from its rank and file as one of the causes of a a steadily falling membership. He did not, however, entirely convince the more than 30 percent of the delegates in the critical factions (Stalinists, Afghans, renovators, etc) who are opposed to the apparatus's proposals, when he devoted a major segment of his report ("I laughingly denounce the competing factions," he said) to the inner workings of the apparatus rather than to the rank and file. There is no democratic progress entailed in organizing factions, he asserted.

The emphasis that he placed on rejecting the proposals of the factions shows that, as expected, this will be the true bone of contention at the 10th PCE Congress, aside from the replacement of what has come to be called the party's "gerontocracy" and its links with society, thus averting the danger, which Carrillo himself pointed out, that the party will be reduced to an electioneering, power-oriented machine that is divorced from the associations and the rank and file supporting it.

PCE in Serious Crisis

Madrid YA in Spanish 1 Aug 81 p 5

[Editorial: "The PC's Crisis Is Indeed Serious Now"]

[Text] The Congress of the Spanish Communist Party has concluded with a certain degree of relief, albeit not exactly intense, that Carrillo has been reelected, although his leadership seems to be nearing its end. Carrillo persists in denying the obvious: his party's crisis. And he is doing so with feeble arguments such as that there can be no crisis because it is precisely the members of the "apparatus" who are criticizing themselves. This, Carrillo says, is not a crisis but a critical awareness.

The truth is that the crisis is real and much deeper than would be desirable for a political equilibrium in Spain. This is why we said that Carrillo's reelection was greeted with some degree of relief. His ouster at this juncture could have unleashed a fierce interplay of forces within the party and caused it to drift from the policy of cooperation that is so necessary, especially in issues such as autonomy. But the real crisis is there, and its symptoms are on the surface, even though the PC is bent on concealing the facts: some 60,000 members have left the party, including a sizable group of intellectuals and professionals who had made the PC a civilized political platform vis-a-vis

public opinion; factions that question the committee's directives (which is unheard of in hierarchies like Communist parties) have emerged spontaneously, and a good many abstentions (30 percent almost) were registered when it came time to vote on the secretary general's report, which was more ideological than informative.

There has been a little bit of everything at the PC Congress. There have been days of total informational clarity, as well as days of secrecy, like yesterday. There have been peaceful days and tense days. But there has also been, as always, a great deal of demagogy.

When internal problems become difficult to address and harassment turns cruel, the normal thing is to go off on tangents and start bandying things about. Some position papers, nicely presented by the Carrillo supporters, are based on demagogical assumptions. For example, there is the one that in examining the party's foreign policy censures the Vatican (we are assuming that the phrase Vatican State is an attempt to dissemble and that the actual target is the Church) for its support of religious parties (Catholic, we suppose), for its meddling in matters of State life (an odd wording) such as education, divorce and abortion, and for the shackles that the Vatican has allegedly placed (successfully, says the amendment) on the struggle of Christians in Latin America.

The Communist Party's internal democracy is truly astonishing. Regardless of how many protestations of Eurocommunism they might make, the amendment does nothing more and nothing less than take the same line as the Communist parties in the East, the only difference being that in those countries they are in power, have no opposition and can therefore enact laws in accordance with doctrine. In other words, the PC is denying the Church its status as a mentor on moral issues and, therefore, religious freedom. We need not repeat that the Church has the obligation to remind Christians of their faith and of the need to lead their lives in accordance with the precepts of the Gospel. Divorce, abortion and education are front-line moral issues that the Church cannot omit from its teachings. The Communist Party knows that, as do the Communist parties that are in power. Support for supposedly religious parties is open to discussion, even when such support is a stated fact. Examples such as Italy, where the Christian Democrats are in power and have passed divorce and abortion laws, do not exactly bolster the argument that the Vatican supports political parties. Either that or surely such support is so weak that it is of no good. Just imagine in Spain...

The 10th Congress of the PCE is over, with neither grief nor glory, but with more grief than glory because its future is truly uncertain. What makes the PCE a worrisome party is its internal breakdown and the impact that this breakdown could have on the electorate and on the political equilibrium in Spain. This is why the crisis seems to us much deeper than Mr Santiago Carrillo says and would care to admit.

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'MUNDO OBRERO' SETS TONE ON EVE OF 10th PCE CONGRESS

Unity, Strength Expected

Madrid MUNDO OBRERO in Spanish 24-30 Jul 81 p 3

[Editorial: "The Challenge of the 10th Congress"]

[Text] The 10th Congress of the PCE is going to convene amid a particularly difficult situation, 5 months after the attempted coup d'etat on 23 February and while a minority government is showing itself incapable of coping with pressures for a coup and while problems such as unemployment, terrorism and the construction of the State of autonomies persist. We are certain that the PCE will emerge from this congress stronger and more united by reaffirming its personality as an open, democratic Eurocommunist party with a solid internal organization and a single policy.

The 10th PCE Congress will open in a few short days. The more than 1,200 delegates that will be attending it have already been chosen in a process that has highlighted many of the problems and issues that the congress will have to tackle. Many developments have taken place in our country since it was called in November. It was the most serious of these developments, the attempted coup d'etat on 23 February, that showed that the policy pursued by the PCE has been correct. We could say that in contrast to what has happened with other political forces, the PCE has not had to make any changes of direction in its strategy.

As has been characteristic of our troubled history, the PCE's highest leadership body is going to meet amid particularly difficult circumstances. Although we are no longer forced to operate in the underground by a dictatorship, we are faced with the real threat of a regression, which a minority government that gives in to pressures from coup plotters and that is reactionary on social issues and on crucial foreign policy aspects cannot consistently cope with. Unemployment, terrorism, coup plots and home rule are problems that demand solutions. Democratic coexistence, which is based on the concerted action of all progressive social and political forces, hinges on this.

Experience has shown how great a contribution communists have made to the forging of this kind of unity.

If the 10th Congress has to approve a policy in keeping with this situation, it also has to examine the problems facing the PCE itself in implementing such a policy. The pressures on the party are great, and the challenge facing the congress is a serious one.

On the one hand, there is a clear-cut, conscious effort to do away with the political independence of Spanish communists, as part of an overall strategy against Eucocommunism. On the other hand, there are proposals that would lead the Communist Party towards Social Democratic stands, thus shattering its unity of action and plunging it into futile strife among various organized groups.

Either of the two options would prevent the PCE from continuing to play its democratic, revolutionary role, which has been essential in the struggle against Francoism and which is indispensable in the march towards socialism in freedom.

We are certain that the PCE will emerge from the 10th Congress stronger and more united by reaffirming its personality as an open, democratic Eurocommunist party. Behind the delegates, behind the congress, supporting them in their decisions and then putting them into practice, are tens of thousands of communists, organized in companies and in the countryside, in neighborhoods and universities throughout Spain.

It is these men and women who will take up on a daily basis the policy that emerges from this congress and who will, above all, put it into practice in its most essential form: in their everyday contacts, with all workers, with our citizens. This is precisely why they have organized in a democratic party in which they can voice criticism with complete freedom at all levels, a party with a solid internal organization and a single policy, a revolutionary Eurocommunist party: the Spanish Communist Party.

Carrillo and Party Renewal

Madrid MUNDO OBRERO in Spanish 24-30 Jul 81 pp 12-15

[Speech by Santiago Carrillo at the Seventh PCE Conference in Madrid; exact date and place not given]

[Text] The secretary general of the PCE, Santiago Carrillo, began his speech at the Seventh Madrid Provincial Conference on Sunday morning with some thoughts about what the 10th Party Congress, for which this conference is laying some of the groundwork, ought to be.

The 10th Congress must above all help to provide an answer to the problems facing Spain, its peoples, the working class and the laboring masses at the moment. This must be the prime, main and fundamental objective of the 10th Congress.

Why? Because we are a political party that speaks for the people, that works for the people and above all for the working class.

At the same time, the congress has to self-critically examine the party's activities over these 3 years, which must inevitably lead us to intensify our regeneration, to heighten our internal democracy and to define, spell out and confirm the Eurocommunist strategic line of the Spanish Communist Party.

In this vein, I would say that within what we call Eurocommunism there are unquestionably nuances and at times quite a bit more than nuances.

For example, to me the critical approach to real socialism cannot compare real socialism with Francoism and even go so far as to assert that Francoism was better than real socialism. There is a line there that I, as a Eurocommunist, cannot step over, regardless of how critical I might be...

The Roots of Eurocommunism

Eurocommunism also has historical roots. These historical roots are to be found in the break with Social Democracy, which betrayed the working class, came to terms with its bourgeoisies and was responsible for the first imperialist world war.

Another of its historic roots lies in the resolute and determined support for the great October socialist revolution, which was a source of inspiration for the most advanced sector of the working class.

Another root is to be found in criticism of Social Democracy as a party that has acted as a loyal manager of capitalism and that has not historically been a combative, revolutionary party.

To me these are the basic, historical differences that separate Eurocommunism from Social Democracy.

Now then, I think that all nuances, all opinions have their place in the party. I think that those who consider the model of real socialism a good model have their place in the party, as long as they apply the party's policies with discipline. And I think that those who, on the other hand, support the approaches closest to Social Democracy have their place in the party too, as long as they also apply the party's policies with discipline.

I think that by encompassing all of these currents the party cannot, however, make a potpourri, a hodgepodge. The party must have a strategic line, a well-defined political position that does not represent a compromise between some positions and others, and the party's unity must be based on an acceptance of its political line.

The Conception of the Party

So as not to make my speech too long, I would like to focus on one issue: the issue of the conception of the party, which is as just as important as or more important than an agreement on a general Eurocommunist line.

I want to begin by examining the view that the party ought to be a reflection of society and, therefore, that it ought to reflect the diversity of currents in society.

I ask myself this question, which answers itself: Can the Communist Party be a reflection of this society, a capitalist society that has to be completely transformed, or should it be the reflection primarily of the class that we must rely on to transform the society in which we live, the working class, the hardworking strata of society and the revolutionary intellectuals?

The party must be a reflection of the working class and of the people in certain strata, above all the intellectuals and individuals of culture, who by taking up a single ideology and a single policy merge with the working class in the program to transform society.

Because, I repeat, if the Communist Party is a reflection of this society, it will devour the Communist Party, incorporate it; this society will bury the Communist Party, and another force that aims at transforming society will have to emerge. And as we view Eurocommunism, that is not the way things should be.

I realize that a socialist country with a single party (a model that we do not advocate because we feel that the current societies with real socialism have to improve themselves if they do not want to stagnate and enter a serious crisis that could lead to the defeat of not only certain systems but also of the entire cause of socialism) does have to have a party that is a reflection of society because since it is the only party, it identifies with society and the State, and it can have organized factions within it that would reflect the realities of a society that is not yet homogeneous.

A Divided Party Is Not a Vanguard Party

On the other hand, however, I feel that if we advocate that kind of model for a party in a situation like ours, we are making a tremendous mistake, because if we propose to be a reflection of current society, that means that our party would become a sort of copy of parliamentary democracy, a copy of the model of this society. This would divide the party, on the one hand, into two or three different subparties and, on the other (let's not fool ourselves; the bulk of the party would not play this game), into a mass a mere voters who sometimes lean towards this faction and other times lean towards that faction, depending on the moment, the circumstances. Is that a vanguard party?

Comrades, I think that from a Marxist standpoint this cannot be called a vanguard party. A vanguard party is a party in which all members participate and are leading figures in its policies, albeit with differing degrees of responsibility. A vanguard party is a party in which the mass of members are not passive (although, I repeat, there are differing levels of activity) and in which the active cadres do not just divide into groups and discuss and decide policy among themselves. We too criticize this parliamentary democracy, this society, which we defend and will continue to defend with all our might.

Why? Because this democracy is not yet participatory enough; it does not allow citizens to become more directly involved, because in this democracy there is still a a gap, an abyss between voters and elected officials. When we on the Left criticize this democracy, we are demanding citizen involvement at various levels, direct democracy in many aspects of society. In other words, democracy must not merely mean delegating decision-making power to a few elected officials.

Now then, this is what people are trying to reproduce in the party when they defend the idea of currents, factions or tendencies (call them what you will), in a nutshell, political cliques within the party, next to a mass of members who do not get involved and just cast votes.

The Party Has Been Making Policy From the Top and Upwards

What has the party's fundamental mistake been during this period? And when I say the party I mean the party leadership.

Not only the Central Committee, however, but many of the party's cadres as well. What has the fundamental mistake been? The fundamental mistake is set forth in the position papers and in criticism of the party leadership. The fundamental mistake is that the party has been making policy from the top and upwards.

What does this mean? It means that we have moved from the underground (where the party made policy above all down below, in the grassroots organizations and in the mass movements) to legality, and in light of the objective need for councilmen and deputies, thousands of party cadres who were working down below, in the mass groups and movements have gone upstairs to work. And this is not all. We have maintained a practice from the underground that was justified at the time, when it was hard to have true democracy at the grassroots level, and so that as many comrades as possible would take part in decision-making, we formed a great many leadership bodies.

We have now gotten to a situation (forgive me if I exaggerate a bit here, because exaggerating at times can provide a more graphic image) in which in this party if you are not a deputy, if you are not a provincial deputy, if you are not a councilman, if you are not a member of the Central Committee, if you are not a member of the Central Committees of the nationalities and regions, if you are not a member of the Provincial Committees, it seems as if you are nothing.

Contact With the Masses Is Necessary

We have gotten to a situation in which, with exceptions (I repeat that I am exaggerating a bit), the party's best cadres are not where the party really makes contact with the masses. If we exclude the labor movement, the party's best cadres are upstairs and, what is more, they do not want to go downstairs. Some of them go downstairs, head downstairs, are so good as to show up down below when preparations for congresses or conferences are underway and it is time to win votes.

It is true that we have made policy from the top. I say this not to hurt anyone, but to make you think, to think about the party, to think responsibly...

What has happened under this practice? Under this practice the basic intermediaries between the party and the masses, the party and society, the party and what we call the social fabric, the basic intermediaries during this period have been elected public officials: the deputies, the councilmen, the provincial deputies; they have been the basic intermediaries.

It's not that we elected officials do not have to serve as intermediaries between the party and the people. It's just that under this practice, what ought to be the essential intermediary between the Communist Party and the masses, in other words, the work of the groups with the people around them, with the mass movements, with the social fabric, what ought to be fundamental in a Communist Party has been lacking or has been very weak, with the exceptions of groups that have weathered the storm of this crisis very well.

Now then, let us reflect where this will lead us. If we continue a practice whereby our basic intermediaries with the masses are elected officials (and speaking of elected officials, I would like to mention that I have heard people talk about the autonomy of councilmen. This is one of the points on which I am in complete disagreement with what has been proposed here, because there is no autonomy of deputies or councilmen in the party. In our party, and this is one of the differences between us and the Social Democratic parties, the deputies come under the Central Committee, and the councilmen come under the pertinent party bodies. That the committees are not supposed to do the councilmen's work is another thing, but between this, between allowing them to take initiatives and placing trust in them, on the one hand, and regarding them as an autonomous group, on the other, there is a gap that cannot be bridged in our party). What is the danger? Comrades, if the party's sole or main intermediary with the masses are elected officials, the time will come when the party leadership will not consist of the various levels of party committees; it will consist, rather, as is the case today in the Labor Party, for example, of parliamentary deputies or councilmen. And today in the same Labor Party the Left, with good judgment, is trying to take the leadership away from the deputies and give it to the party, because this leadership in the hands of the deputies has been a factor in the Social Democratic nature of the policies pursued by Labor governments.

Internal Democracy Means Participation

And if we tried to incorporate into our party, which is a Communist Party, what the Labor Left is trying to correct now, I think we would be making a mistake.

Yes, our leadership and party are to blame because they have been unable to reverse this trend and to bring the party's cadres back into the groups and to develop internal democracy. However, internal democracy, and I recall that I have discussed this more than once with comrades in party organizations, internal democracy would mean, for example, that the Communist deputies and

councilmen from Madrid would meet every 2 or 3 months with the party's aktiv and report on what we have accomplished, and our party's aktiv would tell us what we have done well or poorly and would give us ideas and make suggestions. This would be one facet of developing internal democracy in the party.

But that's not all. Our party will not be a truly democratic party; it will have a purely pro forma democracy as long as we do not succeed in getting the whole party to truly participate in debate and decision-making and in eliminating the division between those who lead and those who vote for or against them without getting involved.

We Must Put an End to Factions and Horizontal Contacts

This erroneous practice by the party has led us (and I think it must be said) to a situation in which the party is beginning to have tendencies, currents or fractions (call them what you will) that have their own discipline and that vote in blocs. In Barcelona, for example, a group of activists attacked a Communist deputy, a member of the leadership of the PSUC [Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia] and a member of the leadership of the PCE. In other words, there is confrontation in which political ideas are no longer involved and in which insults, threats, hatred and ultimately physical violence are. This is an extreme case, comrades, but if the party does not tackle these issues with vigor, with the vigor that we have not shown during this period, and does not head off and put an end to factions, currents and tendencies, we will wind up somewhere else in a similar fashion. And in talking about this danger, I am not excluding the so-called precongress platforms, because let's be objective and reflect on this, comrades: in order to hammer out a platform during a precongress period, there have to be horizontal contacts among those hammering it out before the precongress period; otherwise, there are no precongress platforms.

And why is a platform going to disappear the day after the congress? Who is going to make it disappear? The concrete experience that we have today without legalizing platforms is that the groups that have more or less been linked together (and we have the example of Catalonia, I repeat) have not disappeared after the Fifth Congress, and it will not be easy to put an end to this situation without administrative measures.

The Necessary Regeneration of the Party

Comrades, we have to regenerate the party. And from a personal standpoint, I am prepared to provide every opportunity for that regeneration. But in this party we cannot consider it a fault to have taken up arms in the struggle against fascism. I do not consider it a dishonor to have waged war. If there are comrades in the rank-and-file or in leadership bodies who have waged war and still have their strength and are respected, I, comrades, will not be one of the ones to sweep away the old guard. Nevertheless, I realize that there are comrades in the old guard who should give way to the younger generations. I realize that there are those still in leadership positions who

should change jobs and do lighter, less difficult work, and I also realize (which is why I have proposed appointing a general deputy secretary, which was later amended to the effect that there could be several) that if I should continue as secretary general of the party, I will need help and cooperation.

Regenerate the party, yes, by removing, shifting or replacing veteran comrades who are no longer fit; but a regeneration can also affect youths who have not shown themselves to be equal to their responsibilities. A regeneration as I see it does not depend on age; it depends on ability, on the dedication that each person can give the party.

Comrades, does the fact that groups, tendencies and factions are not a good idea for a party in our situation mean that there is no freedom of opinion in the party?

Full Freedom But, Joint Responsibility and Loyalty

I think that all of us should freely voice our opinions on all issues in the party. I think, furthermore, that it is no catastrophe if there are nuances at times among leaders in their approach to Eurocommunist policy, as long as they are just nuances and as long as there is joint responsibility and mutual loyalty.

Freedom of opinion has not been lacking, comrades. When MUNDO OBRERO was a daily, I read in it that I was a Stalinist, and we were not even in the precongress period. It did not occur to me to protest, and I repeat, we were not in the precongress period.

Our press and the press of others have published opinions that are not those of our collective leadership, and no one has protested.

What we cannot do is "regenerate" the party by introducing into it the worst vices of parliamentary politics, because in practice at times a regeneration is thought to mean pacts within the party, compromises, corridor politics within the party and a battle for places in party leadership bodies. This is not regenerating the party; this is introducing into the party the methods of the oldest and most detestable of politics.

Examples from History

I think that we can look to this example (and if I raise these issues like this, it is because I feel that we are really gambling with the party): the Italian Communist Party, which has been legal for 40 years, has about 30 percent of the votes and is an infinitely broader reflection of the various working class and social sectors. Nonetheless, the Italian Communist Party, in which there are well-known figures with differing nuances and stands on a number of issues, does not have factions or currents or precongress platforms. The Italian Communist Party has been able to preserve and maintain this rich,

and diverse internal life through a sort of tacit compromise among all, the tacit compromise of preserving the party's unity and homogeneity and of never allowing differences to become organized.

And don't come and quote me some remark by Lenin in connection with the 10th Congress of the Russian Party. The Bolshevik Party in 1917 was a front of parties, not a full-fledged party. In 1917, the Bolshevik Party was a party made up of the old Bolsheviks, the Trotskyites, the Bogdanovites, the Social Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks who joined the party on the eve of the October Revolution. It was a party in which at a given historical juncture several groups with different histories and makeups converged to take power, but once in power they continued to be at odds. Those who are familiar with this period know to what degree they were at odds. And I am not talking about the Stalin era; I am talking about the era of Lenin, who was the one who proposed the elimination of factions.

I think that it is absurd to compare that party, its makeup and its problems with ours today.

Comrades, if we want our party to continue progressing today (I would stress something that is often forgotten, namely that ours was the only party that gained, not lost, votes in the 1979 elections after the Moncloa pacts and the consensus), and I think that the Communist Party can continue progressing amid the gains by the Left that seem to be beginning in Europe and that could occur in Spain, we must not ourselves destroy this potential by dividing among ourselves and clashing.

Grassroots Concerns

Madrid MUNDO OBRERO in Spanish 24-30 Jul 81 pp 35-45

[Text] Forum of the 10th Congress

In this the last issue before the start of the 10th Congress, we conclude publication of the material received for the forum. In view of space problems, the committee appointed by the secretariat to monitor this section has decided to publish the remarks signed by members and to hold back the resolutions of party organizations, which can appear in the PCE's organizational channels. In addition, in order to include all of the material that arrived before this final issue went to print, we have had to abridge some of the remarks, endeavoring at all times to preserve all of the political elements in each of them.

Is the Central Committee to Blame for Everything? (Maximo Frutos Redondo, Card No 690)

I am a bit disturbed by the articles that some comrades have written in MUNDO OBRERO. I am certain that there are many shortcomings and that there always will be to a greater or lesser extent. It is alright to criticize these

shortcomings and to demand that they be corrected when they are clear-cut and affect the party as a whole. What I do not agree with is the manner in which some comrades voice their criticisms.

Some write on an entirely theoretical topic, mostly sheer, useless rubbish, and then unscrupulously launch a furious attack on the party's current leadership. They are no longer asking for just a different party; they are asking the party leadership to give in so that all those who left out of pure whimsy can return. What is more, some are calling on us to ask Claudin to return once again. These poor fellows seemingly did not know what they were doing when they left the party. As a communist, I am against these approaches to the party's problems. Shortcomings must be criticized and corrected, but criticized in an objective manner in a bid to maintain party unity above all else. It is my opinion that Tamames has great ambitions and is not very reliable. True communists should strive to see to it that the PCE emerges from the 10th Congress stronger and more united, sovereign and independent, so that it can develop a Eurocommunist policy under the specific conditions in our country.

It seems that all of us comrades have been "super" guys, that we have all done perfect jobs in the groups and elsewhere, that we have no shortcomings. The Central Committee is to blame for everything. How wonderful!

I have so far not read a single article in which a comrade criticizes himself and cites specific examples of his everyday efforts for the good of the party, but I have read truly destructive articles that employ a vocabulary that is not worthy of a communist.

No, Comrade Miguel Naveros and Comrades Francisco Caballero Garrido, that is not the way you should have expressed yourselves. That kind of vocabulary is not proper, because you too are communists. You seem to be speaking on behalf of others or other parties. All of us communists belong to the party.

The Crisis of the PCE (Juan Gutierrez Romero, PCA Card No 32,133, Villafranca, Cordoba)

I, who saw the birth of the PC, am truly worried about current developments, which are unprecedented in the party's history.

The rank-and-file, the thousands of day laborers who make up the grassroots of our party in Adnalusia, are unfamiliar with Karl Marx and all the theoreticians of socialism because their low level of culture and their concerns preclude this. In my opinion, they have come to the party because of a need: the need to free themselves from exploitation...

It is shocking for us to be going through this crisis today when we recall our party's first demonstration in connection with the Atocha murders at the end of the dictatorship. The bourgeoisie was left speechless. They thought to themselves, and rightly so, that if the party had been able to muster that rally through political work amid a whirlwind of pitiless repression, what would be it like if it were not outlawed?

(...) Disillusionment and fear are the reasons why our members who identify less with the party and who are less willing to sacrifice for it have left our ranks.

(...) Almost none of the people who leave the party (some join its opposition) come out and say sincerely why they did so. Some say that they do not like the lack of democracy, while others cite the lack of revolutionary activity, inasmuch as no party comes to power peacefully, or claim that our leadership is senile. I think that they get these ideas ready-made from outside the party.

It would be absurd to let loose the rallying cry of an assault on power to retain the impatient revolutionaries. It would also be absurd to open the door to a foolish democracy for those who are not reliably committed to the party, and it would similarly be absurd to sweep all of the pieces off the board and replace them with others dictated to us from outside.

But if the party cannot change society in our days, why does the party exist? Let us keep in mind that this is a party of and for the workers, and everyone knows that the capitalist system, with governments made to order for it, forces the working class to wage an ongoing struggle for its very existence, a struggle that it would be suicidal not to accept. To wage this struggle we need a leadership, and this is the function of the party, in cooperation with the other democratic parties...

Unity Above All (Pascual Garcia Mora, Sauquillo Vallecas Group)

Owing to its specific importance, one point stands out in the draft position papers: the unity of the party as an indispensable premise for subsequent unity of action on the Left, as noted in position paper two, aimed at consolidating democracy.

(...) Our party faces too many pitfalls, duly outlined in Position Paper VII, fo us not to seriously, firmly and tenaciously take up its defense. We should begin by ironing out the differences among us, banishing factions that could challenge and endanger our policies, which have been fought so tenaciously for so long from the outside by opposing groups, and by doing our utmost to bring back those comrades who left the party over mostly minor matters, so that we can all make possible the great party of the masses that we all want and the democracy that our country needs.

(...) Therefore, as a grassroots party member, I call on all those comrades who are still not certified to come and help their party with their valuable experience so that we can all make possible the policies that the 10th Congress sets before us (...)

WE PCE Members Are Not a Flock of Sheep and We do Not Need a Shepherd (Juan Perpine, Card No 152,754, Zaragoza)

The strength of the PCE is forged neither in silence nor in a unanimity of views. Thus, I regard as comforting some of the things that Comrade Santiago Alaman, from Zaragoza, says in his article in MUNDO OBRERO (Issue 131), entitled "Where Does a Shepherd Without a Flock Go?" (...)

I must express my complete disagreement when we members of the PCE are considered a flock. The simile should be totally rejected, and of course we do not need any shepherd because as we know, shepherds first fleece their sheep and then sacrifice them for their own benefit.

Now that this matter has been cleared up, I will proceed to roundly reject the definition he gives of the current PCE groups, in which he says, among other things, "...there is no information for the rank-and-file, just routine talks without substance..."

The comrade clearly cannot attest to what is going on right now in all groups throughout Spain, but he does so nevertheless, and what is more, he ignores the activities pursued by his own group, Las Fuentes, Zaragoza. It is for this reason that at the risk of continuing at too great a length, I feel it would be a good idea to mention some of the things that have been done there over the past 6 months: two political debates on the UCD crisis and the political moment; six group plenums; discussions on the provincial conference; two open-air meetings (one run by Ramon Mendezona); group attendance at the demonstrations against the diversion of the Ebro, against terrorism, on May Day and against the 23 February coup; 30 percent increase of MUNDO OBRERO reserves; various comrades in positions of responsibility in the CCOO; three comrades on the Board of Directors of the Association of Neighbors (one vice presidency); several comrades working in APAS; 20,000 pamphlets entitled "The PCE Reports" distributed throughout the district, dealing with pensions, terrorism, the UCD crisis, coup threats, the diversion of the Ebro and the doctors' strike; an exchange of views with councilmen at the local headquarters; putting up its own and the party's posters on defending democracy; free children's movies during the winter; a monthly news bulletin; discussion of position papers and bylaws; a talk on NATO on 2 July, directed by Manuel Zacarate, with an extensive publicity campaign on the issue.

All this in addition to a sound financial policy with a sizable increase in revenue and a modest but decent public bar service open from 830 to 2200 hours, as well as an assembly room that neighborhood communities have been frequently using for their get-togethers.

It is not my intention to voice exaggerated praise of a PCE group, among other things because we should have accomplished much more than we did, but neither can I allow Alaman to get away with suggesting, in light of what has been done, that the PCE is going nowhere (...)

We cannot forget where our real strengths lie, and what we must never lapse into is defeatism and seeing only the negative side of the PCE's situation, which exists but not to the extent that our comrade would have us believe. What is at work, deep down, is impatience and the result of excessive hopes that have prompted disenchantment, because we did not respond to the need to overcome our difficulties and come out ahead.

Regarding the 10th Congress (Jose Maria Morilla Caro, Card No 118,870, Simancas Group)

We communists are now very close to the 10th Congress, and conditions are precarious with regard to the consolidation of democracy.

I have been avidly reading, but with some degree of uneasiness, everything having to do with this congress: letters, articles on amendments, and I have been attending group discussions. All of this in a praiseworthy effort to enrich the position papers drafted by our comrades in leadership posts, men who have given more than enough evidence of their enormous political and human stature, with many years of experience and dedication in each and every one of the circumstances under which they were called upon to live.

This does not mean that I am underestimating, much less underrating, those comrades who, like me, make up the rank-and-file, inasmuch as a strong, organized rank-and-file with an inherently communist sense of discipline is the heart of the matter. This is why we have to endorse, one by one, the position papers and the bylaws, in a word, the political line that the party adopted since it became legal.

This is because if we take an objective look at national political realities, in which we are immersed, we have to concede that it will be a long time before the "Red legend" is psychologically banished from our country.

There, proud and defiant, stands knocking at our door the other Spain of A. Machado, the one that is prepared to chill your heart. We are in the midst of the storm, with lightning constantly flashing over our heads. It has been just a few months since 23 February, and it is just a few days until 23 July.

Let us not create problems, let us not cause crises. If someone named Tamames, Lopez or Garcia leaves the party, it is for one reason only: they were never communists, because if the party is still standing after the terrible crisis created by the "crusaders," it is because many men stood fast, while others remained on the Central or the Executive Committee, and many, many people stayed in the rank-and-file in spite of the lengthy "wall of silence and terror" that fascism erected in our country.

All of us sincere democrats making up the political spectrum ought to thank the genuinely Spanish and patriotic man who wants to be the king of all Spaniards and who courageously put an end to the lengthy agony of our struggle in the underground. And just as we support the figure of Juan Carlos, with an eye towards the realities that I referred to before, we must support, honor and endorse each and every one of the directives that the party issues.

Let us once and for all cease engaging in demagogy and pedantic displays that only cause boredom and the departure of good members.

Let us make our groups pleasant meeting places. Let us create conditions to attract young people: sports, literary gatherings. Let us work with and for the party, injecting optimism and realism into our group tasks. These are the views that I would honorably like to express.

Position Paper I: Foreign Policy (Francisco Gonzalez Garcia, Barredos-Laviana Group, Asturias)

This position paper seems to be the most controversial in certain groups, in connection with its criticisms of certain socialist countries and specifically the Soviet Union. I think that it is not all that regrettable. If we realize as communists that constructive criticism is the most positive part of any member, it will enrich his work, and therefore, there is no reason to take such discouraged stands. What is happening in our times in certain parties, which say one thing today and another tomorrow? Years ago our party established a stand on these matters, and no comrade or party organization should be surprised to see our writings find fault with stands such as the ones that have been taken since the Czechoslovakian incident.

I realize that our members have a fondness for the Soviet Union, but this does not rule out criticism of certain courses of conduct that cause tensions at odds with the progress of peaceful coexistence and the independence of any territory and its leadership parties to change their lives without breaking down their support as revolutionaries for the transformation of prevailing systems and even within the countries with socialist methods of production, to apply less narrow procedures under which the workers, who are the hub of development and are interested in achieving higher goals, are forced into molds that are out of step with the times.

Capitalism and imperialism are clearly doing as much dirty work as they can to distort socialist progress and to halt minimum gains in the countries that they rule. However, we cannot close our eyes to this fact: when the workers point out shortcomings and the issues take hold, something is not right. I thus feel that the matter cannot be resolved by employing procedures similar to the ones that imperialism uses; takeovers when those taken over are not in agreement are not advisable. Rather, the latter should come up with solutions and provide helpful solidarity, which has been very constructive, as we have seen in other nations, and which the party has never said anything against.

I thus find this a constructive position paper.

The Dictatorship of the Proletariat Is Only Democracy (Angel Gil Sanchez, Card No 105,059)

Either I do not know exactly what it means to be a Eurocommunist or I do not understand why we call ourselves Eurocommunists.

With regard to the first possibility, I do not think that a clear, official definition has been developed of what Eurocommunism is and what differentiates it from "simple" communism (...)

Neither the position papers of the Ninth Congress nor the papers of the 10th Congress specify this clearly. I do not know whether there is another document in the party that clarifies this, because the only one that presents this

theory is Santiago Carrillo's book "Eurocommunism and State." This, however, cannot be regarded as a party document. It is a work by its secretary general in which he sets forth his political philosophy. Even taking this book as a basis for our political principles, I do not find in it the major differences to divide the international communist movement into "Eurocommunism" and "Leninism."

Let me state things as I see them. Marx "discovered" a fact, namely that some men exploit others. Based on this he developed an outline for resolving the problem and drew up a blueprint for future society. Later on, Lenin and others adapted this blueprint to their specific geographic and temporal conditions. This blueprint is called "scientific socialism" or communism. The future society that we want has been clearly defined; it is a blueprint that we want to put into effect, not a discovery that we have to prove.

This blueprint for society began to be carried out with the first revolutions, but the original plans were not respected; they were modified for one reason or another. The result was a structure that was not depicted in the blueprint. What emerged was a different structure that although having its advantages, also suffers from many disadvantages. We should not call this structure communism, or even socialism, because it is not (...) If communism were always real communism, we would not have to call real communism Eurocommunism.

And here is where we come to the second possibility. Why do we call ourselves Eurocommunists, if not to differentiate ourselves from pseudocommunists? It is from these people that we have to differentiate our policies, not from the original blueprints, which are still valid everywhere.

One of the few points on which we can disagree with the classic blueprint for Marxist socialism is the issue of the dictatorship of the proletariat. But what is the dictatorship of the proletariat but democracy in the most literal meaning of the word? Marx and Lenin acknowledge as much. Let us not confuse this with the manner of implementing it. There are two ways of achieving a dictatorship of the proletariat, a grassroots democracy or, if you wish, a grassroots domination of politics, economics, culture and society in general: by armed revolution or by the ballot box (...) But the fact that we make use of the bourgeois democratic game to achieve power does not mean that we should renounce the preponderance of the people in social, political and economic life that I spoke of previously, because after all this is what dictatorship of the proletariat means to me.

And if I am not right about this, we are contradicting ourselves when we call ourselves Marxists and do not admit the dictatorship of the proletariat, because this, I think, is an essential issue in Marxism.

Let us not allow ourselves to get carried away by what is in vogue at a given moment. We suffered under a dictatorship for many years, and it is to be expected that the word repulses us. But a one-person dictatorship under which a single person or a small group imposes its will on an entire people

is not the same as a grassroots dictatorship under which the people themselves impose on themselves and and other minority groups their way of life, their culture and their desires for the future, and it is in that future that a dictatorship will no longer be necessary.

Let us not confuse the dictatorship of the proletariat with the regimes that exist in the countries of Eastern Europe, where if it existed initially, it has now evolved towards a dictatorship of the party and even towards a dictatorship of a minority within the party.

And to conclude, I think that there are facts that corroborate my doubts. The examples of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, etc show us two possibilities: a) That the sector that wanted or wants the changes is the revolutionary segment of society, in which case the leaders do not represent the will of the people if they do not allow progress in this direction; b) This social sector wants counterrevolution. Why, then, don't the people move to oppose them? Have these peoples lost their ability to respond and do Soviet tanks thus have to shore up their revolution?

On the Basque Country PC and Position Paper VII (Marta Bizcarrondo, Card No 314, Basque Country PC)

For professional reasons I have been out of touch with the party's political problems over the last few months and I therefore did not plan to take part in the discussions prior to the 10th Congress. Nevertheless, I have carefully read the draft position papers and bylaws, as well as the various opinions that have been expressed in MUNDO OBRERO in recent weeks. I had done something similar during preparations for the Fourth Congress of the Basque Country PC, which met late last Junuary. This entitles me to make some observations regarding a number of the opinions that have been expressed, which I think are very debatable.

With regard to the federalization of the party, my impression is that a "centralist" view is taking firm shape, portraying any trend towards federalization as an attempt to break up the party. If unified, consistent action by the working class is more necessary now than ever, they argue, how can we allow the dispersion of forces that autonomy for each of the national parties would entail? I feel that this clarification is indispensable here: the federalization of the party is quite different from a confederated party or a federation of communist parties. It is not a question of each national party going its own way and of our nationwide leadership being a sort of relations committee; rather, the point is to come up with a method of coordination in keeping with the State of autonomies that is in the process of developing. The Communist parties of Catalonia, Galicia and the Basque Country already have to deal with other parties and other problems and they are operating under political subsystems that would cause any uniform policy to fail. A monolithic approach is the leást revolutionary one, in my judgment: it means closing our eyes to the complexities and difficulties of current conditions. In this vein, some comrades speak of "the same oligarchy" exploiting "the same working class." Wouldn't we like things to be that simple!

I was thus surprised at the statements that Ramon Ormazabal, the president of the Basque Country PC, made on this issue from a "priority forum." Since I have not read the second part of his article, I am not familiar with the reasons why he disagrees with the stands of his party's Fourth Congress. But I am almost more worried by the indirect reasons he gives in his article for keeping the national parties on a short leash. If this were the only source that a person had for learning about the politics of Basque communists, he would come away with a bleak outlook. All that we can learn from the Fourth Congress seemingly boils down to an unfortunate sentence about a technocratic management between the Third and Fourth Congresses of the EPK [Basque Communist Party], in other words, since he left the post of party secretary general to become its president. To this Ormazabal adds that "the distressing performance of the PCE-EPK between its Third and Fourth Congresses" is closely tied to its regeneration (although, obviously, he concedes that this is not the only cause of the problem). This enables him to kill two birds with one stone: to voice a negative assessment of the efforts at regeneration that culminated in the Fourth Congress and to apply the lesson as a warning against any change in today's PC. What an odd suggestion from a leader! To proclaim a ban on action so that a person who is short on ideas and is looking for arguments against change in the PCE can find them in the string of misfortunes that has gone down as the "regenerated" and "technocratic" history of the Basque Communist Party.

Furthermore, there are no grounds for this negative assessment. Beginning with the Fourth Congress, we should recall that it was a healthy confirmation of Eurocommunism in the difficult days that followed the PSUC Congress. With regard to the Basque Communist Party's very small political presence, it was that small at the 1977 elections, in other words, before the Third Congress. Since then the party has played a disproportionately large role in comparison to its meager parliamentary strength, by taking the initiative in the struggle against terrorism and for a unity of democratic forces, by pressing for an overhaul of left-wing nationalism and, in a word, by being the only political force that acted consistently against the division of the Basque Country into two opposing communities. This is not even to mention the new image that its leadership succeeded in giving to all of Spain through the mass media, or what is even more important: the prospect of a comeback by the Basque left through a convergence with Euskadiko Ezkerra, the positive results of which are already visible. So then, even if it fails, the bid by the PCE-EPK would have been worthwhile in spite of the obstacles that were placed in its way both inside and outside.

I have made the above assessments with a view towards developing the criteria that can serve as guidelines for the delegates to the 10th Congress, especially with regard to the bylaws and Position Paper VII.

The Reality of Eurocommunism (Jose Lazaro, PSUC councilman, Tarrasa City Hall)

The violent attacks against the word "Eurocommunism" are of no importance because they come only from radicalized minorities that are trapped in the

"ghetto" and in narrow-mindedness, precisely because this is a new approach to pursuing the communist policy in light of the new concept of a revolutionary society within the framework of pluralism (...)

The point now is to achieve socialism by convincing the forces of labor and culture of its superiority and its effectiveness in dealing with the problems that society presents within a framework of wideranging political freedoms. Thus, it is based on this proposition and on the concept of Eurocommunism that we have to ask ourselves what it means to be a revolutionary today. To this end, it is indispensable to thoroughly analyze traditional views, an analysis that ought to enable us to distinguish clearly the difference today between a "revolutionary" and a "reformist" (...)

Our Eurocommunist blueprint is not a recent one. Its beginnings, the result of in-depth analysis, coincide with the national reconciliation policy started in 1956, a policy whose main objective was a rapprochement among the progressive forces that opposed Francoism. It was during the development of this process that the comrades in the Red Flag joined the PSUC, not to compensate for the lack of cadres, as has been suggested, but as a logical outcome of a more realistic policy more in keeping with the times. It bears noting that the validity of our Eurocommunist blueprint has been confirmed by the unfortunate developments in Czechoslovakia in the spring of 1968.

It is groundless to assert that the PCE or the PSUC lacked cadres at the time. It is true that most of the comrades who had made up the cadres were in Franco's jails, but it is no less true that they were being effectively filled in for by other comrades who had a lengthy track record in the party. It also bears mentioning that any lack of cadres, which did not come about, would have had less of an impact on the PSUC if we keep in mind that Catalonia was a haven for all of the comrades who were being persecuted in other nationalities or regions of Spain, comrades who joined the PSUC and took up the grievances that Catalonia had been voicing.

With respect to the exile of our historic figures, which is often referred to in a demagogic and slanderous manner, we must state that there has never been a party as close to its country, as closely linked to the people as the PSUC and the PCE, and especially their leaders, who on the international scene were and are capable and courageous enough to call a spade a spade, regardless of what others might say (...)

It is symptomatic how the capitalist countries of Europe prick up their ears with consternation at all of the remarks and gestures of the leaders of Eurocommunism in light of the abandonment of dogmatic, obsolete positions. But these revolutionary expectations require an in-depth, comprehensive analysis whereby we communists will have to reflect at length so that we can commit ourselves to this energetic investigation of the substance of Eurocommunism. This does not mean that we are retreating from our revolutionary stands nor that we should modify communist foreign policy towards imperialism, whose crisis does not diminish its aggressiveness at all. The plutocracies are

obviously not going to cheerfully allow power to be wrested from them. This is why in view of this situation we should see whether the revolution ought to be the work of a minority or whether, on the contrary, it ought to be based on a broad grassroots consensus, not on the mere isolated single-mindedness of a few small fringe groups out of touch with most progressive left-wing forces, which have nothing to do with the factionalism and language inspired by left-wing cretinism.

But neither the PSUC nor the PCE can pursue our political strategy firmly and with conviction in such a short time, given the prejudices that have hardened over a half century. Therefore, in order to portray an accurate image of what it is and seeks to be, debate and links with the people are indispensable, so that we can remove from people's heads the revolutionary concepts that have been transmitted from generation to generation in our society as a whole. Regardless of how difficult and laborious this shift is, it is absolutely necessary so that most of grassroots public opinion, the working class and the people in general grasp the real truth about Eurocommunism as a tool that offers great potential for surmounting the obstacles that have so far just thwarted the march towards a revolution of the majority within the framework of socialism in freedom, which is the essence of Eurocommunism.

The PCE, Leaning to the Right (Castor Arenas, Card No 70,730, Torrent Group, Valencia)

The position papers published so far are similar to the ones approved at the Ninth Congress. With these papers and with the replacement of Leninism by Eurocommunism, the party has suffered bleeding wounds that it has to stanch politically. Along with these wounds, the leadership of the PCE has been making mistakes, one of which left it leaning to the right, both domestically and internationally, none of which have been explained either to the party or to the working masses.

(...) I think that Eurocommunism means Europe (...) What policy of rapprochement has the party pursued with the Communist parties of Western Europe? So far, with none of them, except the Italian party (...)

I think that the party ought to show more respect for the socialist countries. There might be something about them that is not to our liking, but we have learned a great deal from them (...) and above all, it is thanks to them that several countries have been freed from slavery, and (without them) all of our countries would be subjected to American fascist imperialism (...)

I propose that (the 10th Congress) appoint a new leadership that can rebuild the party so that it can recover its own national personality.

A new leadership that is capable, here and abroad, of correcting all of the mistakes that our party has made so far; that, with or without Leninism, with or without Eurocommunism, is capable of opening the party's doors and

attracting all of the comrades who because they were disappointed, bored and in disagreement with the Eurocommunist policy, left or resigned from the party.

A new leadership that is capable of carrying out what the party's current leadership has been demagogically saying about uniting all Communist parties, all progressive left-wings and reaching a political understanding with all of them to become a political and social force with nationwide representation and with the ability to fight for freedom, democracy and security for Spain.

(...) We must all think things over in light of the upcoming 10th Congress and united we must all shout loudly, very loudly: Long live Jose Diaz! Long live La Pasionaria!

Position Paper IV: the Countryside (Isabel Benito Benito, Tomas Garcia Azcarate, Sol-Cortes-Palacio Group, Madrid)

The proposed text is, in general, confusing, repetitive and has major gaps and unnecessary details as well but does offer some constructive new contributions.

It is repetitive because it refers to the same measures in different sections.

It is confusing because it does not stress, as it ought to, the major guidelines for the policy that our party is proposing. It makes pedantic, groundless assertions, such as in the first paragraph, in which it posits that there is a developed-country agriculture and an underdeveloped-country agriculture. Farming in the United States is not at all similar to what it is in France or Holland, and the same goes for Mali and India.

It goes into unnecessary details. What good is it for a position paper to talk about pulses or combined standards (resistance/yield); this is on page 26. It makes constructive contributions. It discusses the farm foodstuffs problem by placing agriculture in a broader context and it shows a special sensitivity to ecology.

But It Has Major Gaps

--Not a single reference to the burning issue of Spain's membership in the Common Market: measures to be anticipated, adapting our legislation, the sectors and regions to be protected.

--Not a single reference to the impact of the energy crisis on farming, particularly on family farms (EFA).

--Not a single reference to the need for regionalization as a step towards a better life in the countryside.

--Not a single reference to the failure to honor the Ninth Congress' resolution to convene an agrarian conference. If the congress is the party's highest body, then the party is entitled to an explanation of and, if appropriate, to know who is responsible for the nonobservance of this congress resolution.

--The EFA's should be supported not because of their more or less ecological nature, nor because they retain jobs (page 26) but because the people who live on and work the land are natural allies of the working class in its struggle against the monopolies within the progressive social bloc.

--There is no proposal for an administrative reform.

--There is no proposal for early retirement for farmers and no reference to a land pool for settlements of jobless farm workers and for updating EFA's.

The most serious mistake, however, has to do with the issue of expropriations. The party defends three different views.

In its position papers it fails to defend expropriations for social reasons in districts with very high unemployment. It backs the law passed in Parliament with the support of the UCD.

In MUNDO OBRERO it defends expropriation of farms that are more than twice the size of regional or district EFA's. With this it is throwing all medium landowners into the arms of the most reactionary large landed estate sector.

In Parliament, the communist amendment to the Law of Manifestly Improvable Farms clearly distinguished between the most reactionary large landed estate sector, which is subject to immediate expropriation, and the others, who should be encouraged to invest. Any indiscriminate policy in this regard would cause only less investment, more unemployment and more tension.

Which of these three approaches does the party really support?

In short, the only thing that this position paper causes is embarrassment in others because it retreats from the first draft of our party's agrarian program, as in the position paper approved at the Ninth Congress.

Fewer but Better (Jose Vidal, PCE Card No 67,244, PCPV [Communist Party of the Valencian Country] Card No 6,244)

Our party, the PCE, is a political organization that was born to constantly struggle against and do away with all of the prevailing social inequalities that we are still enduring in these complex and turbulent times: unemployment, economic depression, etc (...)

We should begin to realize that if most of our members do not have wideranging information on what scientific communism is and have not read or studied anything about Marxist doctrine, they will be unable to make their way securely amid social struggles, much less amid these unrestrained controversies that are under way at top party echelons and most of which I as a rank-and-file member imagine are being waged for personal reasons (though there might be other motives) so that people can make a name for themselves. Let us cut these controversies short, comrades, and hold a serious, constructive and socially responsible dialog at our upcoming congress.

Our party is said to be in a crisis. Is the PCE really in a crisis? What kind of crisis? Of doctrine? Well, I don't think so. It is the capitalist system that is in a crisis (...)

Let's not try and confuse things. As I see it, after the dictatorship the PCE, let's be truthful, suffered a serious heart attack. We got fat too quickly in terms of our membership and we are now paying the price. And why are we paying the price? Because that mass of members who descended upon us like an uncontrolled flood brought so much confusion and so many problems to local groups that they caused all attempts by our real members to make the organization operate within the PCE's bylaws to fail. The party is there today, but it is not in operation. And it will be even less so because the majority of members, disgusted and disillusioned, have gradually been quitting, and not the ones who flooded in and were not real communists, but rather the ones who were and who still are but have nevertheless had to make this disastrous decision. In light of these regrettable episodes, I think that the PCE has to have some sort of way to monitor party membership. Not everyone who would like to should be allowed in the party, just those comrades who by their conduct and integrity are a clean and clear mirror in which the entire people can look at themselves without shadows. We will have fewer members but we will gain thousands and thousands of sympathizers. If we do this, things might change. Only proven and capable comrades should be members of the party, and thus, with discipline and order, we will be able to guide the working class and the intelligentsia in their social struggle and to see to it that there is conscientious discipline in the PCE, along with democratic centralism, and that Marxism, which is a living, scientific and evolving idea, fulfills its historic destiny.

To Zaldivar and Others, with Feeling (Vicente Llopiz Gonzalez, Concepcion Group, Ciudad Lineal District)

In his article in EL PAIS on the 28th, Carlos Alonso Zaldivar addresses a real problem, spurring party participation in citizen life, but he conceals his actual intention (perhaps I am making a fasle value judgment, but I do not regret it) to change things in a very peculiar way within the party so that outward participation is possible.

It seems to me that with the best of intentions Comrade Zaldivar has done a disservice to the party and made a valuable contribution to the campaign to discredit all parties, including ours, a campaign which, as we all know,

is part of a more wideranging effort that is aimed at the heart of our democracy (...)

Zaldivar spices up his ideas (which have always been quite clear in this regard) about greater party involvement in civic life with a reference (and I am quoting the article) to the danger involved "when democratic parties respond to the criticisms and challenges they receive exclusively in the form of self-defense."

What constitutional parties is Zaldivar referring to? All of them? One in particular? Isn't the PCE, by chance, included among these grassroots parties?

It hardly seems believable that such a remark should come to us from a comrade who has done so much to develop the party's operational and political line, which if it contains anything, does not talk about self-defense.

It seems to me that these public remarks (...) are a reflection of a lack of channels for reaching the grassroots from the echelons of the party in which comrades like him take up all their time drafting policy theory and subsequently disagree with those of us at the grassroots who study, try to assimilate and carry out the policies they have drafted on high.

(...) These theoretical discussions, at times conducted by the superchampions of internal democracy and regeneration and other times by the backers of a party of the "catacombs," have wasted valuable time that we could have devoted to what Zaldivar accurately describes as "the relationship of our organizations with their social environment" (...) The fact is that the comrades who have done all this discussing in a bid to regenerate the party and bring it out of the "ghetto," have taken up so much of our time that they have done exactly the opposite of what they intended. Far from having allowed this time to be devoted to our neighborhoods and everyday problems, they have paralyzed "praxis" for the sake of theoretical speculation and often thus paralyzed the groups themselves.

Lastly (and once again I am making a value judgment that I do not regret), to whom is Zaldivar pointing when he says at the close of his article: "Political leaders who are such because they have achieved genuine authority in society and who do not think they have authority just because they are leaders"?

(...) When we say things as serious as this, the people want dates, details, situations, names! Because otherwise we might confuse them to the point that they would belive that we are all the same: "First among equals," and the "equals," as far as I know, don't matter at all!

Reflections on the 10th Congress (Santiago Alvarez)

We have lately seen an odd attempt to utilize Lenin's stand on currents or factions in the Russian Communist Party to show that he was in favor of them.

What really happened in the party of the Bolsheviks up to the time of their 10th Congress in 1921?

We know that Lenin's concept of the party and of revolution gave way to a constant struggle against opposing concepts. Lenin defended Marxism against populism but also against other currents or views within Marxism that ran counter to it. He fought the "legal Marxists," the "economists," the BUND, the "Mensheviks," Zinoviev and Makenev, "Trotskyism," etc. He fought against all of the deviations of the policy that was supposed to lead and did lead to the triumph of the October revolution and to its consolidation.

It is true that Lenin was very patient in his efforts to keep dissidents in the party and even in its leadership bodies, and very tenacious in his efforts to have the policy that was approved collectively, whether unanimously or by majority, accepted and applied by all, but he was especially vigorous in his defense of what he considered a just political line.

When the currents and factions got to the point of jeopardizing the existence of the party as the leader of the revolution, as well as the revolution itself, Lenin said: Enough!

In the speech with which he opened the 10th Congress of the Russian Communist Party, Lenin said:

"Comrades, we have gone through an exceptional year. We have afforded ourselves the luxury of holding discussions and engaging in controversies within our party. For a party that is surrounded by enemies, strong and powerful enemies that encompass the entire capitalist world, for a party that bears such an unheard of burden, this luxury has indeed been astonishing!"

And he went on to say: "Our task now is to show that regardless of how we allowed ourselves that luxury in the past, rightly or wrongly, we must emerge from this situation."

And he concluded: "Our work must be united, and not just formally, but more cohesive and united than before, and there must not be the slightest hint of factionalism, regardless of where and how it manifested itself up to now; there must be no traces of it. Only on this condition will we fulfill the enormous tasks that await us."*

The 10th Congress ultimately adopted two resolutions: one on party unity and another on syndicalist and anarchist deviations. I have taken the following paragraphs from the former:

"Every aware worker must clearly realize the pernicious and unacceptable nature of any sort of factionalism, which in spite of the desire of the representatives of some groups to maintain party unity, inevitably leads in practice to the shattering of harmonious work and to heightened and repeated

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*Lenin, "Complete Works," Volume 32, pp 160-161, Cartago Publishing, Buenos Aires.

attempts by our enemies to infiltrate the government party's ranks, so as to deepen the divisions within it and utilize them for the purposes of the counterrevolution."

In Point 4 it stresses that "in the practical struggle against factionalism, each one of the party's organizations must with all severity prevent any such manifestation." (op. cit. p 233)

After advising that constructive proposals be carefully examined, Point 5 rejects "on principle, deviation towards syndicalism and anarchism" and entrusts the Central Committee with "totally abolishing all factionalism."

With regard to the resolution on syndicalist and anarchist deviations, two problems are of particular importance:

1. The need for the most energetic measures of ideological struggle and the purging and housecleaning of the party; 2. Confirmation that the above deviations "have been partly due to the party's acceptance in its ranks of former Mensheviks and of workers and peasant farmers who have not yet completely assimilated communist ideology, but are primarily due to the influence of the petite bourgeoisie element on the proletariat and on the Russian Communist Party."

Lenin responded with major proposals to the concerns that arose in the congress's discussions.

He proposed to include in the Central Committee two members of the platforms that were opposed and defeated at the congress, but on the essential condition that the platforms be dissolved, and he responded negatively to those who contended that justice had not been done to the members of the group called "democratic centralism," while at the same time showing great sensitivity to some of their proposals, such as, for example, the need to struggle against bureaucracy.

He explained that they would not make public Point 7 of the resolution, which said that "the congress grants to the Central Committee the power to apply, in the event of a violation of discipline or a reemergence or acceptance of factionalism, all sanctions available to the party, including expulsion from its ranks, and if Central Committee members are involved, they will assume the status of substitutes and, as an extreme measure, will be expelled from the party."

What conclusions can we draw from this experience?

1. First of all, that Lenin showed signs of great revolutionary flexibility, in order to take advantage of all possible "materials" to build the party.

2. That he showed a great deal of common sense in embracing all of the constructive elements of the proposals of the "platforms" to the extent that they could be accepted and assimilated by the party.

3. But, at the same time, he vigorously opposed the organized platforms or factions, inasmuch as they endangered the party and the revolution itself.

These and none others are the historical facts.

The Limitations of Position Paper VII (Javier Varela, Carlos Acero, Chamberi District, Madrid)

We think that Position Paper VII is inadequate for the following reasons:

1) Because it does not analyze the political and organizational roots of the current crisis of Spanish communism, which are: a) the subsistence of an organizational model that emerged from the Third International; and b) the contradiction between the implementation of Eurocommunist policy and the obstacles that the the party's current makeup puts in its way. In light of these two factors, we feel that the 10th Congress's basic task is to overhaul current organizational structures and methods.

2) Because it makes overly negative assessments of the direction of the current political trend, assessments that have been refuted by recent events. The result tends to water down the party's own mistakes into alleged objective impossibilities.

3) Because it attributes too much responsibility for the organization's poor performance to the grassroots organizations and to intermediate cadres. Everything boils down to "erroneous applications" of regionalization, to "inadequate explanations" of our policy or to its "faulty application."

We should not be frightened to admit that our party is going through an emergency situation.

In the first place, we have a situation in which the various sectors of our activities are compartmentalized. To cite the most prominent cases, there is the impression that the communist cadres in CCOO are the ones who formulate union policy and that our councilmen are the exclusive decision-makers on municipal and civic policy. There is an obvious danger of questioning the party's function of coordination and of depriving its organizations of their meaning.

Secondly, there are more than seeds of disintegration among the organizations that make up the PCE, and relations between the PCE and the PSUC are at a touchy juncture. If things continue like this, we are running the serious risk of a fragmentation of the party.

Thirdly, there is the possibility of a split between a sector of leadership cadres and a major part of the communist membership, who do not see the cadres as a logical extension of their concerns and efforts. Rather than generational, this conflict is between political and organizational customs of different eras in the history of the Communist Party.

Fourthly, neither can we hide the problems that stem from the coexistence of greatly diverging political concepts. On the one hand, there are the concepts of a sector of members who have been poorly assimilated politically and who have had no direct experience in the party with the changes that have taken place in our policy in recent years. On the other hand, there are the concepts of the sector that exasperatedly reflects the impact of the social crisis through a political and ideological radicalization.

Fifth, we have to talk about the major social segments that would be hard to bring into the party: young people and women who reject the traditional ways of looking at and engaging in politics; intellectuals and professionals who cannot find room for action among us. These are issues whose resolution is vitally important for an organization that posits the establishment of a historic bloc in which they would be indispensable elements.

Some of the splits and conflicts we are talking about are to be expected in a party with a lengthy and complex history. But inasmuch as much as they have so far not been addressed with the involvement and depth needed, two issues remain particularly unresolved in our recent history. The first, that the disappearance of Leninism from our ideological principles has not been sufficiently translated to the organizational level. And the second, that the adoption of Eurocommunist policy by our party has so far not been complemented by the election of a leadership group that would pursue this approach without ambiguity.

The first issue could be expressed as follows: the varieties of political party organization are not abstract ideals; they are related to the society in which they operate and to the kind of strategy that they develop. This means that we need another kind of party today, another instrument that can make our Eurocommunist blueprint a reality; that the current party is a closed organization that is not very representative of its potential rank-and-file, that is extraordinarily centralized in its decision-making and that is incapable of providing channels for the pluralism within it and of basing its national and sectoral homogeneity on a fundamental political consensus. The party that we need has to open up to social movements, become more participatory, more collective, place greater emphasis on sector policies and find links between the specific organizations that are set up and the regional organizations. Lastly, there must be enough organizational channels so that minorities can express their positions with complete freedom in the party. It does not seem consistent to reject within the party what we acknowledge as rights for the whole of society.

It is from all of the above, not from alleged proselytizing, that our numerical growth and our organizational consolidation will come. In our opinion, this is the only way to achieve party unity in the current context.

The second issue has to do with a turnover among our cadres and leaders. The 10th Congress has to approve decidedly Eurocommunist position papers and bylaws. Any indecisiveness, any step backwards could quickly shatter our political and electoral influence. The leadership teams elected at all

levels until the final session of the 10th Congress should be able to see to it that this policy is pursued. We cannot expect history to be understanding of our current limitations. The course of events requires of us a specific pace of change, which means that we must make the changes that are needed right now.

View on the 10th Congress (Francisco Monge, Card No 141,569, Toulouse, France)

Since its Fourth Congress in Seville in 1932, the PCE has been pursuing a policy of masses, thus becoming the vanguard of the working class and indicating to the workers, to the peasantry, to young people and to women how to struggle along with progressive forces to achieve freedom and wrest numerous advantages from capitalism day after day.

The political strategy formulated at successive congresses was always adopted in accordance with the times in which we lived.

After losing the war, the communists who remained in the country and those who had to seek exile continued and headed up the struggle, reorganized the party, and it is thanks to these men that we have a Communist Party in Spain today.

I do not mean this as a lesson to the younger generations that are among our ranks today, but I would like them to understand that the party belongs to all, and when I say all, I mean young people and veterans alike. I want them to realize that having a Communist Party today cost many tears and a great deal of blood.

When all is said and done, my purpose in addressing all the members of the party is that the upcoming congress, above and beyond differences of opinion, be a congress of all communists, that our party be solid and united to continue its complete respect for democracy and to achieve, through universal suffrage, the victory of socialism in freedom.

A Forced Opinion (Ramon Rodriguez Lechuga, Card No 4,815, PCKE-EPK)

The examination and discussion of the position papers for the 10th Congress of the PCE represents the detonator of the bomb whose fuse was lit even before the last congress of the PCE-EPK was held.

So then, without an in-depth analysis (God help me!) but without beating around the bush and calling a spade a spade, how does this party member, in short, view this big house of our joys and pains at the current moment?

On the one hand, there are those backing the "regeneration," and on the other there are those backing the status quo, who are more commonly known by the friendly name of "bigwigs" [carrozas]. According to the former, once again, naturally, as I see it and summarizing the issue to the utmost, the course to be pursued, the road we have already traveled notwithstanding, is basically regeneration. In passing and without harm meant, this suggests the following question to me, given the average age of our top leaders, which, I understand, is between 25 and 40 (right, esteemed comrades Roberto, Infante, Igueregui,

etc?): How and where are we to seek this regeneration? Obviously, only by getting hold of those test tube babies, who seem to come all prepared, to guide the destinies of our party. Then, in descending order, come federalism, democratic centralism, partially or completely watered down, and as the cornerstone of the great system, a Basque Eurocommunist party (with or without borders?), which inasmuch as the original one, the one that all of us have been building for the last 50 years, has not erred in its political proposals, can unilaterally offer its remains on a silver platter to those who (gracious me!) have just proclaimed that they were the ones who were in the wrong. Such harakiri for the sake of so-called leftist unity has not happened in France, as far as I know...And therefore...the French Communist Party has remained in its place, and the French Socialist Party in its place. This is a lesson to be learned and, above all, not to be forgotten. Lastly, so as not to bore you further with this list, we have been presented, as a fastener for this brilliant brooch, a novelty so unheard of that I frankly don't know whether 90 percent of the party will know what it's all about. I am referring, of course, to the Congress of..."Surenne" (sic). In all humility, "Monsieur, s'il vous plait, there is one "n" too many and two esses missing. As those illustrious socialist leaders of my younger days would say, it has left me perplexed, pensive and agape. But from one rascal to another, I'd bet my dying breath that what they are saying there in plain language is that the party has to do with Santiago Carrillo what is did with Rodolfo Llopis and company. I bet they are!

As for the 25 percent of us indignant Carrillo backers (I insist on including myself, of course) who supposedly have to expelled (I'm not the one who made up this news item), we want to let them know that even before Santiago Carrillo joined the PC, from the days of Bullejos, Adame and Trilla, ever since the firing squad execution of those long forgotten heroes Fermin Galan and Garcia Hernandez, and throughout the republic, which didn't give us rice pudding either, Civil War, the French underground, the exile (of communists, I mean), the concentration camps, the armed struggle in all the theaters of operations in which fascism was fought, the resistance agsinst the German occupation of France, Franco, his generals, his police, the firing squad or simply summary executions of the blood of our blood (if they lifted up their heads!) or with or without legal status, no one, not even the cleverest, has been able to bury us. And those who have that misguided intention now, even if they smear us with perfumed vaseline, I would tell them: Don't waste your time either, gentlemen!

The Influence of the UCD in Our Dejection (Francisco Cordero Bazaga, Card No 136,717, Talavera de la Reina, Toledo)

In my opinion, the slow and contradictory pace of all UCD governments, plus their rightist policies, have been the main reasons for dejection and disillusionment among the working class masses.

The party has made mistakes, but not basic ones. There has been a lack of steady contacts and communication between all levels of leadership and the

grassroots and between the party and the people, explaining what we are doing in Parliament, in city halls, what we are not doing and why we are unable to, thus preventing all of us from being put in the same bag: government and opposition.

The party cannot be strengthened nor mistakes corrected by calling for the ouster of our party's national leaders because they have committed the crime of being veteran members and having taken part in our Civil War, especially when they have shown that they have political vision and revolution integrity. Their political proposals are today being taken up by the PSOE and even by the administration.

We are forging a new kind of party for the democratic path towards socialism, but, I feel, while preserving democratic centralism, which combines internal democracy with unity of action.

I think that the 10th Congress ought to forget about getting caught up in theoretical disquisitions and focus debate on the specific problems plaguing us. Let's not take more time than necessary to debate and pass resolutions, because Spain's problems cannot wait and time marches on.

On Minorities and Opinion Trends (Juan Huder, Card No 108,805, Valdezarza Group, Northern Federation, Madrid)

I am assuming that the PCE's general political line is determined in our congresses, is further refined in the PCE's various conferences, committees and assemblies and is put into practice by the various executives and the PCE as a whole, respecting and enforcing the resolutions of the congress. It is to be expected that different interpretations will arise when the time comes to implement them. In the event of disagreements, the opinion of the majority must obviously prevail, thus becoming the "official line" to be implemented by the executive body of the PCE, which must therefore have a homogeneous makeup. The same does not go for the various central, provincial, etc committees, which do not have to be homogeneous and, in fact, are not.

When majorities and minorities emerge, the freedom of expression of the minorities as such, not just as isolated comrades, must be guaranteed, especially during precongress periods. Therefore, although what is unanimously put into practice is the decision of the majority, the comrades who argued for an alternative that was eventually backed by a minority have the right and even the duty to make their view heard at their party level or party-wide if the matter is an important one.

(...) Therefore, I defend:

1. The homogeneity of executive bodies; 2. The representativeness and proportionality of the other committees; 3. Democratic centralism, insofar as it entails the unanimous application of the majority line and the authority of

higher over lower committees; 4. That minority positions are not "the dirty laundry that has to be washed" or purged, should the need arise, but rather respectable stands that must be discussed; 5. That in order to discuss we must be informed, and not just from one angle; 6. That the best medium of information, in addition to the organization, is a party press that is open to society and to members, not just the ones in the majority; this would enable us to rise above the methods of our internal underground; 7. That we must not confuse an organized faction or tendency (with perhaps its own press, dues and separate organization, etc) with the minorities' right to freedom of expression in the PCE.

What It Means to Be a PCE Activist (Armando Gomez Amador, Card No 133,887, Southern Group, Del Carmen District, Murcia)

Being a PCE activist unquestionably means something more than just belonging to the PCE or carrying a party card. It means action, an aggressive determination to change things, a constant and unwavering struggle for our ideals, discipline and a defense of our party's overall and organizational policies once they have been debated and approved by the majority. Therefore, being a member of the PCE is not easy. It demands determination and courage, thoughtfulness and a critical mind, and an insatiable thirst for ideological enrichment.

An activist is the product of many values and personal courage, of an analysis of and resistance to the distorting and negative factors with which the capitalist system tries to influence us. This demands patience, an avoidance of first-person approaches and hasty, facile opinions, shunning malicious, destructive criticism, and realizing clearly that the only way, the Marxist way, to study and understand the social, political and party problems that are put before us is by discussing and analyzing them at our organizational centers.

To belong does not mean to be an activist, I reiterate. Activists are the party's active and aware strength, the party's conscience, so to speak. They are the core of energy that guarantees that our party will continue as an organization and as a force for change in society. In a nutshell, we could say that without activists there is no party, no Marxist party, that is. This does not mean that I believe or propose that the PCE should confine itself to its activists and exclude or downplay others. Far from it. Members often join the PCE passively, expectantly. They are driven by a desire to belong to the party, but, logically, they are not always clear about their ideas, and their ideological background is rather jumbled. Therefore, activists must represent an example to be followed and a constant stimulus because of their selflessness, thoughtfulness, integrity and political capabilities. I am not talking here about an elitist caste and second-class communists. That would be unthinkable in a Marxist party like ours. Activists and members represent two ways of being involved in the PCE, but they are both communists and both belong to the PCE. In reasoning out goals

and ideals there should be only friendship, candor and generosity of treatment and, above all, the most democratic and absolute equality. That is Marxism. That is how our PCE must be.

Regeneration and Internal Democracy (Jose Maria Romeria, Card No 6,109, Card No 5,982, Santurce)

Agreeing with the essential elements of the conclusions approved by a majority of the PCE-EPK Santurce Group, which we belong to, we the undersigned wish to express our views on a number of issues that are in the forefront on the eve of the 10th Congress.

We have no doubts that regeneration and internal democracy are not overlapping terms; rather, their relationship is dialectic in our internal life and in our party's image in society in its struggle to transform it. Therefore, a regeneration within continuity must avoid a break with our political and ideological thought, enable our finest cadres to take up leadership posts on the basis of their political abilities, not their age, avoid the risk of adventurism and move the party forward towards its goal of becoming an authentic democratic party of the masses.

It is a secret to no one that we have been exerting constant efforts at regeneration, to the point that the leadership elected at our Third Congress, including the secretary general, was more than 60 percent composed of comrades who came from revolutionary nationalism and professional and intellectual sectors, most of them young people who had recently joined our ranks.

One of the major adverse effects of this regeneration was the self-criticism of the Fourth Congress's report, which described our organizational efforts as odd for a revolutionary party. We agree with this assertion from top to bottom, because this method of operation has ingrained habits in the party that have done nothing to reaffirm us as a democratic tool for involvement, far from it. Here are some examples:

--As part of the organizational inconsistency that has been on the rise ever since the Third Congress, leadership functions have obviously been personalized, which entails a real risk of a shift towards personality cults.

--Coinciding with an unmistakable relaxation of democratic centralism, encouragement has been given to postures that are claimed to be "democratic and of free expression" but that have calculatedly and uninterruptedly informed the press of aspects of our internal life, thus sowing uneasiness and confusion among our members, especially since these aspects have not been discussed in our own media.

--If the full and conscientious involvement of all comrades through a boosting of their political level is really tantamount to the development of internal democracy, then attaining this goal through an intensified political debate, not in the abstract but linking it to a surmounting of specific problems, has

not been and is not a concern of our leadership, because their estrangement from the rank-and-file is more than obvious.

We want to make it clear that a regeneration viewed in subjective terms would lead the party into a political abyss and, therefore, to its breakup.

With regard to organizational relations with the PCE, there are comrades who in defending the shift to a federation of parties, argue that Spain today is moving inexorably towards federal structures. This is sheer single-mindedness, because in light of the danger of a political regression that we are faced with, one of the objectives that the ruling class questions the most is the reform of the State's apparatuses, and in this regard the development of the autonomies is one of the most important issues.

They also argue that in its position paper on organization (page 21) our Fourth Congress said that "incorporating federal elements or moving towards a federal party in organizational terms is an open issue in which communists nationwide must become involved." No one denies this. We are, in fact, engaged in such a debate, and whether we federalize or not depends on the conclusions that all of us communists in Spain reach.

But what these comrades do not mention is that on the same page 21, a bit above the quoted paragraph, the paper asserts that "the PCE-EPK feels that the best move in the current situation is to reaffirm itself as a national and class party with full sovereignty in drafting and pursuing its national policy, as well as its forms of organization." It makes little sense to deceive ourselves by playing with words, because it is clear that the substance of this paragraph seriously conditions collective debate by clearly transcending the concept of full autonomy and, furthermore, that the implicit aim is to spur by decree a process similar to what happened in the PSUC with the merger of various parties, which gave it the "status" of an independent party.

We want the PCE-EPK to continue being fully autonomous in formulating its policies in accordance with the specific characteristics of the class struggle in the Basque Country, a continuity that is provided for in the first draft of the bylaws. However, we oppose the theory of full sovereignty, because if we take it to its logical conclusion, it would lead to the breakup of the PCE as a valid tool not only for progress in the development of national freedoms among the various peoples of Spain but also for the triumph of socialism nationwide.

The Functions of the Committees of Guarantees (Teofilo Garcia Lopez, Card No 149,006, head of political training in PCE's CF in the RFA)

In my opinion, the establishment in the bylaws of the Guarantees and Control Committees at the Ninth Congress was well received throughout the party. It was also obvious that initially, given the scant experience in this field, mistakes would be made during the break-in period.

The bylaws that emerged from the Ninth Congress were very clear on these two points:

a) They prescribed the functions of the Guarantees and Control Coordinating Committee and of corresponding lower-level committees, but nowhere did they set forth the points that are not within their jurisdiction; the notion apparently was that this was unnecessary;

b) The decisions of the Coordinating Committee (CCGC) cannot be appealed, and it is answerable only to a party congress.

In other words, in the hypothetical event that it made a decision exceeding stipulated bounds, thus clashing with decisions made by the Central Committee, it would be placed above the Central Committee, which is also chosen by the party congress as its highest political body.

Bearing these premises in mind, let us suppose that at some point a member (or members) of the Central Committee (CC) (to take the most serious case, but one that is a current possibility, not science fiction) disagrees partially or completely with some or all of the policy that the CC is pursuing and acts in accordance with his political views both inside and outside the party (we should recall that Lenin was in the minority several times and acted in accordance with what he thought was right). This comrade (or comrades) would not normally be subject to sanctions. But what if the CC, observing strictly political criteria, decides to expel him from the party, and the CCGC rules that the comrade's political views are correct and that there is no ground for expulsion? The CCGC would thus become the party's supreme leadership body, taking over the functions of the CC.

It is noteworthy, however, that the new bylaws (Article 52) include a brand-new paragraph that to some extent reflects my concern, in connection with the Finance Control Committee (up to the provincial level). It reads:

c) To analyze whether the committee is pursuing a sound financial policy and to suggest ways to improve it.

Why isn't this paragraph included in connection with the CCCF? Let us once again assume that the CC, based on exclusively political criteria (legislative, municipal elections, etc) decides to make an economic investment that the CCCF later deems politically improper. There is no mention of "suggesting" in this case either (which dampens the problem quite a bit). The committee can simply dispense with "suggesting" and rule outright, which would obviously create the same situation as we saw above.

I am not proposing any amendment; I would just like the committee that debates the bylaws at the 10th Congress to reflect on this omission and keep it in mind.

Ideology as a Weapon of Struggle (Manuel Tellado Garrido, PCE Card No 036,942, PCE Card No 021,942, Huelva)

Now that we are in the midst of debate on our congress, we must all realize that ideology is above all awareness and that awareness means struggle, dignity, principles and revolutionary morale. Ideology is also a weapon of struggle against all that is poorly done, against weaknesses, privileges, immoralities. The ideological struggle is the front line of combat, the lead revolutionary trench for all revolutionaries today.

A communist must be an unyielding fighter, convinced of the insurmountable justice of his cause, studious, hardworking, demanding, profound and completely devoted to his people. The party exists only by and for the people. Bureaucratic methods and the spirit of the petite bourgeoisie are totally alien to its principles. Close and indissoluble ties must exist among the cadres, activists and the people, based mainly on example and the trust that a revolutionary lives and dies for his people.

Authoritarianism, demagogy, self-satisfaction, vanity and irresponsibility are inconceivable in a communist. A brotherly and humane spirit must be one of his basic traits. And above all there is his internationalist awareness, which does not rule out the most deeply felt patriotism. A communist must bear in mind, however, that the homeland comes before the individual and that mankind comes before the homeland.

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CSO: 3110/142

CARRILLO DELIVERS CENTRAL COMMITTEE REPORT TO PCE CONGRESS

Madrid MUNDO OBRERO in Spanish 28 Jul 81 pp 13-40

[Text] On Saturday 25 July, by a vote of 94 for, none against and 17 abstentions, the Central Committee of the PCE approved the following report of the secretary general, Santiago Carrillo, to be submitted at the 10th Congress. The Central Committee also approved the names of its members who will sit on the position papers and bylaws committees. The draft regulations and program for the 10th Congress and the nominations for officers and president, which were also approved by the Central Committee, were debated and rounded out on Monday evening at a meeting with the chairmen or heads of the delegations attending the congress. At this plenary meeting, the Central Committee resolved, by a vote of 112 for, 2 against and 2 abstentions, to exclude Francisco Garcia Salve, a decision that was ratified that same day by the Central Commission of Guarantees and Control. The 10th Congress will close on Friday the 31st in the assembly room at Quevedo Theater.

The Party and the World Situation

As the 10th Congress opens, the world political situation in which our country finds itself is reason for serious concern. The danger of conflicts and war is on the rise; serious tensions exist; a disturbing arms race is under way. If there is no change in international politics, Europe is headed towards an unreal buildup of nuclear devices that augurs nothing good. Areas of friction in other regions of the globe persist and are even on the increase.

The enormous resources earmarked for the research and development of new weapons are diverted from the efforts needed to overcome the backwardness and underdevelopment of extensive areas and to attempt to resolve the grave injustices and inequalities that prevail even in the developed countries.

The policy of military blocs; the meddling, if not open intervention, in the domestic affairs of other countries; the lack of solidarity that sometimes characterizes even States that share a common social system; the growing role of force and power in world relations, are a real threat to mankind's present and future.

And amid this entire accumulation of negative factors there is the phenomenon of the alienation of a large segment of world public opinion, an alienation that stems from the gap between public opinion and the narrow, closed circles that actually decide world politics and that wield power. A typical example of this is the Conference for Cooperation and Peace in Europe, which has been going on in Madrid for several months now unnoticed by the public. The public does not know for sure what is going on at this conference and has the impression that the delegates to it are whiling away their time waiting for the big powers to make decisions in places far from Madrid.

Alienation also arises because news reports are doctored, because any everyday event is blown all out of proportion while events and decisions that are of basic importance to the fate of all are relegated to a minor status or remain unknown, and because the prevailing way of life itself and, moreover, the consequences of the world crisis and its repercussions on each country divert attention towards individual, group and parochial problems, not towards the world context of which they are part.

Over these years, the party's leadership has devoted attention to the problems of world politics because it considered them of decisive importance to our own country. Nevertheless, we have to admit that we have not succeeded in getting the party as a whole, much less public opinion, interested in them, except in partial aspects. There has been a great deal of discussion in our party about the occupation of Afghanistan, for example; we have undertaken actions of solidarity with the Nicaraguan Revolution, the Polisario Front and other liberation movements. Fortunately, internationalist solidarity is a sentiment that is very much alive and deeply rooted in the PCE's entire tradition.

But the results of our political and ideological efforts to bring about an understanding of the dangers of the policy of blocs and of the need to transcend it are still not satisfactory; we still often hear the view that blocs are an inalterable reality and that ultimately we have to choose the one that seems ideologically closest to us.

This idea is tied to a memory of the past that associates world wars with revolutionary solutions, thus overlooking the fundamental fact of this era: that the terrifying destructive power of modern weapons, as Engels anticipated in his "Anti-During," means that a world war today would cause not revolutionary crises but rather collective holocausts that could destroy both the oppressor and the oppressed classes.

This outlook, which is still deeply rooted, weakens our ability to struggle for peace and encourages a certain tendency to utilize the struggle for peace as a tool for supporting actions by blocs rather than as an end in itself, on which the entire future of our communist ideals depends. In this regard, the idea that the class struggle on the international level manifests itself today in the confrontation between the two blocs and not in efforts to dissolve them and cleanse world relations of their threatening presence, represents a fatalistic acceptance that class contradictions are going to be resolved through the destruction of classes (a possibility that the

"Communist Manifesto" cautioned us about), not through the socialist transformation of society.

This outlook does not contribute either to an effective struggle against Spain's membership in NATO. Our opposition to NATO does not stem from any leanings towards the Warsaw Pact. We therefore decline to link our campaign to others whose tone might give that impression.

Our opposition to membership in NATO is based on our conception of Spain's national interest (and I underscore "national interest" because in our judgment, the issue transcends left-wing, right-wing or centrist positions and can be placed in that collective sphere) and on our policy against blocs and for peace.

From the standpoint of the national interest, the government has still not given a single serious argument to back up its desire for membership. Spain was neutral in the two world wars this century; it makes no sense to argue that it could not be in a third world war. Those who say that the armies that would occupy Europe would not stop at the Pyrinees and respect our neutrality fail to mention that if this were in fact to happen, they would respect it much less if we were members of NATO and that in the latter event we would have already suffered nuclear annihilation, which would make the defense of our territory impossible.

In any case, the question is not whether we have to take part in a third world war or not; the point is that Spain should help prevent one, and it can do this better outside rather than inside NATO. In itself membership would be harmful to peace because it would upset the current strategic balance. Enlarging NATO with Spain is an invitation to the Warsaw Pact to restore the balance by bringing in new members. In this interplay of moving pieces forward on a chessboard, the blocs would wind up in checkmate. This is an extremely dangerous game for peace and, of course, for Spain.

The Italian, French and, I think, Portuguese Communists agree with their countries' presence in NATO precisely for this reason of the strategic balance, as long as there is no possibility to dissolve the blocs.

It is quite extraordinary that hurdles are being placed in our path towards joining the European Community while the doors of the Atlantic Alliance are being opened wide to us, that we are being offered the chance to station Spanish troops in the FRG while we are hampered from marketing our farm products in Europe.

Our relative military technological weakness is no reason to join NATO either. For example, the fact that we do not possess nuclear weapons ought to induce us, if anything, to work for a nuclear weapon-free Europe or at least for as much of a reduction as possible of the atomic weapons deployed on our continent, both in the West and the East.

A truly national and independent Spanish diplomacy would have to strive for this aim, because the dangers of a spread of nuclear missiles throughout our

continent must not be concealed from anyone. This would help to guarantee the security of only the United States, not Europe, because in this event nuclear war would be waged on European territory, while the United States might avoid being affected, just as it was not directly affected by either of the previous world wars, which when all is said and done, enabled the United States to heighten its hegemony over the West as a whole.

The desire to join NATO is even more reprehensible if we keep in mind the obvious need to stabilize Spain's democracy. The NATO issue would further divide Spaniards, add a new factor of fragility and instability to the nation's situation and set constitutional forces at odds when their cooperation is indispensable for consolidating change.

In the past we have striven to put the issue on ice, and if possible we will keep trying. When all is said and done, this is such a grave decision that it cannot be made by just a parliamentary majority. The Spanish people must be consulted in a referendum; it is a question of no less than their independence and their very existence

We are glad to see that the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] has taken a stand close to ours on such a fundamental problem. In reality, the possibility of preventing such a grave absurdity rests to a great extent in its hands and in the hands of the parties of the Socialist International that govern several European countries, and it is to their solidarity that we must appeal in the event that the UCD [Democratic Center Union] government refuses to consult the Spanish people in a referendum before making such a compromising decision.

We have said that the world situation is serious and disturbing. We are in the midst of an economic crisis that is at the same time a crisis of civilization. The new "status" of many Third World countries that produce raw materials and that have rebelled against neocolonialist exploitation has shattered the economic relations that have prevailed since the Second World War and has thrown the system that predominates in the Western countries severely out of balance, thus giving the current crisis lasting characteristics. This factor, along with the development of production forces and technological gains, is causing rising unemployment and business failures, which further rends the social fabric. There are alarming numbers of young people who are in danger of becoming lumpen proletariat and socially maladjusted, and maladjusted not in relation to the current type of society but in relation to their own class status.

Traditional methods are unquestionably no longer valid in dealing with this crisis. Radical changes are required in socioeconomic structures, from the standpoint not only of class but also of the subsistence of any sort of social life. And these changes must be in the direction of socialization and world solidarity.

Faced with this objective requirement, all conservative forces are rallying in an effort to prevent a solution to the crisis from leading to more just

and egalitarian forms of society. They are even trying to create a psychosis of resignation to the possibility of a nuclear war. Periods of major food shortages are announced when allocating just some of the enormous resources being spent today on the arms race would enable food production to be boosted in extensive areas that today lie unproductive, which would lead to well-being.

The most decisive task for all sincerely progressive forces is to bring about a sweeping change in world politics by reorienting it towards peace, gradual disarmament, cooperation and a new world economic order. We have to see to it that the world prepares for peace instead of for war, as is the case today, and this clearly demands that the doors between States be open, that communications among peoples be smooth and that there be fully guaranteed control of armaments.

To this end, in what would be a new cultural, political, economic and social renaissance, Europe can and must play a very important role by developing an autonomy vis-a-vis the two major powers that it lacks today.

The need for such autonomy is obvious even in the economic sphere. The monetary and trade policies being pursued by the Reagan administration offer Europe little hope for the near future if it does not join forces and really initiate its own policies in all areas.

The outcome of the French elections offers a hope. The election of Mitterrand, the victory of the Left, the formation of a government with Communist involvement and the adoption of a PSF-PCF platform, whose planks we could support, could mark the beginning of change.

We must unreservedly salute Francois Mitterrand's courage in telling U.S. officials that the French people, not the United States will decide on the makeup of the French Government and whether or not to appoint Communist ministers.

This is a lesson of national dignity and political consistency that we must acknowledge in a man who by his stands has perhaps become the most important leader of the European Left today.

If Italian Christian Democracy is on the decline, as a wide range of opinion media in that country concede, perhaps the main, if not only, reason is its rejection of the historical compromise that has thwarted the workings of the country's democratic institutions and that has caused it to lose prestige as a future force.

The hope kindled in France seems capable of spreading to other countries. It is significant that for virtually the first time the votes lost by the Christian Democrats in Italy have gone not to the MSI [Italian Social Movement] but to the Left; that in Greece there is a chance that PASOK will win the upcoming elections; that the Communist Party in Cyprus came in first in the latest electoral contest, and that in Great Britain, in spite of the Social Democrat splinter group, the Laborites are winning the by-elections in London.

As far as Spain is concerned, the Left might make progress at a future electoral contest. This would make possible the formulation of a more consistent and progressive foreign policy than the one being pursued by the current administration, a policy geared towards bringing about real change in the world.

In recent talks with Italian comrades, we have considered the need for the forces of the Left and of progress in Europe to relaunch joint initiatives for action in dealing with world problems, including, obviously, the crisis and its socioeconomic impact, the arms race and the dangers of war.

Such initiatives would require more ongoing cooperation among the Communist parties of Western Europe, which would have a very specific role in them. Although some steps were taken in this direction, such as the Brussels meeting, in our judgment the lack of continuity in cooperation among the Communist parties in this region is a handicap that has weakened communist influence and moves in Europe, which to be effective must also be autonomous.

In this regard, we intend to work increasingly actively to achieve what we agreed upon with the then secretary of the PSF, Francois Mitterrand, at our meeting in Madrid in May 1980. I recall that in the communique released on that occasion we concurred on "the usefulness and importance of conducting a dialogue and developing affinities among the parties that belong to the European labor movement." On the occasion of that meeting Mitterrand told the press: "We have repeated what we had already said separately about the usefulness of having initiatives and encounters among all of the representatives of the European labor movement, from the Scandinavian countries to the Mediterranean, so that the European labor movement regains a dynamism that will, nevertheless, enable each of us to preserve our personality: Socialists, Communists, Social Democrats, Laborites."

If this was necessary in 1980, it is even more so today, and this would afford Europe the possibility of regaining an autonomous role for itself in world politics.

And as we are aware of the role that Europe played in the colonial structures of the past, we must hasten to assert that Europe today can have an impact on the rest of the world as long as it views its role in a diametrically opposite manner. In other words, Europe should support the cause of real liberation and independence for the peoples of the Third World, their economic development, the surmounting of the enormous gaps between North and South. Europe would have to support things like the Nicaraguan Revolution, the struggle of the Salvadoran people, freedom for the people of the Sahara, the creation of a Palestinian State. Europe could help liberation movements to unfold and underdevelopment to be overcome within a framework of real independence for each nation, without being pawns in the struggle between blocs. In other words, the role of Europe today should be exactly the opposite of the one it played during the colonial period and the one that some European nations, under the influence of bourgeois parties, are still tempted to play.

Our proposal for Europe's role does not mean that we are underestimating other countries. In this vein, we feel that the role of the UN has to be reassessed as the body that encompasses the nations of the earth as a whole. And as far as the Socialist countries are concerned, we Spanish Communists feel that a specific proposal from them, not a mere general statement of intentions, a specific and precise proposal from the Socialist countries to move towards a dissolution of military blocs and to close down overseas bases in accordance with a realistic and reasonable timetable, would be a most important contribution to efforts for a change in world politics and for the consolidation of peace.

The Transition Period and the Party's Policy

I would now like to discuss political developments over these 4 years.

In a modern State, a radical break with a fascist dictatorship has taken place only when foreign armies have lent their support (the case of Europe in the Second World War) or when there has been a crisis of unity in the Armed Forces and part of them rose up against the dictatorship (the example of Portugal).

Neither of these developments has taken place in Spain, nor were such developments foreseeable. When there has been talk of a democratic break, no one meant a radical break with the State apparatus, but rather the possibility that a mass movement would make possible the establishment of a provisional government whose actions would not be conditioned by former legislation. I think that this is expressed quite clearly in our texts from the years prior to the change, when we proposed the "Pact for Freedom," and even in the planks of the program that we proposed to the provisional government. The following are the essential points of potential common ground that the Spanish Communist Party has been stressing:

1. A broad-coalition provisional government.

2. Total amnesty for political prisoners and exiles.

3. Political freedoms without discrimination.

4. Recognition of the specific national character of Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia through the provisional application of the autonomy statutes put into effect or approved at plebiscites during the 1930's. Autonomy for the regions.

5. Free elections for the Constitutional Cortes, which will decide Spain's future political system.

We did not expect either that the establishment of this government would mean a break with the hegemony of the bourgeoisie. The hegemony of the bourgeoisie can only be diminished through the process of consolidating democratic change and will disappear only when we have at least a politicosocial democracy.

I say this because in our discussions confusion often arises between the concept of the democratic break and a radical transformation of the State and hegemony. Thus, the fact that there has not been a break is blown out of proportion, leading to the conclusion that the party has lost under democracy the dominant position that it had in the anti-Franco opposition. This is confusing different categories and lapsing into the most unrealistic subjectivism.

To begin with, I think that if we want to make an objective judgment of what the anti-Franco resistance was, we would have to clarify that it comprised, in one manner or another, a minority of the Spanish people, never a majority. When people mention the dominant role of the PCE in the opposition, they are talking about the role of Communists among a minority, albeit the most aware and dynamic minority in society. That minority could have radically transformed itself into a majority if change had been triggered by a revolution. When it took place through a reform based on the previous legal order, that radical change in public opinion did not come about. And we Communists maintained our influence and even boosted it with the two million votes we won in 1979.

The strategy that we developed subsequent to the proposal of a national reconciliation, which emerged after the Pact for Freedom, was a long-range approach to be pursued over a prolonged period of time. It was based on a recognition of this fact: the impossibility of radical revolutionary change during the historical period in which we were in, with a society in which the memory of defeat in the Civil War was a decisive factor and caused broad working class segments to remain passive even though they were inclined towards democracy, a society in which, furthermore, 40 years of dictatorship coincided from the 1960's on with a capitalist boom that spurred the creation of areas of relative well-being (compared with the past), without wideranging collective linkages, and engendered a lack of solidarity, a disregard of major national problems and narrow professional interest groups.

Basically, the party is pursuing the strategy it charted and is trying to influence the process of reform so that its results approximate the ones that a democratic break would have yielded.

Let's not kid ourslves. Even if the democratic break, just as we conceived it, had taken place, we would still be facing most of the problems we have today: a State apparatus inherited from the previous regime, with its well-known drawbacks; the economic crisis and its social consequences; the home rule issue and, probably, terrorism. The difference is that with the break the party would have done much better at the polls and, therefore, had greater influence on political decision-making.

These problems exist, I insist, not because there was no democratic break. In this regard, I would point out that in the 1930's, when there was a democratic break with the previous regime, there were manifestations of discontent just a few months after the republic was proclaimed, and that disenchantment in the wake of a political change is not unique to this period or this country.

According to objective laws, there are periods of regression amid major movements of change, and we should not forget that after the republican democratic break in 1931, the Right was again victorious in 1933 and initiated the so-called bleak biennium.

In those days my generation also saw the exodus and abandonment of those who felt cheated and who hesitated in light of an uncertain future. It is perhaps for this reason, not because of insensitivity, that we are troubled less by certain adverse developments at the current juncture and their impact on the group of forces promoting change and on our party itself.

The Policy of Democratic Concentration

After overcoming the obstacle posed to us when change occurred through reform instead of a break, in other words, the attempt to keep us on the sidelines by outlawing us, our party has gradually adapted its tactics to the strategy it developed long before.

We have to state that ours has been the only Spanish political party that has theorized political change while keeping in mind its characteristics and difficulties. Our weakness has perhaps been that this theory development has remained at the leadership level instead of encompassing the party as a whole, especially since the time that we became a legal party again and our numerical growth outstripped our previous makeup.

From the beginning we confronted events with an awareness that Spain was entering a lengthy transition period in which the shift in the balance of power towards the working class and the forces of labor and culture as a whole was not going to be easy.

At the 1977 elections we became even more clearly aware that changing the balance, above all for our party, was going to be extremely difficult.

The policy of democratic concentration was and is a logical outgrowth of our strategic line. This policy did not entail an abandonment of the class struggle (Lenin did not renounce the class struggle either when in 1905 he advocated the worker party's participation in a government with bourgeois forces and was opposed from apparently leftist positions by the Menshevik wing of Russian Social Democracy).

The policy of democratic concentration aimed and aims at winning segments of power for the working class, thus reducing the hegemony of the oligarchy, at reversing the balance of power and thus assuring a more progressive orientation.

Furthermore, this policy coincided with the objective need to consolidate democratic change.

Two factors have prevented this policy from being fully implemented.

One, the desires of the oligarchy, imposed through its influence on the UCD and on the State apparatus, desires bolstered by American pressure.

Two, the policy of the PSOE, which initially wanted to swamp us on the Left and later voiced excessive moderation to vie with the UCD for the middle-of-the-road vote, while believing until last 23 February that the Far Right's threat to democracy was not as serious as it has been shown to be.

Nevertheless, the objective need for the policy of concentration has been a permanent factor all these years and has forced us to adopt substitute formulas that have not always been successful but that we found it difficult to reject.

One of these formulas was the much reviled Moncloa pacts. I believe there is no need now to detail their content; they involved a major modernization of our politicoeconomic structures. If I had to do it all over, I would sign them again, but this time without the euphoria that we felt in seeing our party, whose legalization was refused just a few months before and that had only 20 deputies, appear before public opinion as the political architect of the first major government agreement after the change.

Did we have every guarantee that they would be complied with? Obviously not, but there is no prior guarantee that any political pact will be complied with. We knew that the employers association was against them; we were not unaware that the PSOE signed them without enthusiasm and with the intention of utilizing their nonobservance in its competition with the UCD. But even so we had to sign them so that we could try to see to it that they were complied with and, ultimately, to utilize their nonobservance against the people responsible for it, thus capitalizing politically on a defense of their progressive elements.

The first union elections after the Moncloa pacts were a triumph for the CCOO [Workers Commissions], which had gone out on a limb to defend them, as the outcome was not the same as in the general election, contrary to what other forces were hoping. In other words, the working class did not reject the pacts, in spite of the shortcomings in our explanations and the demagogic campaign waged from leftist positions.

What, then, were our real mistakes in connection with the Moncloa pacts?

I mentioned one of them in passing in referring to the euphoria that overcame us at the time of the signing. Nevertheless, we announced at the time, with a probably not too happy look, that if anyone cheated, we would tear up the cards. And I say with a probably not too happy look because after all this was a question of preserving and consolidating our democratic institutions, and we not in the mood to tear up the cards.

And the fact of the matter is that in April 1978 we spoke out in Parliament and said that the administration was not complying with the pacts. And we have been saying this ever since.

We must criticize ourselves because these denunciations, as well as other facets of Communist efforts in Parliament, did not strike a responsive chord in the street, among the masses. This has been one of our weaknesses.

But I think that the main cause of this weakness was that we Communists, instead of acting as a bloc, pointing the finger at the people who were failing to comply with the pacts and claiming for the party the merit of being faithful to our signatures, split up into those who justified the signing of the pacts and those who challenged it. This is something that the party will have to overcome if it wants to bolster its influence on society: its insufficient political homogeneity, an issue that I will discuss in detail later on.

We probably could have tried to go farther in rallying the masses. But if assess the situation at that time objectively, a major mass rally, had one been possible, would have set us at odds with the government and even with the PSOE and the UGT [General Union of Workers], which also bore their responsibility at a time when an effort was being made to draft the constitution.

The drafting of the constitution was a fundamental act in the political change. The party took an active role in this, and the constitution enshrined the broadest political freedoms, established the autonomies and paved the way for structural economic changes. It is a code under which the Left could govern the country. Now, of course, the problem is to develop and implement it. But it is a fundamental starting point for the development and intensification of democracy. The Spanish people began to clearly realize its value after last 23 February. Regardless of how events develop in this country, we Communists will proudly wear the title of having been among the architects of the constitution approved in 1978.

The method of consensus used in drafting it was not the best. We Communists had previously proposed a clear-cut constitutional pact; we did not secure one, and the consensus was another substitute for the policy of concentration.

There were many criticisms of the consensus from the Left and the Right. But thanks to the consensus we drafted a democratic constitution that for the first time recognized the existence of nationalities. Because of the diversity of political forces involved in drafting it, compromise and mutual concessions were indispensable, as well as negotiations inside four walls.

We are in favor of openness and reporting, but in politics this method will never replace the practice of initial, private overtures and trial-and-error among parties to lay the groundwork for an accord.

We are in favor of assembly debates, but this will never take over the role of elected, responsible political leaders in making necessary political decisions at a given juncture.

The campaign against the consensus during the drafting of the constitution was unfair and and was not beneficial to democracy; on the contrary, it jeopardized it.

After 23 February, many of the people who lightheartedly criticized it realized their mistake.

This, however, is the bottom line on the party's policy: at the 1979 elections, which were held against our wishes, the PCE was the only party that gained votes in absolute terms, around 300,000, whereas the other parties lost votes. And this was in a campaign in which pressures for a two-party system were stronger than ever and in which some people were hoping that the PCE would be wiped out.

The outcome highlighted that the policy of the PCE, which had no immediate chance for power to automatically attract the so-called useful vote (on the contrary), was recognized and appreciated by a segment of the electorate that had not voted for us in 1977.

The Municipal Pact of the Left

The 1979 elections and the position of UCD marked a change, a turnabout in the policy towards the Right. In his inauguration speech, Suarez proclaimed the end of the consensus and the UCD's intention to pursue its program and to govern alone, even though it was in the minority and even though he had won an absolute majority as president thanks to some strange deals, an unstable, constantly threatened majority.

This turn to the right coincided with a situation in Europe in which the Right was also predominant and in which the crises in our country were worsening. The UCD administration has not offered solutions to the problems of unemployment, which is increasing every day, has not headed off the ruin of small and medium business, and has not been able, in pratice, to tackle the problems of agriculture.

With regard to the development of home rule, no sooner had the UCD promised that under Article 143 it would immediately grant the same levels of autonomy as under Article 151 than it tried to curtail the jurisdictions of the historic nationalities and committed whopping mistakes in connection with the Andalusian autonomy that forced it to recant; and no sooner had it made its promises than it retracted them, thus helping to create the impression that the government's home rule policy was marked by a certain degree of anarchy, which the Far Right took advantage of to instill the idea in some sectors that the unity of Spain was breaking apart.

In spite of the grandiloquent statements by successive interior ministers, the UCD administration has obtained very meager results in its moves against terrorism, while citizens have felt increasingly unsafe and the democratic system has seemed more and more unstable.

To offset the UCD administration's turn to the Right, the PCE, on the day after the municipal elections, took the initiative of proposing to the PSOE the pact that would bring the Left into power in cities, where 70 percent of Spanish citizens live. The pact has not enabled us to draw up a

joint government program in all municipalities, which, together with existing legislation and the lack of funds, has made running the cities more difficult.

Nevertheless, a general assessment of leftist city governments shows the positive results we have achieved, the existence of honest, clean government, efforts to improve the quality of life and a desire for openness, even though we have not always found ways to fully acquaint the people with our city hall activities and with the shackles that current legislation still places on municipal government capabilities.

In any case, as of the municipal elections, the rapprochement and cooperation between Communists and Socialists entered a more favorable period that was also marked by frequent agreement in parliament, which, however, we did not manage to translate into a joint, mass effort, except on very isolated occasions.

Seeing themselves as a government alternative, our Socialist comrades, moved by a desire to attract part of the bourgeois, centrist electorate, refused to accord our joint efforts the intensity and continuity that we Communists judged necessary to make the Left more influential in Spain so that it could become the hub of a policy of democratic concentration and progress.

I think that until 23 February our Socialist comrades were unaware that the conditions for an exclusively leftist government, even on the basis of the autonomous project that excludes the Communists, which they repeatedly say they advocate, are not yet ripe in our country.

In discussions of the Workers Statute and in the AMI [Framework Collective Bargaining Agreement] negotiations, the Socialists acted out of a desire to portray themselves to businessmen as a party that if it came to power would not jeopardize their interests. The PSOE, which has been increasing its contacts with economic circles, obviously wants to gain support from the ruling classes in some cases or to neutralize them in others. The Social Democratic temptation is present in this approach.

Something of a crisis thus arose in political and trade union relations. We Communists opposed the Workers Statute essentially because it opened the doors wide to mounting unemployment, as confirmed by what has happened since then, in spite of the optimism of the labor minister, who during those discussions announced the creation of 1,000 jobs a day. And we supported the stand of the CCOO Confederation in the AMI talks.

The Socialists think that once the UGT becomes the only negotiator, with the approval of the government, business and the mass media, its union organization is going to grow stronger, above all if the CCOO reacts by moving towards more radical stands that are out of touch with the great working masses that are being hard hit by the crisis.

The party is helping to see to it that this move does not take place and is striving to dampen the consequences of the frictions in the union sphere by maintaining its unified stand.

We Communists oppose the Social Democratic temptation beckoning the PSOE and offer instead the idea of an understanding on the Left to pressure the government into pursuing an effective policy to combat what we regard as our number one problem: unemployment.

We still feel that it is not in the workers' interests to have a continuation of the UCD policy, which responds to the demands of the CEOE [Spanish Confederation of Business Organizations], or to wait until 1983 for a problematical PSOE victory; rather, it is in their interests that we immediately formulate an effective policy for dealing with unemployment and the crisis, which in practice has to be the outcome of an agreement among parties (including the ruling party, of course), unions and employers, in other words, in a nutshell, a policy based on the principle of democratic concentration.

We approach the problem of rationalizing the autonomy process from the same starting point. The Central Committee Plenum of 3 February 1980 passed a proposal in this regard suggesting methods, timetables and an autonomy map and advocating a State pact among the constitutional parties to resolve the issue.

This is why we took part in the negotiations with the government to correct the mess that it had made of the Andalusian autonomy, and we did so after joint action in Andalusia with our Socialist comrades that met with success.

In a way, through city government efforts and the autonomy issue we are striving to overcome the frictions that have arisen with the PSOE in connection with the Workers Statute and its consequences.

Our support for the PSOE's motion to censure the Suarez administration also has its place in this approach. Due to its parliamentary strength, the PSOE clearly played a leading role in debate on the motion. We felt that Comrade Felipe Gonzalez's presidential candidacy gave the censure motion testimonial, propagandistic overtones, because he knew in advance that he was not going to obtain an absolute majority. On the one hand, however, it was a timely occasion to attack the UCD rightist policies and, on the other, to show the country the image of a Left united in favor of a policy change in a more progressive direction. And in this debate the UCD's attempt to keep the PCE out of the democratic parliamentary workings was invalidated.

The UCD's clearly rightist economic and social policies, its ambiguity and inconsistencies in implementing Section VII of the constitution, and its ineffectiveness in dealing with terrorism gnawed away at the administration and eventually triggered tremendous divisions in the centrist party and isolated Prime Minister Suarez.

Suarez's resignation has still not been clearly explained; we do not know what last-minute pressures might have hastened it. But if it is true that from the Left we had to censure and denounce his administration policies, it was the Right, which never forgave him for his role in the transition, that finished him off.

The Appointment of Calvo-Sotelo and the Coup D'Etat

The appointment of Calvo-Sotelo to replace Suarez seemed in February to be a result of rightist pressures. His inaugural speech and his responses during the debate made this evident. That is why most Spaniards were very surprised by the coup headed by Lieutenant Colonel Tejero and Lieutenant Colonel Milans del Bosch and supported by General Armada.

With the 23 February coup against a right-wing government, this country's politicians finally became convinced of the fragility of our democratic institutions, thus proving us Communists, who were aware of it ever since change began, to have been in the right.

The fact is that the coup almost succeeded and that the professional solidarity of the Armed Forces caused broad segments of them to remain passive vis-a-vis the coup plotters. The king's resolve and the obedience that the overwhelming majority of the military commanders showed him saved the constitution that night.

Since the danger of a coup has not vanished and since we can still detect conspiracies and are witnessing a campaign against our institutions, including the crown, a number of opinions bear hazarding as to what would have become of Spain had such a coup been successful.

Even if a dictatorship thus imposed tried to establish itself through brutal repression, its days would be numbered. And then?

Then perhaps there would be no way to retain the Basque Country and Catalonia as integral parts of Spain. And in whose hands would the Canary and Balearic Islands have wound up? In its alleged endeavor to bring unity to Spain, the coup would have shattered it forever.

The longing for revenge would scuttle any possibility of peaceful democratic development, of coexistence, and those who were the anvil during the coup would become the hammer.

Spain could have once again become an arena for confrontation, and not the peaceful kind, not only among the various social classes and political groups but also between the major world powers.

No military dictatorship could resolve our economic problems, unemployment, the crisis plaguing small and medium business, the price of oil, especially in the face of a hostile Europe and a far from favorably disposed world.

Furthermore, terrorism could well cease to be a Basque phenomenon and spread throughout the country, legitimized by the existence of a tyranny.

In the medium run, even many of the people who were swept up by the coup would have to react against such insanity.

I realize that it is unlikely that the people who are disposed to coups will listen objectively to the remarks of a Communist. Unfortunately, there are still many people who do not realize that the 1936 coup was against a democratic republic, not aimed at defeating "international communism," as they have repeatedly been told, and that while an army can be legitimately proud of having defeated a foreign aggressor in a national war, such pride is not legitimate in the case of a victory in a civil war that patriotism should move us all to put in its proper historical place as a painful episode that is not to be repeated.

Where, then, does the danger of a coup come from? From the gap that still exists between democratic Spain and part of its Armed Forces.

It is obvious that the political and ideological development of the Armed Forces has not proceeded at the same pace as in the broadest strata of Spain's population.

Whereas these strata have strived to transcend the myths and conditioning factors of the Civil War, to move with the times and to look ahead, certain negative phenomena have been instrumental in bringing these processes to a standstill in the military.

It is not that the democratic change has mistreated the Armed Forces; on the contrary, it has treated them better than the dictatorship did. And the constitutional political forces have concurred in according the Armed Forces the lofty consideration they deserve in a modern State.

The negative factors are to be found, for example, in terrorism, which has aimed its bullets at the Armed Forces for a specific purpose: to provoke them into a confrontation with democracy.

The Far Right has cultivated this provocation by identifying terrorism with democracy and portraying all democrats as terrorists or accomplices of terrorists.

Another negative factor has been the lack of orderly planning of the autonomy process and insufficient explanation of its content in the barracks, and even a number of mishaps involving the flag, which are often blown out of proportion by self-interested propaganda.

But aside from more or less widespread ideological phenomena, aside from group reactions, often intensified by the lack of contact between the people, their political parties and the Armed Forces, aside from the impact of propaganda that tries to take advantage of the fond memories that many

of them might harbor concerning the man who was their commander for many years, there is one obvious fact: except for the king at certain especially solemn moments, the government and its auxiliary bodies have perhaps not explained clearly enough to the Armed Forces the nature of the changes that have taken place in Spain.

The new authorities asked the democratic parties that did democratic propaganda work in the Armed Forces during the dictatorship to refrain from continuing in order to respect the nonpartisan nature of the military. And we did so, playing the game cleanly. But the Far Right continued its subversive efforts very openly, and effective steps to prevent this were never taken. What is being heard today in the barracks is antidemocratic propaganda.

Under the impact of this propaganda, the Armed Forces can hardly be expected to overcome collectively and in such a short space of time the ideological vestiges of the Civil War, and this delays their identification with the nation. This problem will not be resolved either through purges, which would crystalize prejudices and trigger dangerous upheavals, or in a short time. This is a problem of time, of patient training and information, of experience with democratic life, of an inevitably slow penetration of a democratic awareness in the Armed Forces.

When I asked an Italian comrade at what point they got the feeling that their country's Armed Forces had accepted democracy, he told me that it was in 1974, in other words, about 30 years after fascism had been defeated and democracy established. And nonetheless, there are still high-level military officers today who are mixed up with corrupt politicians and venal financiers in secret organizations with very shady aims.

Thus, we have to get used to the idea that this will be a lengthy process, but if we want to prevent democracy from foundering, we feel that the following four conditions must be rapidly fulfilled:

1. The existence of an information system that is firmly and provenly loyal to the political system.

2. A guarantee that the most effective rapid deployment units are prepared to counter any coup outbreak.

3. Harsh punishment, under the law, of coup plotters and all those who conspire against our institutions.

4. A halt to Far Right propaganda in the Armed Forces.

The 23 February coup, though unsuccessful, has greatly tarnished the prestige of the civilian government. The emergency situation prompted by this episode has brought the constitutional forces together. One of the things that has changed is the approach that the Calvo-Sotelo administration was initially

going to take, an administration that at times wavers between the temptation to harden laws by curtailing freedoms and paring back autonomies, and liberal measures. In any case, the anti-Communist leanings that were announced have not materialized for the moment. In contrast, in recent months the Divorce Law that was tied up has been passed; the individuals allegedly responsible for the Almeria crime have been put on trial; the Communist parliamentary proposal for the legal defense of persons under arrest has been taken into consideration; a brigade was formed to go after right-wing terrorists. It is also true that the Left, including the PCE, has moderated its opposition to the government and lent it its cooperation in various instances.

This was necessary for the civilian government to regain its authority and to head off developments that could demoralize the citizenry.

The constitutional parties sponsored an initial response to the coup on 27 February, in Madrid, Valencia and Asturias in particular, a rally that took on uncommonly large proportions.

The country also shut down for 2 minutes on 8 May in another major grassroots demonstration against terrorism.

Such rallies have not continued, however, even though the PCE has stressed the need to extend and prolong them.

The bourgeois parties and to a lesser extent the PSOE have reservations about mass rallies and joint appearances by the constitutional parties.

Nevertheless, in the face of coup threats, such joint rallies, in one form or another and at various levels, are the best backing for the civilian government, for parliamentary and administration action and for the preservation of the constitutional and parliamentary monarchy.

Current Relations Between the Administration and the Opposition

On the day after the coup, we would naturally expect the beginning of a policy of democratic concentration, and on the morning of the 24th this was apparently the view of a well-known UCD figure, who later, after who knows what reflections, changed his mind.

Having learned its lesson from this harsh experience, the PSOE announced its willingness to be part of a broad parliamentary majority government, the need for which our party had been stressing for some time.

However, the UCD rejected the proposal and maintained its one-party administration, once again seeking formulas to take the place of a policy of democratic concentration. In this connection, we should discuss the ANE [national employment agreement] negotiated among the administration, labor unions and business.

The leadership of the PCE has lent its support to the ANE because it is headed in the direction of the proposals that we have been formulating against unemployment and is in keeping with the National Solidarity Plan proposed by the Confederation of Workers Commissions. Employed workers are going to give up two percentage points in relation to the CPI [consumer price index] in order to help:

a) Create 350,000 jobs in 1982 to dampen unemployment;

b) Extend unemployment insurance to 200,000 more jobless workers than receive it now;

c) Transform the community work subsidy into unemployment insurance, after a census is taken of unemployed farm workers, which will benefit some 100,000 of them;

d) Establish unemployment insurance for nonmigratory farm workers;

e) Extend the subsidy to unemployed workers who are heads of family.

The ANE is not a panacea in dealing with the crisis. It is a partial measure both in time and in scope. But it is an effective plan of struggle against unemployment that could also have a stimulative impact on the economy.

Parallel to this, the government has agreed to the partial return of union assets to the CCOO and the UGT, which will facilitate their consolidation, and has given the unions supervisory powers in the institutes connected with social policy.

In light of the experience with the Moncloa pacts, many people are wondering: Will the ANE be honored?

For the time being, the government has to make budgetary decisions to honor it before the 1982 collective bargaining. If it does not make them, the unions will not consider themselves bound by the agreement.

Moreover, the accords call for the creation of a monitoring body in which the unions will take part.

We know that the CEOE has strongly opposed the agreements, that it did not want to sit down at the table with CCOO and UGT together, that it has subsequently protested the return of part of union assets and even that one of its leaders has called for the resignation of the Social Democratic faction of the UCD administration, to which the employers imputed the initiative leading to the accords.

In any case, fulfillment of the ANE will require vigilance and pressure on the part of the unions, as well as left-wing activism in Parliament to insure that it receives financing in upcoming budgets.

The autonomy pact that has been the object of quite atypical negotiations is another attempt to take the place of a policy of democratic concentration.

The administration and the PSOE first agreed to charge a Committee of Technicians with drafting initiatives that neither of them wanted to take themselves.

The exclusion from these efforts of the UCD as a party is also odd. What is the point? To make the PSOE and the technicians take the responsibility for measures that could turn out to be unpopular among Spain's nationalities and regions? Do the technicians and the PSOE have to undo the wrongs that the UCD caused?

Later, when the negotiations were expanded to the nationwide parties, the UCD was not present either. The claim can be made that the administration and the UCD are the same thing, but the fact is that so far the UCD has not directly involved itself, as such, in the negotiations.

We should also ask: If the PSOE is cooperating so closely with the administration and if Calvo-Sotelo and Felipe Gonzalez give the impression that they are jointly in charge of policy, why isn't there already a broad parliamentary majority government and PSOE ministers?

In spite of these odds ways, we have agreed to take part in the negotiations because such an approach is in keeping with our proposal for a State pact on the issue of autonomy. This does not mean that we accept, outright, the agreements that the administration and the PSOE have reached or that we are going to sign any pact; it all depends on their content.

The fact is that with the possible exception of the Catalonia and Basque Country statutes, the UCD administration has handled the autonomy issue in the most inconsistent manner. The administration resorted to all sorts of manipulations to nullify Article 151 of the constitution, even where the UCD's own followers had demanded it, promising in exchange that the same levels of autonomy would automatically and immediately be obtained under Article 143, which is something that the constitution permits only after 5 years have passed. This course of conduct led to the conflict-ridden impasse that we are trying to emerge from in the manner I have already mentioned.

In the interest of the State, the State of autonomies, we will sign an agreement that redresses all of these wrongs if it guarantees respect for the statutes that have already been drafted; approval of all statutes by late 1982, while setting down separate conditions for the Canary Islands statute, given the islands' specific problems; the autonomy map agreed upon initially; a nonoverlapping bureaucracy and, at the same time, the assurance that the Delegations cannot be used by the central government to diminish the capacity of the autonomy bodies; democratic elections at the regional, provincial and local levels; and the principle of solidarity among the nationalities and regions of Spain in order to correct the severe regional imbalances.

As negotiations now stand, we have given our approval to everything that will insure the State's interest in political issues. We have not yet managed to reach agreement on economic issues because in the proposals from the group of technicians and in the conclusions that the government has drawn from them it has not quantified the solidarity fund or its apportionment; nor are we in agreement with the LOAPA because we feel that its current wording is at variance with what the constitution stipulates.

We want to reach an agreement, but if the reasonable objections that we and other groups submit are not taken into account, we cannot be party to an agreement that under the pretense of the State's interests would primarily serve the electoral interests of this or that party.

Our stand differs from that of the other negotiating parties in our judgment on the status of the Basque and Catalan nationalists. Although we do not share some of their specific stands, we feel it was a mistake not to have included them in the negotiations from their outset. To us, these parties, as long as they abide by the constitution, are just as Spanish as the parties organized nationwide.

Emergency Laws

I do not want to conclude this section on our political efforts without discussing our stand on the emergency laws against terrorism and in defense of democracy, as well as on the state of emergency and martial law.

The latter was a strictly constitutional law that exists in all democratic countries and that has managed to have an impact because of the timing in introducing it. It must be said that we Communists were the ones who succeeded at the Congress Plenum in preventing a state of emergency from being declared against a strike. In general, the emergency laws have not included all of the guarantees that we demanded and they have not precluded potential high-handedness and mistreatment, the proof of which is the scandalous case of Almeria, not to mention others. But the principle of emergency laws in a fragile system like the present one, threatened by coup plots and terrorism, cannot be rejected.

Nonetheless, these laws have been significantly improved in a series of cases thanks to the amendments presented by the Communist parliamentary group. We also authored the bill, taken up by Parliament, to guarantee the legal defense of an arrested person from the time he is arrested.

Those who express reservations about or oppose these laws essay the argument that the heads of State Security agencies do not deserve all guarantees and could enforce these laws arbitrarily. They even claim that in the event of a regression [involucion] these laws could be enforced against the democratic parties.

Obviously, and this is something that we have brought up in Parliament and at the party's public acts, the leadership of the State Security agencies has

to be reformed and all of the individuals in leadership positions must be made to identify with our democratic institutions, because until this is accomplished, the laws will not yield the results expected of them. This is an issue that ought to be part of our political talks, along with autonomy, unemployment and others, a demand that I am publicly stressing from this forum. But we are not going to accomplish this by opposing antiterrorist laws, the need for which cannot be denied at a time like this.

With regard to the danger of these laws being used against democratic parties in the event of a regression, I think that in such an event the people causing the regression would clearly pay very little attention to laws; with them or without them, they would use brute force. One of the reasons that we are battling terrorism is precisely because it promotes and increases the danger of a regression.

At times, in the desire to take precautions, we go too far. I would cite this example. In debating the issue of military jurisdiction in Parliament, we decided to abolish summary and urgent proceedings in peacetime. Leftist jurists thought that summary and urgent proceedings could be applied unfairly. If this proceeding had been kept, however, the trial of the 23 February coup plotters would have been conducted 48 hours after the coup, and it would no longer be a political issue, as it is today.

In discussing the political efforts of the outgoing Central Committee in a report like this, it is impossible to touch on details, and I must focus on the general courses of action on which its efforts have been based. Rightly or wrongly (the congress is the judge), the Central Committee feels that its political efforts have been consistent with the policy set forth by the Ninth Congress and, furthermore, with the strategy that the party decided on many years ago.

It is true that our policy of democratic concentration has not given Spain a government and a majority to apply it consistently, that we have had to accept substitute prescriptions and methods that have been inadequate and that have in many cases yielded unsatisfactory results, and that we have had to make difficult compromises to insure that the process of democratic change did not come to a halt.

But in all responsibility we reject the ultracritical attitude of those who wrap up our political efforts during this period in a bundle and throw it into the garbage pail. It seems at times as if they are talking about a leadership that had power in its hands and lost it through incompetence, recording failure after failure. They know well, nevertheless, that we have achieved legal status against great difficulties, that we had only 20 deputies in the first Cortes and 23 in the second, that with this minimal representation we have had an influence in politics and an importance that many observers consider out of proportion with our actual strength, and that our representativeness could continue growing at the next election if the campaign of insults that is taking place in our own ranks and that the press

naturally reports on, does not act as a countercampaign that will diminish the PCE's potential in advance.

Debate and a battle of ideas are vital to the party, but when they are replaced by a nihilist confrontation that regards the party not as an instrument of history for promoting the revolution but as a short-term instrument that one can join and leave frivolously and to which a basic loyalty is not accorded, then this is not a debate, and most of our members do not bother getting involved and wind up not knowing which party they are in or whether they are really part of a class party.

The fact is that no one is seriously proposing a policy other than the policy of democratic concentration that we have been pursuing. At the most, members are saying that we have not rallied the masses enough, that we have not renewed the leadership enough.

I would find an internal logic in criticism that, based on opposition to the policy of national reconciliation and of a pact for freedom, argued against the party's involvement in a process of democratic change that is regarded as insufficiently radical and preferred uncompromising opposition and even the underground; in criticism that consistently condemned the policy of democratic concentration and concluded that the party ought to pitch camp, free from vile contacts, and wait for a revolutionary opportunity that presents itself miraculously or as a result of external factors.

Such a stand has an internal, albeit absurd consistency and if adopted, would turn the party into just another tiny clique by isolating it from real life and the conditions of the class struggle during this period.

But just as harmful as this would be criticism that denied what a good many of this country's politicians and journalists frequently concede, albeit more in private than in public: that the Communist Party is the one that has had a clearer perception of the balance of power during this period and that has most consistently defended the realistic solutions best suited to guaranteeing the progress of Spanish democracy. And it looks like we ourselves are engaged in destroying what ought to be a political asset for us at the upcoming election.

It is understandable for something like this to happen in the UCD, which has held power all these years and which is a multiclass party with various ideologies. That it should happen among us is not.

Mistakes in the Work of the Party and of its Leadership

Does this mean that we have had in our conduct no grave mistakes, inadequacies and shortcomings to subject to severe criticism and self-criticism?

We have indeed had them. But we must define and identify them clearly, because in this way the criticism will result in a strengthening of the party and in

progress which must be made. And we believe in fact that our fundamental weakness --on which the self-criticism, which we ourselves conduct, and many of the criticisms leveled against us agree--has been a pronounced inclination to conduct politics at the top and upward.

That mistake has been made by a part whose traditions in the underground were precisely the contrary; to conduct politics at the grassroots, in the mass movements, downward and not upward, and to have thus achieved a social penetration which no other opposition force achieved under Francoism.

This mistake did not stem from any change of conception about the party's mass nature; the idea of territorialization was aimed precisely at developing that nature. The mistake stemmed from a practice which has been gaining acceptance and against which we have not known how, or been able, to react in time. The origin of that practice--its objective cause--lies in the change of tasks from the underground to legality and in the persistence of certain leadership methods of the underground.

On becoming legalized, in a relatively brief period, the party needed to move hundreds, thousands, of cadres hitherto involved in the mass movements to parliamentary, autonomy and municipal tasks, either directly or to provide help and assistance.

At the same time, the trend toward large leadership bodies at all levels has continued, if not intensified, encouraging by this means also the cadres' upward flight.

The only mass movement which has not suffered this flight is the trade union, which had very important active functions and a personality and tradition of its own. But other movements, without the direct presence of the people who had encouraged them, have languished, lost strength and, in some instances, almost disappeared.

This has also been influenced by the change in the nature of the mass movements' work when democratic legality came about. It is clear that in the period of the underground, many associations performed, together with their specific functions, functions characteristic of the party organization; there were no very pronounced boundaries in the anti-Francoist struggle.

I believe that one of the shortcomings of our formulation has been a failure to foresee the change which was bound to occur in the activity of those organizations, to the effect of making them genuinely independent of the party, broadening their composition and centering them on the formulation of their specific demands and mass mobilization to achieve them, as centers of democratic participation in social life. The failure to define the mass movements' new tasks and styles, except in those which were most deeply rooted, probably also caused the withdrawal of not a few activists.

Nevertheless, the gravest aspect was the abandonment of the associations caused by this upward flight. The party's grassroots organization thus lost vitality, dynamism and political influence. The principal instrument through which the

party is linked with the masses--the grassroots organization--failed. Such a practice modified de facto, although not de jure, the party's communist conception, which is different from that of the bourgeois, and even social democratic, parties. By this I mean that communications between the party and the masses have been taking place principally through parliamentary, autonomy or municipal representation; in a nonorganizational manner in which we will always be outdone by other forces which have more extensive use of the mass media. And I do not underestimate the importance of this level of relationship; what I am saying is that in our conception the essential thing is the more organizational and deeper level of contact through the party organizations with the mass movements, which, I would add, is crucial for our influence and our deep penetration in the social fabric.

We have heard so many complaints about the associations' defective functioning, but how few of those who complained have used their intelligence and ability in the associations' work, striving to turn them into a political and cultural center for the local workers and working population, thus helping to build the party--and at the same time, the mass movements--by training new members and cadres politically and even culturally.

The view which we had at the Rome Central Committee plenum [presumably dating from the underground period] concerning the associations' prospects is correct, provided that we change the practice of this period. We said at that time that:

"...The association meetings will make possible a richer political exchange than that of the cells.... The party line will be able to reach them more directly, through comrades holding responsible posts. A more lively dialogue will be able to develop between leaders and members which will have repercussions on the quality of political life.... At the meetings dozens of propagandists, capable of clearly explaining the party's policy to the masses, will be trained.

But we cadres have largely deserted the associations; we have concentrated in the high representative political spheres and in the higher committees, and in fact there are very few cadres who spontaneously decide to work in the associations.

Either this 10th congress will be the congress of the cadres' return to the grassroots and of the strengthening of their presence in the associations, or else the continuation of the current practice will lead us toward a kind of party which will have very little to do in its structure--and indeed, in its substance--with what a Communist Party is.

A bourgeois or social democratic party has, above all, voters, not members. A communist party has members and voters. If communist parties preserve their membership, it is because of the existence of a kind of relationship between cadres and members which occurs at the level of their organizations and which enables members not to be mere followers and mere voters but coparticipants in the activity of the party as a whole--political protagonists. This is the real meaning of democracy in the party and of participation, far more than political duels among very small groups of cadres whose faces are sometimes not seen in the associations, except at the meetings on the eve of a congress.

And until we surmount this, there will be a loss of membership, even if we win new voters; the party will grow weaker, because our members do not wish to be spectators; they wish to take part.

There has been a great deal of talk in the party about the issue of loss of membership. But no serious inquiry has as yet been conducted to discover the real causes of the loss of membership--an inquiry among those concerned. And one will have to be conducted after this congress. And we will have to see where this phenomenon has occurred to a greater or lesser extent and why, since there are considerable differences between some places and others. It has been very easy in some circles to attribute it to rejection of the leadership and of its policy, even when loss of membership coincided with an increase in our voters.

I am not convinced that, if there had been a different practice, a greater concentration of our cadres' efforts on the associations and direct attention to their work, the party, despite a certain democratic ebb, would virtually not have lost members [sentence as published]. Moreover, I believe that if there is a change in the style of work, it can win them back, secure the return of those who left and swell its ranks.

The situation in the associations, the crisis in other mass movements for the reasons which have been set out--and, I would add, the trade union's organizational weaknesses which the confederation's second congress has set out to surmount--have decisively influenced our ability to mobilize the masses. It is not that there has been a conception opposed to mass mobilization in the party; it is that mass mobilization has also been conceived as something which is resolved from above, with decisions and appeals. The Asturian comrades have a valuable experience; the demonstration in defense of the Asturian economy, which they began by calling alone, as regards the other organizations and parties, and for which they prepared meticulously for many months at meetings of associations and local meetings, with the participation of all the party's leading cadres, creating a mass atmosphere which led to the biggest demonstration there has ever been in Asturias, supported ultimately by the groups which were initially opposed to it.

The ability to mobilize has also been affected by this inclination to conduct politics at the top.

This practice which we are criticizing--and which is directly a self-criticism of our shortcomings as a leadership--entails other dangers which are no less grave; that with the activities of the leadership bodies and elected representatives as our almost essential link with the masses, with the weakening of the organizational ties between the elected representatives and the party and with the dwindling of the latter's political life and organization, our party will end up by becoming an exclusively electioneering and administrative party, and cease to be a revolutionary party; a party in which the struggle for leadership at this or that level supplants the debating of ideas, and in which the aim is power in its less noble sense, and not the triumph of the emancipating ideal of communism.

The fact that the party pays great attention to parliamentary, autonomy, provincial or municipal work, or that it mobilizes itself actively with respect to elections, regarding them as essential political battles, does not mean falling into electioneering, but attaching to elections all the importance they have in a democratic path toward socialism.

But the danger of electioneering arises when the deputy or councillor, once elected, virtually severs the direct link with the membership; regards himself as the party's spokesman without taking the membership into account, and ends up by feeling that he is invested with an authority which is to some extent independent of the party bodies which proposed him for the posts which he holds.

Real power could thus shift from the party's members and bodies to the elected people, and at the end of a practice of this kind, we could be confronted with a situation like that which the leftwing is attempting to correct in the British Labor Party. That is, with the parliamentarians and elected people leading the party, we would then have a kind of party with the characteristics of the Second International.

In this connection, I believe that although we are in time to correct it, our current practice is leading to a gap between elected people and and party. Allow me to generalize, although there may be exceptions. It seems to me that we deputies do not inform the party sufficiently about our work. And if this is true of the deputies, whose work becomes known in one way or another, it is even more true of the councillors. We have not been able to institutionalize a method whereby the councillors in each place will regularly inform the party aktiv, receive its suggestions and criticisms and discuss their conduct with that aktiv. It is not merely a matter of being honest and efficient administrators; it is a matter of acting in contact with the people, and the first link for that purpose is contact with the party members.

Concerning the Party's Leadership Bodies

But the trend toward an upward flight is manifested not only with respect to the state bodies, but in the numerical composition--excessively large--of the leadership bodies at very different levels which makes them ponderous and lacking in agility and which, moreover, contrasts with the lack of cadres for the grassroots organization.

This is to some extent a legacy of the underground era, when the size of the leadership bodies to some extent offset the objective obstacles to the party organizations' democratic functioning. But when legality came, that practice continued, and participation in the leadership bodies, instead of following a criterion of efficiency and internal democracy, has become a kind of distinction or status within the party, if not a dividing up of influence.

It is sometimes said that there are veteran comrades who may find it distressing to leave leadership posts at this or that level, but that very thing is the case with very many nonveteran comrades, full of strength and vigor, who would give the party much more and enrich their own experience by asserting themselves

as leaders of an association rather than as titular members of this or that higher committee.

This also encourages the accumulation of posts, which led us to raise the problem of incompatibilities in Cordoba, albeit with scant effects (of course, the Cordoba proposals remain unimplemented). It also impedes the necessary homogenization of the party which, in order to be real, needs to pass through the sieve not only of a debate but also of actual work in the depths of the party.

The leadership bodies which we have at various levels are today also an obstacle to the party's proper functioning because of their size and because of the accumulation of responsibilities by their members. We have complained, from various angles, of grave shortcomings in the Central Committee's work. But, irrespective of this or that shortcoming, the basic problem is that we do not have a real PCE Central Committee.

How is the PCE Central Committee's role to be understood? I believe that it can be understood in two ways. One of them would be how it functions now; that is, as a body which meets from time to time, discusses these or those issues well or not so well and then disperses, with everybody devoting himself to his duties as an elected person, leader in a nationality, region or province or as a trade union leader, without any responsibility or direct obligation as a PCE Central Committee member at the level of the country as a whole, attending or not attending the plenums as the case may be, depending on what his own duties at other levels allow.

Another way would be a necessarily smaller Central Committee in which, apart from a number of members in their own right, apart from the secretaries of the nationalities or regions and some other comrades whose participation in mass movements at the national level of whose political authority justified it, the remainder, even though living in the outskirts, would devote 30 percent of their time to the Central Committee's own work, not only attending the plenums but working on its specific tasks with the organizations in this or that part of the country, irrespective of their origin.

I believe that this second way, which is that which the current blueprint for the statutes seems to define, would make possible more frequent meetings and more direct and lively contact between the Central Committee and the party as a whole; direct knowledge of the latter's reality--and not merely that of one sector or area--and hence fuller information and more fluid communications and movement of ideas between grassroots and leadership.

I believe that this means that the post of Central Committee member should cease to be an honorific distinction and become merely a working post, and that removal from it should cease to appear to be a defenestration and take on the nature of a redistribution of the party's strength, taking into account its needs and application of the criterion of incompatibilities.

This conception should be extended to the party's leadership bodies at various levels as a whole, with which I believe we would also have taken a step toward a genuine democratization of our functioning.

In so doing, it would be necessary to make an effort to change something which today is very frequently a negative fact. People outside our ranks have the idea that the communist party functions with a strong centralism, guaranteed by acceptance of the rule of democratic centralism.

The fact is that the centrifugal tendencies in our midst--and perhaps, together with them, the remnants of the compartmentalization which was necessary during the underground era--are so strong that frequently the intermediate leadership bodies act as a barrier instead as a link between the central leadership and those below, and in certain areas as a barrier between the higher leaderships in that area and those of the impoverishes collective political life and which turns some sections of the party into cantons. This must be ended by means of political work and, when necessary, through antibureaucratic administrative measures.

These tendencies are an obstacle to organizations such as the Communist Party of Andalusia or the Communist Party of the Basque country becoming really established, and to there being a more fluid relationship between the Central Committee bodies and the organizations; with the result that frequently in this supposedly centralized party, everybody goes his own way and lack of communication rather than autonomy occurs.

I will mention an extreme instance, in a field to which sufficient importance is not yet attached--that of finances. Every time there is an election campaign, a referendum or some other political campaign, we encounter the same obstacle--the party's poverty. And yet, in fact, the party is not so poor. Many associations or local sections have their own nest egg; that is, their savings bank account, which is sometimes large and for which they receive a tiny amount of interest. If the amounts in these nest eggs were put together, it would total hundreds of millions of pesetas. The Central Committee could deposit in in a bank account with a far higher interest rate. The nest eggs would grow and the associations and sections would be richer and could withdraw in case of need the sums they required through the Central Committee. But that capital which today is underutilized would also enable the Central Committee to conduct broader political campaigns and give financial assistance to the organizations which needed it.

Thus as a result of that dispersal the party is far poorer than it would be in fact if there were less localism than there is today.

Of course, in all this situation there is a responsibility on the part of the party's central leadership. At the Cordoba plenum we raised and formally resolved very important issues, but we did not have the ability to put them into practice.

Concerning the Party Apparatus

In this connection, it is inevitably necessary to refer to the party apparatus. There is a good deal of talk about the apparatus and there is even the black legend about the party apparatus.

I believe that in a political party today the apparatus is made up of the party's full-time officials in its leadership bodies, in the bodies representing the people (parliament, the municipalities and so forth), in the mass movements, in its press or in its enterprises, if it has any. The full-time officials as a whole comprise the apparatus. There is no bourgeois or workers' party which has no apparatus. Strong parties usually have strong apparatuses; moreover, they need strong apparatuses. The demagogic criticisms of the apparatuses and "bureaucracy" deliberately disregard the complexity of a political party's functioning nowadays.

Sometimes parties which are in power use the state apparatus to enlarge and develop their own; in other countries the state apparatus and that of the ruling party merge and form a single apparatus.

Under these conditions, the apparatus can constitute a factor restricting internal democracy, an instrument for the leading group's remaining in power. And that can also occur in communist parties.

But is it possible to speak in those terms of the PCE's apparatus and bureaucracy as certain comrades demagogically do who sometimes form part--and even a privileged part--of that apparatus without apparently realizing it?

One of the consequences of what is still the PCE's weakness and at the same time a factor which intensifies that weakness is that its apparatus, the core of full-time officials in one form or another, is still very small.

The fact is, we do not possess the financial resources to have the apparatus which would be necessary to guarantee for the party as a whole extensive and open information and, vice versa, for conveying information, opinions and initiatives from the party's grassroots to the leadership. There are entire provinces which lack a single full-time official. And in those in which there are full-time officials in elected posts, it has not proved possible in many instances, for probably justified reasons, for them to take part in the work of extending the party's organization and propaganda.

The leadership elected at the 10th congress will have to tackle as one of its tasks the organizing of a genuine party apparatus. Today the problem is not that there is an apparatus which is crushing party democracy; it is that there is no apparatus.

And the confrontation and the polemics in the party lie, rather than in the party as a whole, within the apparatus, among the elected people, the trade union cadres, the full-time officials and leadership aides and councillors. The political debate in the party is largely a debate within the apparatus, the comrades in the apparatus, full-time party officials and councillors. The sectarian and dogmatic stances in Catalonia are headed primarily by a group of full-time officials, either in the party or in the trade union movement--that is, pure apparatus.

On the other hand, many members do not understand very clearly the real significance of these battles among those whom they regard as their leaders, and

are even indifferent toward them. I say all this in order to assert two truths: first, that we need a stronger and better apparatus; second, that today the apparatus does not represent unconditional support for the leadership, which stifles internal democracy; in many instances it represents opposition to the leadership, and this is not a party apparatus' function, either.

The Trade Union Front and the Cultural Front

On the trade union front, the party leadership has made mistakes connected mainly with the working method in it.

Before the legalization of the party and of the workers commissions, we concerned ourselves seriously with the issue and helped formulate a clear line of transformation of what was a movement into a trade union. There the party leadership played the role which rested with it.

Our mistake was that in seeking to guarantee the trade union's independence, we agreed that, in view of the number and quality of the communist cadres working in it, a permanent body attached to the leadership to deal with trade union policy was not necessary. We wished to shun traditional methods connected with the conception of the trade union as a driving belt.

And the result was not satisfactory. In not developing methods which would provide the communist trade union cadres with a party forum for discussing their problems, there was ultimately no trade union policy consistently accepted by everybody, and we passed on our confrontations to the trade union.

These confrontations intensified when the crisis and its consequences worsened. At that point, the party leadership did intervene--effectively, I believe--organizing a broad debate which culminated in a Central Committee meeting whose decisions have had a positive influence.

It is possible that more systematic attention, effected by a general committee body, would have made it possible to foresee and avert conflicts which have arisen, although not, I believe, completely.

At the Central Committee meeting to which I refer, it was decided to set up that body--a decision which we have not yet implemented, with the intention that the new Central Committee should do so, and because the Central Committee which is now resigning did not have the people necessary for this task--not because of a shortage of comrades with trade union experience but because they are all engaged in tasks difficult to abandon. Of course, I wish to state that the party is identified with the trade union line approved by the confederation's second congress and that it will fully support it.

Another front on which we have demonstrated serious weaknesses is the cultural front.

One of the tragedies of the political change that has occurred in our country is that in the cultural field, in the broadest sense, there has been no real

change, there has been a continuing lack of official concern for and interest in culture, and the basic aim of the cultural policy that has been pursued has been to adapt what existed in Spain in previous years to the new forms.

Do we have a responsibility for this situation? My answer is: Yes. And what is our responsibility? Of course, I will only provide a general answer to this question. I believe that we have drawn up good platforms for each sector. I believe that we have taken initiatives in parliament and expressed just criticisms of the government, but I also believe that we have committed two serious errors in the work of the party and its leadership.

First, we have failed to encourage the formulation of an updated joint program designed to be discussed by the various forces of culture, in the broadest sense, so as to encourage these forces' independent action in the democratic process. In other words, we have failed to take up this matter as a party as a whole.

Second, we have not devoted ourselves seriously to forming a strategy for the cultural forces, and more specifically to discussing it with the cultural forces with a view to reaching an autonomous solution on the part of these same forces that would dispel the inertia of our stance during the Francoist period.

Thus our initiatives in the various sectors and our short-term initiatives on matters of culture, in the broadest sense, have not been followed up by general, far-reaching action by the party as a whole so as to revitalize and, I would say, to restructure and convert the front of cultural forces. This seems to me to be the party leadership's main responsibility in this process of change in which, as far as culture is concerned, little has changed and sometimes certain things have changed for the worse.

I believe that this is one of the reasons, the main reason, for the intellectuals' disenchantment not only with change, but with our party itself.

Apart from this, some influence might have been exerted by the effects of the territorialization, in which connection we have failed to bear in mind the need to maintain certain sectional organizational activities on that front. But I believe that this has been a secondary factor compared to the previous one, because the decline in membership has occurred even in the associations that remained sectional.

I also believe that our position among professional people has been influenced negatively by the fact that hitherto it has not been possible to form in some of their sectors unitary trade unions independent of the confederations and capable of rallying support for their own demands from both politicized and nonpoliticized members.

Development of Party Democracy

The development of internal democracy is a vital necessity for the party's growth within society. An active democratic life means that there can be more and more communist party members capable of actively spreading communism. It

means the free expression in the party of varying opinions influenced by social or cultural origins; differing viewpoints on the issues that now split the international communist movement; differing viewpoints on theoretical issues under debate; and differing opinions on short-term stances in connection with day-to-day political matters.

We are entirely in favor of the broadest freedom of debate in the party.

At present, this diversity is freely expressed in our party, in its own and other press organs, in the precongress debate and before this debate. I remember reading in the daily MUNDO OBRERO articles accusing party leaders of being "Stalinists," and nobody issued any indignant rejoinders or took any measures. Frankly, I know of very few communist parties that have gone as far as this. I cannot imagine a L'UNITA article calling Berlinguer, Pajetta or Bufalini Stalinists--outside of the precongress debate, and, moreover--remaining unanswered.

But party democracy is something more and also different from what some comrades are demanding. The prime task of party democratization demands return to the associations--and not only when conferences and congresses occur, but in a permanent manner, by taking part in political tasks and also current work--the unfamiliar and unselfish work which is often carried out only by modest comrades whom some people in fact regard as the party's infantry.

Party democracy demands that well-educated comrades carry out training and encouragement work in the associations, that they strive to improve the party's political standard, broader involvement in debates and a simple and specific form of debate that will provide scope for the involvement of those who are not at present involved and who limit themselves to internal debates. I consider serious and significant the low attendance of party members at preparatory meetings for the 10th congress and sincerely wonder whether we chose the right kind of theses drawn up by the Central Committee; whether we are not straying dangerously from the party's general cultural standard, which is a reflection of the standard that exists among the working class and broad strata of the people. Because this could be a road to an estrangement between the leadership and the grassroots and between the party and the masses and therefore to a reduction of internal democracy and the party's democratic capacity.

In our party, leaders are now elected by secret ballot--at all levels, I believe--and, moreover, with an opportunity to amend lists submitted by the electoral committees by including candidates rejected by them. I do not believe that any political party elects its leaders more democratically.

At our conferences and congresses the positions not only of the majorities but also of qualified minorities are defended and voted on.

In view of these points that have already been achieved, a real democratization must aim at increasing the involvement of the party as a whole in its internal political life and in mass political activity.

The Central Committee rejected by a large majority the idea of organizing currents, tendencies, factions or whatever you wish to call them. Lenin is often invoked to justify the authorization of these forms, but Lenin himself proposed their prohibition at the Bolshevik Party's 10th Congress. And let us not forget that he had to proceed from an existing situation.

Starting in 1917, the Bolshevik Party was a conglomeration of several parties and factions of various origins and histories--Trotskiyist, social [as published] revolutionary, Menshevik, Bogdanovist, and so forth--who united on the eve of or during the October revolution, though maintaining ties and points of agreement within each of them continued to distinguish them. It was impossible to surmount this real diversity, which stemmed from what had been a recent merger, by means of formal measures.

Our party's formation was different. It was not a merger of several different political groups. We could create this if we authorize the formation of currents, and I refuse to accept that this is any kind of democratic progress. We have developed the idea of a new kind of political group in which parties with socialist aims, class trade unions and mass movements can converge while maintaining their own organization, recognizing the philosophical and political pluralism that exists among those struggling for socialism, and that must be respected in a socialist society as we see it. But within this new kind of group the PCE must maintain its own philosophy, its revolutionary Marxist character and its own organization. The PCE must not be a caricatural microcosm of this new political group.

Some comrades who support the authorization of currents claim that the PCE must be a mirror of society. Clearly this is another view of the party that is not Eurocommunist, inasmuch as we believe that Eurocommunism is simply the way to be a revolutionary Marxist communist at the end of the 20th century in industrialized European society. It is something different from Eurocommunism. The party is above all an instrument of the working class, of Marxist intellectuals and the working people's masses for transforming society; if anything it is a reflection of the shared interests and ideas of the exploited class and sectors--not accidentally or automatically, but by rallying its members around its ideology and policy. In other words, by transforming their spontaneous currents into revolutionary awareness.

In our view, the authorization of currents would in effect mean introducing the parliamentary interplay that exists in society--and that is fully understandable because of society's composition--into a party that has been and intends to continue to be a vanguard of society, in other words, a highly active and collectively active part within it.

We would have several authorized currents seeking the support of a passive mass of members, virtually mere voters, and competing with each other for this support. But this conception is radically different from the concept of a vanguard party, a collective vanguard party.

Also we would recreate in the party organization the procedures which, in their criticism of the leadership, some members condemn as one of the defects of

parliamentary politics--the policy of consensus, pacts, compromises and underhand arrangements. If we took the authorization of currents to its logical conclusion, namely electoral proportionality, we might bring into the party another phenomenon that sometimes occurs in society--the latter's ungovernability because of the distribution of power among opposing currents.

I can understand why members of ruling communist parties in countries where other parties do not function and where consequently, since the single party is identified with the state, it should indeed by the reflection of society, advocate the authorization of factors; it is the only way of offsetting the absence of pluralism. In our country, however, there are several parties and groups from which to choose.

I would add that those who advocate the creation of precongress platforms within the party are, consciously or otherwise, opening the way to the creation of currents, tendencies or factions. How can a congress platform be created unless prior horizontal contacts and political relations outside the regular party bodies exist? Like it or not, a platform is the foundation and program of a faction. And if it needs prior contacts before the precongress period to take shape, why should it disband after the congress?

I believe we must be clear about this: Let whoever wants to authorize currents within the party propose it openly. It is no crime. We would all then know what we were voting for.

Some say that "the party must authorize what already exists." Indeed, it cannot be denied that within the party there are groups linked in one way or another on a local or even widespread level and that there are "clandestine" horizontal contacts about which everyone has now heard.

But this is in fact polluting the atmosphere within the party, creating tensions and dangers of splits and, in fact, instead of increasing democracy, it is reducing it. It was thus that in Catalonia the situation was gradually reached whereby a dogmatic and sectarian group was acting more and more as a separate party opposed to the PSUC, mobilizing its followers against the meetings of the party's leadership bodies and insulting, threatening and even attacking its leaders. When such an extreme situation is reached, any provocation is possible, and any provocateur can infiltrate. And a choice presents itself: either those elements leave, or it becomes an inevitable necessity to expel them. The regrettable thing is that in these crises one also loses sincerely revolutionary members blinded by the frictions of a splinter group trend. If possible, we must separate them from the splint group advocates; if we do not manage to do so, in time they will realize that this is their party and will return. [sentence as published] But by cleansing itself of factions the party can surmount internal disputes and at last pursue a policy in defense of the working people's interests, binding itself to their broad masses and mobilizing them.

Who is behind these dogmatic groups? I do not want to issue any gratuitous accusations, but in any case they are in one way or another motivated by a policy different from the one that we have independently adopted; they are

motivated by the model of a party that does not tolerate factions or dissent and that eliminates them drastically, a model of socialism that will not do for us. Therefore, it is surprising, to say the least, to see some of them agreeing with others who ideologically seem at the opposite pole, in an attempt to establish within the PCE the factions, tendencies or currents rejected by their inspirational models. We believe that this agreement is designed to achieve not more democracy but the weakening of the PCE, which they are trying to destroy, since they have been unable to win it over.

But what must be clear is that the process pursued by the dogmatic currents could be pursued by any other group. This is the dynamics of platforms, currents and tendencies; this is what it leads to sooner or later, and instead of facilitating free collective discussion by the entire party--the enriching debate--what it does is crystallize group stances which impoverish, split and break up the party.

Extending party democracy means reinvigorating its associations, linking them with the masse and their movements, making these associations bring under control the economic and political problems that exist around them and that affect men, women and young people, and turning them into centers of mass culture in all fields.

Extending party democracy means that leadership bodies at all levels must be responsive, responsible and sensitive to the heartbeat of the workers and the people. It also means having a free debate that will ideologically and politically form and homogenize the party, with the best people being elected to the leadership bodies by secret ballot and members having the freedom to criticize leaders at all levels without fear of reprisals.

Extending party democracy means that during periods of debate there are no restrictions on anyone in the free expression of opinions, but that when the time for action comes there must be unity and that discipline is the same for everyone.

In the party we have reached a situation in some cases in which unity of action and discipline have been violated, even in the leadership bodies. Unless this congress establishes order in this and other fields, the Communist Party, which has the opportunity of increasing its strength, including its electoral strength, despite the by no means easy objective conditions under which we are developing, would embark on a process of crisis and of suicidal self-destruction.

What is in no way connected with democracy is tolerance toward those who attack the party's strategic outlook, the absence of steadfastness toward those who try to lead it down different paths, and leniency toward those who, though within its ranks and even its leadership bodies, at the same time devote themselves to publicly denigrating the party.

Party Regeneration

This congress must constitute a further step toward the regeneration of the party and of its leadership bodies. It is a fact of life that on the whole the party has taken into account. Regeneration means adapting the party to the growing complexities of political action on two planes--as a revolutionary party of

struggle and as a party of government. As a party that must remain linked with the masses, defending their day-to-day interests and trying to formulate solutions to state problems, with a sense of responsibility for the country's future, though still in a minority, because it aspires one day either to form the majority or to be a member of it. This is why the party needs the involvement of the factory worker, of the peasant who works the land and of the intellectual capable of helping it resolve the state's most difficult problems.

Regeneration also means promoting young cadres, new leaders, to replace those no longer able to continue leading because they have lost their energies through old age or because, though still young, they have not proved equal to their tasks. It means redistributing responsibilities, moving people from one position to another according to their abilities, not allowing themselves to be led by inertia and routine, by stagnation; and to do so while maintaining the necessary political balance, without unnecessary ruptures and without breaking continuity.

The regeneration task is always difficult. There are communist parties, including some of the most authoritative ones, which provide us with the example of leaders who always die in office. I do not consider this a good example. There are other experiences, other methods, based on rotation, but where this is used, however much rotation there is, the people are always the same in one post or another, with their own specific personal influence, whatever their role.

We believe that at this congress there must be a thorough regeneration of the Central Committee, even more thorough in the Executive Committee and more thorough still in the Secretariat, which must be a very active and dynamic body, in view of the functions entrusted to it. One or more deputy secretaries-general will also have to be appointed if the provisions of the party bylaws are approved.

Much attention will have to be devoted to the leadership's bodies' collective work, to make the leadership team broad, representative and prestigious and to ensure that relations of loyalty and shared responsibility exist within it.

When new leaders are promoted there are always risks of either nor chosing the most capable people or of not chosing the most reliable ones. Capability and reliability--or, rather, steadfastness--must be the decisive qualities. It is a bad example when a party leader leaves the party, and we must try to ensure that selection spares us the slightest surprises of this kind.

Having said that, I entirely refuse to accept that regeneration means the indiscriminate elimination of what, to use a very overworked word, we could call the party's "old guard." The experience of other parties shows, as an observer as wise as the Pole Adam Schaff recently stressed, that the party's bureaucratization begins with the elimination of the old guard. In saying this, I am sure of defending the party's interests, its future and also its distinguishing features.

It is no disgrace for a party when alongside cadres from later generations there are still in its ranks and its leadership men who took part in the armed struggle against fascism.

It seems incredible to have to say this in the PCE, but unfortunately it is inevitable when there are people within our own ranks who reproach us for having fought the war, forgetting that if the PCE is the party of the policy of national reconciliation and Eurocommunism, it owes this to a large extent to the open and innovative spirit demonstrated by this "old guard."

Similarly, it is no handicap to have charismatic leaders. At present, it seems fashionable to deny the leaders' role, in the name of party "democracy." Of course, the party was wasting its time when for so many years it strove to promote natural leaders within the workers movement and the mass movement...!

Anti-elitist demagoguery forgets one essential point; namely, that one of the links between any party or organization and the masses are the leaders, that all mass strength is generated by leaders and at the same time generates leaders, and that without revolutionary or other movements there are no leaders, while without leaders these same movements will not progress.

Marxism has always acknowledged the role of the individual in history, and when I say individuals, I am not talking only about a few great men, but about the multitude of more modest leaders who headed the mass struggle to change the world at various levels.

But it is unnecessary to turn to the authoritative testimonies of Marxist theoreticians; it is enough to see how, in our country, parties with a history which lost their traditional leaders and parties with no history have hastened to manufacture leaders using marketing methods, because it is their organizations, but also their leaders, that create the contact between the party and the masses, between ideas and the people.

Those who speak out against the leaders generally aspire to be leaders themselves. But it is not the post that confers the role of leaders; it is the masses themselves that grant it under specific historical conditions.

Let us not destroy the natural leaders that we have at various levels! Let us encourage the emergence of new leaders, demanding that they do not become tyrants and that they implement in a disciplined manner the policy jointly decided by the party!

In this connection, the new Central Committee will have to find the necessary resources for organizing training work within the party, which has been neglected. We must train hundreds and thousands of new cadres, creating a team of teachers, training centers, courses and abbreviated courses at all levels.

Eurocommunist Policy in the Coming Period

The 10th Congress must confirm the PCE's Eurocommunist strategy. A major contribution to this will have been made by the decisions of the recent conference of the PSUC and of its Central Committee. Some comrades reject Eurocommunism because they have fallen into the trap laid by those who, with unquestionable malice, present a caricature of it as an approach inspired by imperialism and

social democracy. Others claim to be Eurocommunists but are not, and strengthen the dogmatists and splinter group advocates by the stances that they hold.

Being a Eurocommunist now simply means being a communist in the late 20th century, in an industrialized Europe in which political democracy has acquired a great development and where the workers movement wields powerful sociopolitical influence. Being a Eurocommunist means being a communist in an era when revolution can no longer be the solution to a world war, partly because of the development of mass-destruction weapons. It means being a communist when the socialist transformation of society implies not a confrontation between the blocs but their elimination; it means being a communist when there exist a large number of countries that have smashed [as published] the world imperialist system and at the same time and partly for this very reason there is no longer any world revolutionary center.

Being a Eurocommunist means being aware that as a result of the effects of the Great October Socialist Revolution, the development of the production forces and the crisis in the economic structures and cultural superstructures of imperialism, conditions are being created in the world today to attract very broad forces to the cause of socialism--even forces motivated by philosophical ideas that differ from ours and which feel the need for progressive and peaceful solutions similar to the ones that we communists and real socialists advocate.

Being a Eurocommunist means recognizing that the existing model of socialism requires democratic changes, not so as to backtrack to capitalism, but to attain a full implementation in our ideal, and that we will contribute to this through an independent policy that will enable us to advance in what is now the capitalist world.

Being a Eurocommunist means regarding democratic freedoms not as a formal stage but as something lasting that must be extended and developed by bringing democracy also to the economic area, to the area of the ownership of the basic means of production and of change.

Being a Eurocommunist means acting to facilitate communist, socialist unity, the unity of the left and of the progressive forces in Spain, Europe and the world. Being a Eurocommunist also means understanding the historical need for a revolutionary Marxist Communist Party that is, among the forces aiming at socialism, the ideological and political vanguard, a guarantee against the social democratic backtracking and hesitations of others.

It means having a party spirit or, if you prefer, party "patriotism," regarding it not only as a temporary necessity but as a long-term instrument that must serve the cause of liberation of the working class and working people and the building of a new and socialist society.

We do not deny the role of other parties and groups of socialist and progressive leanings; what we are saying is that their role is not interchangeable with the PCE's, that the PCE is a historical necessity, a necessity that would only cease to exist if the PCE were unable to update its strategy without consequently losing its distinguishing features.

Our Distinguishing Features

What are our basic identifying features?

Looking back at history, the break with a social democracy that fell into the mire of cooperation with the various bourgeoisies during World War I, thus violating international working class solidarity and abandoning all plans for the transformation of society. Our distinguishing features also stem from the unconditional defense of the Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia against those who opposed it in one way or another;

From our support for all national and social liberation movements against imperialism;

From our conception of the party not exclusively as a government party that is active only under democratic conditions and dozes off when they disappear, but as capable of struggling for democracy and socialism with every available means and under all conditions, with a political consistency and discipline based on the principle of democratic centralism;

From our adherence to the theories of creative revolutionary Marxism;

And at present from our resolute determination to defend peace and to avert a Third and nuclear world war, as the inalienable precondition for the socialist transformation of the world.

Our distinguishing features are completed now by the corrections that we do not hesitate to make. At the Rome Central Committee plenum we said:

"Have we Communists become more democratic than we used to be? This question might seem simplistic, and doubtless it is. But simple people ask simple questions and we must not refuse to answer them. It is true that the PCE has always struggled for democracy. But it is also true that 40 years of fascist dictatorship have prompted us to form a much loftier assessment of democratic freedoms even than in previous times. Moreover, the negative experience for socialism constituted by the violation of democracy in certain countries and particularly the Stalinist phenomenon have taught us that the absence of democracy is fatal to the thriving of socialism.

"Thus the simple answer to this simple question is that we communists have indeed become more democratic and now regard democracy as fundamental."

We believe that this is an aspect that we must emphasize, because there have been parties within the communist movement that have gained power and transformed the ownership system but have failed to develop democracy and have experienced degenerative processes.

Elsewhere, social democracy has acceded to government and has respected democratic freedoms, but has not transformed the social system.

We advocate a different path, which we consider possible in the industrialized countries--a path that will transform society while preserving and extending democracy.

To achieve this we believe it is necessary at this time to seek scope for unity with the socialists within these parameters. We also believe that by resolutely pursuing this path it is also possible that the socialists will move in the same direction. Confidence in this path, which is not without difficulties, stems from the objective and increasingly apparent need for socialist solutions to the problems now facing mankind.

Under Spain's conditions, knowing that it is not a plan that will be carried out overnight, that it will be difficult to implement and that there will be varying mediations in it, we are in favor as we have said before, of moving toward a new political group in which all the components of this country's socialist movement--political parties, trade unions and social movements--would participate, while maintaining their own personalities and organizations.

Crisis, Autonomies, Terrorism and Threat of Coup d'etat

To end this report, we would like to sum up some of the guildelines for our policy in the period ahead.

First, our stance on the crisis and its effects.

It is very easy to say: It is a crisis of capitalism. Let them resolve it!

Those who say that are forgetting that the working class and working masses live not outside this society but within it and that it is they who are suffering the most direct consequences of this situation. By acting as an isolated group, we Communists could deliberately place ourselves outside the real situation, awaiting capitalism's judgment day, offering to turn the earth into paradise on that day.

But meanwhile, what will happen to the unemployed, the women and young people who can find no place in production?

If we consider this problem we must also consider others. What will happen to the small and medium enterprises that are inexorably disappearing? What will happen to the industries that must be converted unless we want them to succumb under world competition?

What will happen to the unjust agricultural ownership structures, which so pressingly demand reform? What will happen to the pensioners, disabled and other broad sectors who are also suffering as a result of the crisis?

Our party and the trade unions must tackle these problems of the crisis as topical problems and our problems. We must put forward national solutions--I mean national in the social sense--and we must put forward national solutions not because we are abandoning the class concept but out of loyalty to it, because

we are the ascendant class and this ascendant class can only triumph when it manages to embody the interests of the nation.

To come to more specific formulas, the Spanish left will not achieve hegemony until it shows itself capable of resolving the national problems which the center right is unable to resolve.

We must show the people by means of a national policy that big capital and its political spokesman must be replaced in power by the representatives of the working and cultural forces so that in Spain there is work for everyone, prosperity, more equality, justice and freedom.

Consistent with this idea, we Communists support the national employment agreement signed by the confederation of the workers commissions and the general union of workers. The national employment agreement does not resolve all the problems of the crisis, or anything like it, but it is an act of solidarity between those who have work and those who are unemployed. If it is implemented properly, moreover, it will have favorable secondary effects on the economy. We must struggle to ensure its implementation, and the party must devote all its forces to this end, alongside the workers.

But what if the government fails to implement it, under pressure from the employers? We must prevent this from happening. But if it does happen, we workers must not respond by kicking ourselves for having signed it, but by condemning the conduct of those who fail to honor something necessary to the political and social stability of Spanish democracy, thus turning it not into a failure on our part but an experience that will help to extend the people's awareness of the need for the working class to gain positions of power; so that the PCE and the left will be supported by the majority of the country and that there will be a punitive vote for those who failed to honor it.

Of course, the national employment agreement is not enough; it is merely a partial measure and there must be a plan to rebuild and modernize the economy and to reform agriculture, whose guidelines must be laid down at this congress, as the conclusion of the debate on the theses. Such a plan must not be solely technocratic; it must be social at the same time and must not lose sight of medium-term objectives, such as those set by the leftwing government in France; retirement at 60 and a 35-hour working week, which though proposed by the left, are necessitated basically by the development of the production forces which, without measures of this kind and irrespective of whether or not there is a crisis, would expel more and more millions of workers from production, would create a mass lumpen proletariat of young people and would destroy any blueprint for society.

Along this path, and as conditions evolve, we must present proposals for the centers of economic power held by the oligarchy to pass to social ownership.

We must tackle all these economic problems from within society, not from outside, because we would be in limbo outside it. I say inside, because it is only from there that society can be transformed.

At present a Eurocommunist policy is also prompting us to participate in the political agreement on the autonomies.

If we reach an agreement it will be based on observance of the constitution and of the approved statues, the rationalization of the autonomy process and a policy of solidarity aimed at surmounting the terrible regional imbalances that now exist and at safeguarding democracy.

Our strategy is diametrically opposed to terrorism. We are in principle opposed to this method, which has nothing to do with Marxism or Leninism. Terrorism could have some justification in the presence of tyranny, but even then not in the name of Marxist and Leninist ideology. We must condemn the attempt to disguise terrorism with a proletarian ideology as a usurpation that plays into the hands of the right. ETA and Grapo have nothing to do with Marx or Lenin or with the Third World peoples' anti-imperialist armed struggle.

Be that as it may, there is no excuse for terrorism in a democratic system in which there is freedom for all parties, including ones that declare themselves separatist.

The parties and social forces must conduct political action against it but there must also be police action. For it to be efficient it must be directed by officers loyal to the constitution and supported by the people.

This raises the issue of the democratization of the state apparatus. It is intolerable for the far right to remain untouchable even when the government does overcome its timidity and take measures, because there are certain sectors that act with scandalous complacency.

The political and social forces must tackle the socioeconomic problems and the problems of the autonomies. But we demand the same involvement in examining the responsible, calm but steadfast measures needed to avert the possibility of a coup d'etat.

Until the measures are adopted, Spain and the constitutional and parliamentary monarchy will not be secure. Whatever we may do will amount to building on sand. And the constitutional forces must undertake to ensure, supported partly by a popular mobilization, that the changes of policy made in this country are the ones decided on by the people via universal suffrage. This must always be the rule for everything.

The constitution envisages general elections in 1983. We believe that it would be counterproductive to hold them any sooner. If the UCD is unable to govern until then, it must make its mind up once and for all to form a coalition government with broad parliamentary support. Spain cannot bind its fate to the UCD's internal problems, and the UCD has no right to perpetuate a weak government with the sole aim of ensuring its monopoly in government posts.

A government which is strong by virtue of its parliamentary and social support is essential to surmount the threats hanging over democracy.

We will continue to work toward improving and developing cooperation with our socialist comrades and would support their presence in the government if that government's program is consistent with ours. Otherwise, we would adopt a stance of constructive opposition.

At the 10th Congress, the PCE finds itself at a crossroads, at which decisions will be made concerning its continued existenc , its chances of transforming itself in the medium term into a party with considerable electoral strength capable of wielding increasing influence within the left or within the sphere of national politics or of declining either into a dogmatic sector or into an exodus toward another party. Two factors could cause such a decline; the inclination to align with one of the major blocs through the atraction of power and of the abstract formulation of what we might call the "Mitterrand syndrome," the idea that the communist party is a historically obsolete instrument.

In Spain's historical situation, such an event would have very dangerous connotations for democracy. If one adds to the crisis of the UCD and the other political groups the crisis of the PCE and if the political parties on which the democratic system is now based present the people--who largely interpret such phenomena as petty struggles for no less petty portions of power--with the spectacle of their inconsistency, we will be providing ideal scope for the potential instigators of a coup d'etat.

And unless we abandon all sense of responsibility, we must not ignore the fact that in the near future this threat of a coup will be the main obstacle to be overcome to guarantee democratic freedoms.

I am convinced that the PCE is still a historical necessity. But we need a PCE that will democratize and regenerate itself continuously, without losing its distinguishing features; capable of acting as a genuine revolutionary Marxist vanguard of the creative masses and critical within the historical bloc that we must forge, and of its political, social and economic forms--a party in which there is broad circulation of ideas, but a homogeneous policy, not a conglomeration of sub-parties competing for the votes of a passive rank and file; leadership teams within which various comrades can express themselves differently, but within the framework of mutual cooperation and loyalty. A party whose aim is to win over the people, which is not the same as a party shaken by the pressures of society's ruling strata or by the powers of this world.

I am sure that we will emerge united, strengthened and regenerated from this 10th Congress. This is the responsibility of those of us in this room authorized to speak and to vote.

CSO: 3110/143

TENTH PCE CONGRESS HIGHLIGHTED

Socioeconomic Composition

Madrid MUNDO OBRERO in Spanish 14-20 Aug 81 p 17

[Text] Tenth Congress: Delegate Social Composition

Herewith we present the data gathered from a survey conducted among the delegates to the 10th PCE Congress. The figures give an idea of the social makeup of the thousand or so communist activists who debated and approved the party's policy. Among the most salient statistics are the overwhelming preponderance of men (90.56 percent) compared to women (9.43 percent) and virtual balance between industrial workers (33.05 percent) and professionals and intellectuals (30.05 percent). Also noteworthy is the meager presence of farm workers (3.75 percent), students and other categories, whereas the number of technicians is appreciable (9.43 percent). With regard to seniority in the party, more than half of the delegates to the congress joined after 1971, the average delegate membership in the PCE being 13.76 years.

Number of delegates to the 10th Congress	1,214	
Number of respondents	1,095	
Age	38.14	Percent
Men	991	90.56
Women	104	9.43
Industrial workers	363	33.05
White-collar workers	163	14.92
Farm workers	41	3.75
Farmers and ranchers	23	2.10
Self-employed	32	2.93
Businessmen	--	--
Professionals and intellectuals	329	30.05
Technicians	103	9.43
Students	14	1.28
Housewives	7	0.64
Services	6	0.54
Joined the Party:		
Before 1939	86	7.87
1939-1950	36	3.29
1951-1960	82	7.50

1961-1970	322	29.48
1971-1976	389	35.62
1977-1981	174	15.93

Years in the party: 13.76

Central Committee

Madrid MUNDO OBRERO in Spanish 7-13 Aug 81 pp 16-17

[Text] Central Committee

	Votes
1. Dolores Ibarruri	963
2. Marcelino Camacho	911
3. Nicolas Sartorius	838
4. Eulalia Vintro	813
5. Jordi Sole Tura	784
6. Antonio Gutierrez Diaz	782
7. Gregorio Lopez Raimundo	771
8. Francisco Frutos Gras	762
9. Enrique Curiel Alonso	750
10. Manuel Amor Deus	719
11. Carlos Paris Amador	704
12. Julian Ariza Rico	698
13. Pilar Arroyo	697
14. Cipriano Garcia	690
15. Santiago Carrillo Solares	687
16. Carlos Alonso Zaldivar	661
17. Andreu Claret	656
18. Ernesto Caballero	656
19. Miguel Nunez Gonzalez	649
20. Julio Segura Sanchez	649
21. Jaime Ballesteros	647
22. Jose Luis Nunez	642
23. Simon Sanchez Montero	634
24. Pilar Brabo Castells	632
25. Jose Maria Rodriguez Rov.	625
26. Manuel Camara Fernandez	623
27. Manuel Azcarate Diz	612
28. Leopoldo Alcaraz	605
29. Armando Lopez Salinas	604
30. Leonor Bornao	602
31. Ignacio Gallego Bezares	601
32. Pedro Marset Campos	598
33. Antonio Gutierrez Vergara	595
34. Jose Luis Lopez Bulla	594
35. Jaime Sartorius Bermudez	591
36. Emerito Bono	590
37. Maria Salce Elvira	590
38. Antonio Gonzalez Vieitez	589
39. Antonio Martin Lillo	583
40. Tomas Tueros Trueba	576
41. Eduardo Saborido Galan	576
42. Aurora Leon Gonzalez	575

43.	Juan Francisco Pla	571
44.	Sigfrido Domingo Rugino	571
45.	Adolfo Burriel Borque	568
46.	Pedro Bolivar Reverte	564
47.	Francisco Romero Marin	562
48.	Santiago Carrillo Menendez	560
49.	Jose Garcia Meseguer	557
50.	Agustin Gomez Puerta	554
51.	Horacio Lara Palma	553
52.	Julio Perez de le Fuente	551
53.	Jose Luis Inxausti Caton	549
54.	Antonio Romero Ruiz	548
55.	Felix Perez Carrasco	547
56.	Carmen Roney Albareda	546
57.	Juan Ignacio Castano	545
58.	Francisco Palero Gomez	545
59.	Anselmo Hoyos	545
60.	Javier Suarez Suarez	544
61.	Vicente Gutierrez Solis	542
62.	Mariano Fernandez-Fausti	538
63.	Juan Bosco Diaz Urmeneta	538
64.	Ignacio Latierro Corto	532
65.	Santiago Leal Martin Romo	531
66.	Manuel Anguita Peragon	528
67.	Javier Terriente Quesada	526
68.	Juan Pedro Zamora Suarez	526
69.	Pedro de Diego Garcia	523
70.	Manuel Vallejo Benitez	522
71.	Miguel Moran Diez	519
72.	Julio Setien Martinez	517
73.	Antonio Palomares	515
74.	A. Jimenez Castillo	515
75.	Jose Soriano Barquero	514
76.	Nicolas Perez Plasencia	512
77.	Gabriel Martinez	506
78.	Ramon Ormazabal	496
79.	Norberto Buenache Moratil	494
80.	Jose Maria Gonzalez Jerez	493
81.	Pilar Perez Fuentes	493
82.	Cesar Llorca Tello	492
83.	Vicente Zaragoza	491
84.	Txemi Cantera	482
85.	Santiago Alvarez	479
86.	Tina Guillen Cuesta	476
87.	Jordi Borja	463
88.	Joaquin Zamora	451
89.	Vicente Cazcarra Cremalle	443

Ex-Officio Members of the Central Committee

Felipe Alcaraz Masats, Jose Maria Coronas Salcedo, Jose Galan Pelaez, Jose Antonio Garcia Rubio, Rafael Gomez Soria, Angel Guerreiro Carreras, Gerardo Iglesias Arguellas, Roberto Lertxundi Baranano, Martin Silvan, Luis Martinez Fernandez, Jose Carlos Mauricio Rodriguez, Adolfo Pinedo Simal, Agustin Sanchez Trigueros, Jose Valero Gonzalez, Castilla-Leon.

Central Finance Control Committee

1. Jose Serrans	703
2. Francisco Agudo	702
3. Felix Fernandez	698
4. Juan Menor	687
5. Antonio Serrano	686

Central Guarantees and Control Committee

1. Luis Lucio Lobato	732
2. Manuel Alberdi	689
3. Antonio Montoya	683
4. Amador Fernandez Jose	682
5. Melquesidez Rodriguez	679
6. Timoteo Ruiz	671
7. Ambrosio Ortega	670
8. Vicente Mendez	668
9. Felix Perez Garrido	664

Votes cast: 1,079
Invalid: 23
Valid: 1,056

Honorary Members of the Central Committee

1. Rafael Alberti; 2. Manuel Benitez Rufo; 3. Jose Bonifaci; 4. Miguel Caballero; 5. Francisco Ciutat; 6. Irene Falcon; 7. Jose Cros Camiso; 8. Narciso Julian; 9. Domingo Malagon; 10. Ramon Mendezona; 11. Wenceslao Roces; 12. Jose Sandoval; 13. Rafael Vidiella; 14. Sebastian Zapirain

Main Issues Editorialized

Madrid MUNDO OBRERO in Spanish 7-13 Aug 81 p 4

[Editorial: "A Party to Apply Eurocommunism"]

[Text] The 10th Congress of the Spanish Communist Party has been a vigorous reaffirmation of Eurocommunism. This can be seen in the position papers approved by the congress plenum after intense work by the committees that discussed the many amendments submitted by the various delegations.

The 10th Congress addressed another fundamental issue that has prompted impassioned debate in the organizations: adapting the party to new conditions, determining what kind of party we need to apply our Eurocommunist policy.

First in the Labor Committee and then at the plenum, the congress rejected the amendments aimed at institutionalizing opinion currents, which would lead, in a dangerous give-and-take, to tendencies and factions. In this regard, the new bylaws passed by the congress leave no room for doubt: the utmost internal democracy, the broadest freedom of expression and a proper application of democratic centralism, which is indispensable to guarantee unity of action on the basis of a political line approved by the majority.

Federalism was another major topic under discussion in connection with a party model. By a wide majority the congress turned back this amendment and passed the draft bylaws submitted by the Central Committee, which contain major federative elements, including full autonomy for regional or nationality parties in formulating and pursuing policy within their sphere, while at the same time maintaining national-level control, the joint formulation of policy, and the binding nature of decisions and resolutions of PCE leadership bodies. To this we can add ex-officio membership on the Central Committee for the secretaries general of the regional or nationality parties and a system for resolving the conflicts that might arise among these parties or between the leadership of the PCE and one or several of the parties that belong to it.

In addition to the position papers and bylaws, the report of the outgoing Central Committee, presented by Santiago Carrillo and approved by the congress plenum, offered important elements for reflection and clear-cut guidelines for future work. Analyzing our shortcomings and mistakes is, in a nutshell, our major task over the coming months in building the party that our Eurocommunist strategy requires. This task means working from the bottom and towards the bottom, in other words, devoting priority attention to the associations so that we can turn them into the focal points for spreading our policy. It is not a question of merely visiting the associations. It is a question of being there and pushing for a return to the political cadres by reminding people that the associations are the party's main link with the masses.

In spite of the intensity of activity and the enthusiasm of debate, the party did not look inward only. Its decisions and resolutions and Santiago's report itself addressed the serious problems of our day, the problems of Spain and the problems of a world immersed in an arms race and threatened by war.

The bottom line on the 10th Congress is positive, because of its decisions and resolutions and because of the full-fledged, forthright democracy that marked it. But even though they are to the point, the bylaws and position papers by themselves are not enough to satisfy the hopes that broad segments of our people have placed in the Communist Party. We have to honor the decisions and

respect the rules established by the congress. Now is the time to work enthusiastically and doggedly to revitalize the party and, along with the vast working class masses, to help bolster democracy, resolve the problems of unemployment and economic crisis, fully democratize the machinery of the State and prevent Spain from joining NATO.

Resolutions Approved

Madrid MUNDO OBRERO in Spanish 14-20 Aug 81 pp 17-18

[Text] Resolutions of the 10th Congress

Over its 4 days of work, the 10th Congress of the PCE passed a series of resolutions that our space limitations prevent us from offering in their entirety. In the first resolution the congress expressed "its resolute opposition to Spain's membership in NATO," contending that under no circumstances can we allow such a serious decision to be imposed on the country by a simple majority vote in Parliament, as the government would have it. "The congress," the resolution asserted, "calls on all party organizations and activists to immediately undertake a signature-gathering campaign so that the issue of our membership in NATO is obligatorily put to a referendum of the people."

In another resolution on MUNDO OBRERO, the congress disclosed that "various precongress conferences in regions and provinces have passed resolutions demanding to know why the daily MUNDO OBRERO was suspended. The resolution pointed out that although the outgoing Central Committee broached this issue in its sessions on 8 and 9 December 1980 and passed a resolution in this regard that was published in the 12-18 December issue of MUNDO OBRERO, the aforementioned resolutions indicate that the party has not been sufficiently informed on this issue. The 10th Congress entrusts the new Central Committee with furnishing the pertinent information to the party as a whole, so that what happened with the daily MUNDO OBRERO is cleared up once and for all."

In its resolution on political training, the congress made the following recommendations:

"The 10th Congress of the PCE entrusts the new Central Committee with taking the necessary steps so that this requirement is met and formulates the following recommendations:

1. For the immediate future the essential substance of political training ought to be the study of the documents passed by the 10th Congress: Central Committee report, position papers and bylaws. The documents connected with specific sector issues approved by the 10th Congress should also be utilized.

2. Based on the contents of these documents, we would emphasize, political training must aim at making an essential contribution to the homogeneity of the PCE in connection with its Eurocommunist option, as spelled out by this

congress. This option is the PCE's strategic and tactical line in the struggle to consolidate and develop democracy and to achieve socialism in freedom."

With regard to the grievances of pensioners and retirees, the congress worked out the following general lines of the party's policy, among other measures:

--The need to replace the policy of disenfranchisement, charity and paternalism that the administration is pursuing towards pensioners and retirees, with a more just, equitable and democratic policy.

--To put pensioners and retirees under a single retirement and pension system, eliminating the others.

--To see to it that the minimum pension is equal to the minimum inter-professional wage for all those who do not achieve this level, while adjusting it periodically and automatically for any depreciations.

--To demand that no person over age 65 be without a pension. Initially, the pension would assistance-level [social] but in a few years would be brought up to the level of other minimum pensions.

--To stress the need for the Public Health Ministry to develop a network of health care centers for the elderly that would take the necessary measures to prevent or delay chronic diseases.

--To provide the country a well-planed network of retirement homes and clubs to furnish all necessary social services: promoting the various forms of culture, leisure time, trips, vacations, etc.

--To build well-designed, inviting and functional residences without architectural barriers so that the elderly can live in their regular homes, thus preventing them from being uprooted from their environment and avoiding the trauma that this brings on.

--A greater democratization of retirement residences, homes and clubs, by boosting the beneficiaries' involvement and control over them and by issuing new, democratically drafted bylaws for these centers.

--To expand Social Security assistance services in the home for as many of the elderly who need it and devoting particular attantion to those who live alone and are without family.

--To eventually coordinate the economic efforts and resources of Social Security, city halls, the Red Cross, savings banks, etc, for in-home assistance and for the creation of daytime geriatric hospitals.

--Active participation for pensioners and retirees in the management, control and monitoring of the various agencies that are run by Public Health, Social Security and social services...

The congress passed other resolutions, on emigration and fishing in particular.

Main Events Summarized

Madrid MUNDO OBRERO in Spanish 7-13 Aug 81 pp 9-11

[Text] While a great many Spaniards were enjoying their vacations and thousands of Madrid residents left the city half-deserted, communists from all over Spain convened in our capital city. The representative neighborhood of Chamberi was the scene of unusual activity by morning. From Santisima Trinidad to Bravo Murillo, the communist delegates were breakfasting on crullers and hot coffee (despite the temperature), clutching their recently obtained credentials for the 10th Congress.

The lobby at Quevedo Cinema was slowly filling up. It was more or less 1000 hours when thunderous applause greeted the arrival of Dolores Ibarruri, applause that was repeated by those already in the hall, and applause that would thunder even louder when, after all the delegates had convened, La Pasionaria was nominated as a congress officer.

Simon Sanchez Montero opened the congress at 1045 hours by proposing the following list of officers, which was approved without opposition: Gerardo Iglesias, president; Dolores Ibarruri, Santiago Carrillo, Jose Carlos Mauricio, Rafael Pillado, Ignacio Gallego, Marcelino Camacho, Pedro Zamora, Julio Anguita, Pedro Bolivar, Tomas Tueros, Jose Salas, Rafael Gomez Soria, Victor Cueto, Juan Francisco Pla, with Rafael Alberti and Amaro del Rosal as honorary members. Four secretaries were also nominated and accepted.

The Corridors Begin Resounding

The initial comments by the delegates were immediately forthcoming. All of them were impressed by what they called the "strength" of the officers list. Some disliked it; others approved it without reservations. All thought that it was going to be a congress without concessions at which each delegate was going to have to do his best to present his political proposals to his comrades in the most convincing manner.

What could be described as the first battle of this 10th Congress began immediately. Five amendments were submitted to the regulations that had been discussed the previous evening with the delegation chairmen. Only one of them passed, the one dealing with the definition of a minority, which was set at 25 percent of the votes of committee members, instead of 33 percent as had been stipulated.

Coming up was the main course for the day: the Central Committee report. It was slightly past noon when Santiago Carrillo began reading the report that had been approved the previous weekend. It was an extensive, thick, combative 4-hour report that the delegates were able to follow in MUNDO OBRERO, which was distributed to the more than 2,000 delegates, guests and reporters at the start of the opening session.

It was known in advance that the report could not satisfy all, but it was nevertheless interrupted on six occasions by applause, particularly when he asserted: "Though it is legitimate for an army to feel proud of having defeated a foreign aggressor in a national war, such pride is not that legitimate in a civil war, which patriotism should move us all to put in its historic place as a painful episode that is not to be repeated."

It was 1600 hours when the morning session adjourned with the reading of the list of delegations attending the 10th Congress. There were loud ovations for all of them, especially Cuba, and solidarity was expressed through endless applause for the comrades who are struggling for the independence and freedom of the people of El Salvador.

Not Just the Discussions Were Heated

The delegates could not have put on too much weight in Madrid. The lengthy morning session prevented many of them from having lunch on the very first day, and they had to settle for a makeshift snack and something later on.

The evening session was for delegation debate of the report. The lucky ones had air-conditioned meeting rooms. Others fought the heat by stripping down. The Galicians sweated profusely. And they were not the only ones.

There was also heat in the speeches. The Basque Country argued strenuously over point three in the report, and some of the comments were especially critical. The Andalusians also had a lively discussion, and to a lesser extent so did the Valencians and Asturians, who were just as impassioned, however. Madrid, in contrast and as expected, had a lively discussion concerning the assignment of delegates to the various committees, though in the end everything seemed to have been settled. It only seemed that way because debate flared up again the following day.

The Longest Day

It will not be easy for many of the delegates to forget the second day of the congress. The fatigue that built up as the day wore on was so severe that some people will need part of their vacation to recuperate from this 29 July. The most frequently heard comment was that it was just as well that the congresses are only every 3 years.

The day began with speeches by the various delegations on the report presented the day before by the secretary general, and the arguments indicated how

the voting would go. The first to speak was Jose Luis Martinez, representing the minority position on the Aragon delegation. Then came Antonio de las Casas, on behalf of the majority, who presaged the tone of the session quite well: "The delegation from Aragon is divided between approval of and abstention from voting on the report that we debated. Important critiques were voiced in both cases."

Indeed, criticism was an important factor at this congress. In the end, the vote count was divided between approval and abstention, with one faction of the PSUC [Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia] clearly voting no. Andalusia, 142 for, 61 abstentions; Castile-Leon, majority approval, with the minority abstaining; Basque Country, 40 abstentions and 12 for; Galicia with a majority in favor; Murcia, 24 for, 4 abstentions; Castile-La Mancha had no minority position and approved the report; the Canary Islands too; Cantabria, 12 abstentions and 3 for; Valencia, 95 for and 11 abstentions; Asturias, 55 for and 5 abstentions; PSUC, 90 for, 5 abstentions and 35 against; Extremadura in favor; the Balearic Islands too; emigrants, 60 for and 1 abstention.

The last to speak was Paco Frutos, the secretary general of the PSUC, and his speech was awaited with understandable expectation. Following him were Nicolas Sartorius and Jaime Ballesteros, who submitted the position papers and bylaws. The first part of the longest day of the Congress had concluded.

The Endless Bylaws

Debate on the position papers and bylaws began that evening, and of course interest focused on Position Paper VII and the bylaws. As if the debate were not enough, the heat wreaked havoc with the delegates, one of whom fainted. One of the many little incidents that took place.

The debate was arduous. Procedural matters delayed taking up the issues of substance, and for a while it was thought that the plenum would have to decide on some of the objections advanced either in the papers themselves or by some delegation. The obstacles were finally surmounted, and a majority stand, which included the numerous amendments that the position paper had assimilated, and a minority stand, with an amendment covering the entire position paper, were put before the plenum.

Debating the bylaws took even longer. It was 800 hours by the time the delegates to this committee were finished and looked at the morning sun through the door at Santisima Trinidad, where their session was held. Procedural matters also took up much of the long initial debate when a number of Madrid delegates submitted a challenge to the proportional standards according to which the delegation had been selected. The issue was finally resolved by adopting a flexible stance, and although it did not achieve minority status, an amendment backed by delegates from this city was put before the plenum, specifically in Article 16.

Report Approved

The voting on the secretary general's report was not much different from what had been predicted the day before. Secretary General Santiago Carrillo's speech lasted 40 minutes, after which the vote was taken. The congress then proceeded to debate and approve the various position papers.

The first major debate took place in connection with the amendment to the entirety of Position Paper VII. The debate took much longer than expected, as the mere reading of the alternative paper lasted 40 minutes. Speaking for the majority, Vicente Cazcarra delivered an especially tense and controversial speech that was greeted with whistles of displeasure by a segment of the delegates, which triggered loud applause from other members of the audience. This was unquestionably the moment of greatest confrontation and tension.

Once things had practically settled down after the vote was taken on Position Paper VII, the congress began debating the bylaws, and in this connection we should underscore the speeches by Jaime Sartorius and Julio Anguita, the mayor of Cordoba, in defense of the minority stands. The Andalusian's address was particularly brilliant, and he was rebutted by Adolfo Pinedo in what could be regarded as one of the high points in the organizational debate. Jaime Sartorius, whose address as the other spokesman of the minority was clearly designed to dampen the debate, was rebutted by Santiago Carrillo Menendez.

Tense Debate During the Vote

The closing session turned out to be just as long as the preceding ones. Santiago Carrillo, who was reelected secretary general, delivered the concluding speech, and Dolores Ibarruri was once again chosen as party president.

Prior to this, however, the session was especially tough. After the bylaws had been taken care of in the morning the delegates met in a closed door session starting at 1600 hours to vote in the new members of the Central Committee.

Almost all delegates described Friday's evening session as especially tough. It was not until 7 hours after debate began that the doors swung open for the exhausted and, for the most part, hungry, delegates. Many of them had already missed their trains home.

The subsequent wait was a long one. As we have already mentioned, at 400 hours on Saturday 1 August 1,200 delegates left the assembly hall exhausted by what was unquestionably the PCE's hardest fought congress in recent times. Now that it is over, it is up to the party to implement the policies approved.

Sartorius on Communism

Madrid MUNDO OBRERO in Spanish 7-13 Aug 81 p 14

[Text] On Wednesday, the second day of the congress, after debate on the Central Committee report, Nicolas Sartorius and Jaime Ballesteros, speaking

on behalf of the outgoing Central Committee submitted the draft position papers and bylaws to the plenum. The following are excerpts from their speeches.

Nicolas Sartorius: Everyone Has His Place in the Party

The outgoing Central Committee has entrusted me with the task of putting before you the position papers that are going to be debated and, when the time comes, voted on at this 10th Congress of the PCE, in the wake of the work done by the respective committees (...)

In this document, friends and comrades, we have set several basic goals for ourselves, which I will summarize as follows:

--Above all, to present guidelines that are as explicit as possible for solutions to the major problems facing Spain and the world today, especially in connection with the concerns and problems facing the working class, peasant farmers, the forces of culture, women and young people, in a word, the hardworking masses of the peoples of Spain.

--Then, to see to it that they represent an affirmation and development of our Eurocommunist strategy, not only in their formulation but in practice as well. We would like these position papers, this congress to be a complete confirmation of our own road to socialism; in a word, to see to it that Eurocommunism is an irreversible phenomenon for Spanish communism. If we want this to come about and never more be question in our midst, we have to convince, in theory and in practice, more and more segments of our people; we have to combine it with the actual methods of the working class, the forces of culture and the masses in our country. In particular, we have to see to it that the party's cadres and activists endorse this new concept of the revolution in the established capitalist countries as a conscious class need, not as an act of party discipline.

--Then, as would be expected, to point out a clear political line for the party in the upcoming years. This political line should not contain major changes from what we have been doing in recent years, because we feel that our policy guidelines are still sound, although these texts do offer a number of clarifications and additions to avert the contradictions that we have at times lapsed into in the past. Now then, the fact that our political line has been proper does not mean that our political practice has been sound. We have made mistakes in the PCE, some of them serious. It is precisely because we intended to propose comprehensive alternatives and a clear-cut political line that, in contrast to what happened at the Ninth Congress, we have avoided writing parochial position papers (like air-tight compartments) that are devoid of internal consistency and logic. One of the inevitable upshots of this is that particularly important issues such as those affecting various social movements, like feminism, young people, emigrants, ecology, etc have not been dealt with as extensively as they ought to be. We believe,

however, that we should not repeat in every congress what we have said in previous ones or in subsequent detailings, and we would suggest that these issues, aside from what the position papers themselves say, be brought up in resolutions to be passed at the congress, thus becoming part of the party's policy.

Briefly outlined, these are the novel or most controversial aspects of the position papers:

--In the first place, I think that we have succeeded in establishing a clearer and more precise stand than we have so far on international issues, which can be summarized in the following points:

1. The absolute independence of our party in formulating its domestic and foreign policy has been one of its assets for some time now. We must establish once and for all, as an issue that has been settled for some time now, that the PCE's distinguishing characteristics are in its own hands and in the history of these same hands, a history that we fully accept and that has its roots in the great October socialist revolution. Thus, we have no umbilical cord to anyone; instead, we have an increasingly thick rope linking us with the workers and with the interests of our people, our homeland, the sole guide for our actions.

2. Our overall strategic line has become our battlefront for peace, disarmament, detente and a dissolution of military blocs, not a generic anti-imperialist front that in practice would be nothing more than communist agitation and propaganda in favor of one of the blocs. Our concrete, not abstract contribution to the anti-imperialist struggle is precisely this battle for peace and disarmament. Thus, we must put into practice our categorical opposition to Spain's membership in NATO.

3. An unhesitating move towards Europe. We are for membership in the EEC, but this is only one aspect of the problem. Above all, we are in favor of a strategy of the European Left for peace and socialism in freedom. We have a European vision of the march towards socialism, which entails surmounting the historic divisions in the activities of socialists and communists on the Old Continent. Mitterrand's victory in France fills us with hope. The PCE must enhance its European culture.

4. The belief that the European autonomy movements in the East as well as the West are interrelated and will either help or harm each other. The course of events in Poland seems very positive to us for this process.

5. An accurate and logical analysis of the historic and present-day realities of the socialist countries. A balance between a historic and present-day assessment of their role vis-a-vis imperialism and our sober criticisms of degenerative developments and the lack of democracy. We said some time ago that these realities are not a model for us, but neither are they something that has nothing to do with socialism. The PCE must shun sentimental, gut-level or subjective stands in addressing these issues.

6. A new international economic order that entails a qualitative change in relations with the Third World. The European Left must avoid the Eurocentrist temptation like the plague and realize that its well-being hinges on an alliance with the countries and movements that are struggling for their political and economic independence. The PCE must bolster its commitment to the struggle of these peoples (...)

The 10th Congress must be a time to reflect on the choices that our society will have to make, so that we can help consolidate democracy, make Eurocommunism irreversible and help the party to again find its balance, more advanced and more united, as a basic and indispensable tool for moving society towards socialism and communism.

Ballesteros: No to Factions

Madrid MUNDO OBRERO in Spanish 7-13 Aug 81 p 15

[Text] There have obviously been inadequacies, shortcomings and mistakes that we have to correct in the efforts of our leadership bodies and of the party as a whole...We have to give a new direction to the work of thousands of cadres (starting with the Central Committee and other leadership bodies) and aim our activities downward, towards the grassroots, towards the party as a whole and towards the masses that we want to lead and represent (...) Since our legialization we have experienced an upward flight of cadres towards the committees, which swelled without gaining either in efficiency or in true coparticipation; there was also a flight from the rank-and-file, from work in the associations. The consequences of this have been obvious (...)

The bond between the PC and society cannot be forged either exclusively or primarily on the basis of our political decisions as reflected in our activities and in city halls. The party's relationship with the masses cannot be merely party to voter or manager to citizen (...) The more active ties we have with the masses, the better a position we will be in to hammer out solutions to these problems. This new direction...will demand a closer relationship between the party leadership and the party as a whole...which means that the party leadership will have to have greater political and operational capabilities.

We have therefore proposed a smaller Central Committee that can better organize its work (...), a smaller Executive Committee as well that would meet biweekly, thus achieving continuity as a political leadership body that the current Executive Committee has not, and an operational Secretariat, by abolishing the dual function that the Standing Committee and the Secretariat shared during this period (...)

Our party differs from other Communist parties, Eurocommunist parties included, because of its efforts to tailor its internal structures to the fact that Spain is a nation of nationalities and regions. Therefore, our party has been conforming to the imperative and undisputed fact that it is one party by transforming its organizations into parties of nationalities and regions with their own identity and with the fullest autonomy in formulating policy in their autonomous communities.

(...) Bearing these realities in mind, we have introduced several changes in the draft bylaws, certain federative elements (...) However, we do not agree that the PCE should be organized as a federal party. We do not agree with such proposals, and not because of the pro forma problem of the word "federal." This is not a problem of wording. As we all know, there are parties that call themselves federal but in fact are completely centralist. What these propositions, in fact, offer is not so much the idea of a federal party as the transformation of the PCE into a confederation of parties (...)

We believe that this concept of the party is not in keeping with the realities of Spain and would weaken communists, the working class and the forces of culture throughout Spain and in each nationality and region (...)

Lastly and with the obligatory brevity, I would like to discuss the amendments relating to the creation of currents or factions. These amendments are obviously not proposing the same thing as when we talk about differing sensitivities or backgrounds in the party. They are proposing factions grouped around specific stands, either politically or organizationally.

I am convinced that the organization, the institutionalization of factions in the party would diminish democracy instead of enhancing it and rather than representing organizational progress towards an increasingly Eurocommunist party, would be a regression to the old methods of former social democracy, which socialist parties themselves are striving to transcend, especially the ones in which socialists are facing off with social democrats.

The formation of factions in our party would entail groupings around platforms or leaders. It would mean the establishment at all levels, parallel to party organizations and to their leadership bodies, of other leadership centers, with their own organizational activities, their own recruitment drives, their own struggles among themselves (...)

This would not open the party up to a pluralist, diverse society; rather, it would cause the party to look inward and become disorganized at all levels. Let's not fool ourselves. It would mean a multiplication of leadership centers intertwined with the party's regular governing bodies, regardless of how strongly and sincerely we underscore in the bylaws the need for unity of action.

And the same thing goes for the idea of the minorities being able to express themselves as groups in public. If a minority is entitled to express itself as a group in public, first we are giving shape to that minority and thus organizing a faction, and second we are offering the party and the masses two political options (...)

Carrillo's Concluding Remarks

Madrid MUNDO OBRERO in Spanish 7-13 Aug 81 pp 19-23

[Speech by PCE Secretary General Santiago Carrillo at 30 July 10th PCE Congress: "A Party Regenerated and United After Congress"]

[Text] I believe that we can say, not without pride, that at this congress a free and open debate is proceeding, that this debate is being conducted with complete openness toward the press and society and that at this congress and in this party there is no dark corner and no shadowy area which is not illuminated by publicity and by the most complete openness. I believe that it has also been possible to see that--as Comrade Pinedo was saying yesterday--in this party everybody thinks with his own head.

There have been many criticisms of the report which I submitted, and I wish to emphasize something that was said yesterday, namely that that report is not a personal report of my own; it is a report which was debated, approved and corrected in part at the party Central Committee plenum, and that although my fallible hand participated in its drafting, the ideas expressed in it are not ideas which I invented in a vacuum, isolated from the party as a whole; they are ideas which we formulated in comparisons and exchanges of ideas and in debates, and which, in short, are the product of a collective formulation.

The report has been criticized for not being apparently oriented toward society and its problems. I believe that a careful reading of the report, outside the rather emotional atmosphere of the congress, would show that even the internal criticism and self-criticism have a very direct bearing on the requirements for conducting politics and doing so effectively within this society. Of course, there is the examination of internal problems, and these could not fail to exist, because for some time criticism has been occurring in the party of its leadership and internal functioning, and if we had not raised these issues, doing so with a self-critical approach, the congress would have been right to say that we were avoiding problems with which we had been confronted and that we were attempting to evade our responsibilities by raising only the problems of a general political, social and economic nature which Spanish society has today.

Those internal problems must be resolved, and they must be resolved precisely in order to be able to tackle current political issues more effectively and vigorously.

Question of MUNDO OBRERO Daily

The report has even been criticized because I did not refer in it to what happened to MUNDO OBRERO daily. I must say that nobody in the Central Committee--nobody--spoke up to say that it was necessary to pay attention to the question of MUNDO OBRERO daily here. But since it has been raised here, I wish to say that MUNDO OBRERO daily was a long-standing project. While a section of the leadership was still in exile, we launched the 200 million pesetas campaign for MUNDO OBRERO daily. There was already a desire to equip the party with a daily newspaper when we regained legality. And it must be said that those 200 million

pesetas were collected to that end, but it should also be said that most of the sums collected domestically, in Spain, during that period were spent here on the party organizations' work and never reached the MUNDO OBRERO fund. This MUNDO OBRERO fund was in fact composed mainly of the emigrant comrades' aid.

I believe that when we decided in the Central Committee to undertake publication of MUNDO OBRERO, we were too subjective, and I for my part accept the principal share of responsibility for that subjectivism, both when the 200 million pesetas campaign was proposed in Paris and when I supported and maintained here the need for MUNDO OBRERO to be published daily. The fact is that we did not yet possess at the time when we launched it the material basis necessary for maintaining a daily newspaper and that in that we were mistaken. And on that we spent money which had been collected for MUNDO OBRERO daily.

I accept my responsibility and that of the entire Central Committee in this matter, but I at least do not relinquish the idea of the party's having again a MUNDO OBRERO daily some day. The conditions must be created without impatience for this to happen.

It is true that the party press is very difficult to maintain, but the communist parties in general have demonstrated that they are capable, with great sacrifice, of maintaining communist daily newspapers, and they need them, because this is the only way to have a voice which objectively and directly expresses their opinions and judgments about the problems of the country's life.

Eurocommunist Strategy

Entering now into what is the essence of the report, I believe that the Central Committee report propounds and defends the party's Eurocommunist strategy, and that there are no doubts or uncertainties about this strategic line which is advocated in the report: A strategic line which asserts our independent stance, our democratic and pluralist attitude and our stance in favor of what has been termed the revolution of the majority, supported, I would add, by the majority and corrected by the majority when the revolution does not proceed along the path desired by the majority.

And hence the issues of alternation in power, the issue of political support in society and the possibility of dismissing a government through the ballot box.

Obviously that is the essential issue in the report, and many issues are missing; in fact the issue of emigration is missing, the specific issue of women or of young people is missing, an enormous number of issues are missing, but when we drafted it we believed that it was necessary to concentrate on the essential issues posed today in this party and this country. And the essential thing was and is to assert the party's Eurocommunist strategy, and in this respect it can already be asserted that the party congress will not disappoint. The Eurocommunist line will be confirmed with many nuances, comrades, which should shock or alarm nobody, because they reflect a reality of our party.

Military Pacts

During the debate on the report it was asked why in international policy we approach the socialist countries, asking them for a specific initiative concerning

the military pacts. And I ask: Whom could we approach, asking for that, except the socialist countries? Could we approach the United States? We already know that the United States would pay no attention, of course, to a request which we made to it. But we are also approaching the Socialist International, requesting solidarity, so that if it is planned to take Spain into NATO without consulting the people, that solidarity will be exercised with Spain and with the Spanish people. Of course, we are launching that initiative, but we hope that the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) comrades will join in it, since it is they who may have greater influence among the Socialist International parties.

The problem of NATO and of the bases has also been raised. The fact is that we did not embark upon a campaign against entry into NATO previously because we attempted to prevent that problem from coming before parliament and being raised, and to ensure that that problem was frozen, and because we did not wish to ideologize with an exclusively communist initiative an issue which, as I explained in the Central Committee's report, is a national issue which would have been ideologized and turned into an issue no longer of the Left but of the extreme Left if we had embarked upon an individual campaign concerning this issue.

Although I must say, because this is the truth, that there has been no party rally, no round table and no opportunity--for instance, even when discussing other issues on television--when we have not introduced the issue of our opposition to entry into NATO, and what is involved now is to conduct this campaign of collecting signatures.

We were hoping that during this congress we would already have the signatures heading an appeal for a referendum. I hope that we will still have it, because we want that appeal to be headed by personalities who as far as possible will reflect a spectrum of Spanish public opinion which is not especially leftwing. And as far as the bases are concerned, as we have said, we will oppose the bases as long as the bases are an element in the government's strategy of beginning participation within NATO.

As regards the issues of Eurocommunist policy and of Eurocommunist strategy, I will not refer to other aspects. I do wish to say that I deem it totally unjust to say at this congress that we have endorsed the policy of no changes in the state apparatus and that we have not defended human rights. I regard this as totally unjust, and I believe that it reflects a viewpoint which is so biased, so specific and so particular that it does not require my entering once again just now into the exposition of the viewpoints, the facts and the details which demonstrate that we have defended human rights and that if the laws approved in parliament are no worse and have been improved in those respects, that is due to the communist parliamentary group's activity.

The Conception of the Party

It seems to me that, with the vast majority of us being in agreement on the Eurocommunist strategy, I repeat, with nuances which exist in the reality of the party and which nobody could propose to delete with one stroke of the pen, the issue around which the debate at this congress has essentially been polarized

is, rather, the issue of the conception of the party. This involves what party we wish to build, what party is the right party today for implementing the Eurocommunist policy and what party we will reach agreement on now; and we will debate this issue, I am convinced--as Comrade Lertxundi was saying here yesterday--with the intention on everybody's part to heed the resolutions adopted by this congress on this and on all other issues.

It has been said here that we need another party, that we are maintaining the party model of the Third International, that we are maintaining the traditional model. In contrast with this it has been argued, and not incorrectly, that certain contributions and certain innovations reflect the model of the former Second International and that we are maintaining the traditional party model I would say: "It is obvious, comrades, that you have not known the traditional party model. Or, if you have known it, you have forgotten it, because who could imagine a debate such as this in the traditional model, and, I would say, moreover, who could imagine today in many communist parties--and I do not say this rhetorically--a debate such as this?" Who could imagine in the traditional party model a precongress preparation such as we have had?

This party no longer has anything to do with the traditional model of the days of the Third International, and only those who have not known this model could assert such a thing. In our party there is broad debate and a comparison of different stances, and at this congress we are not only maintaining different stances in the debate, we are maintaining them in statements to the mass media. At this congress there is a freedom and a clarity which I believe must be maintained and preserved and which is characteristic of a new kind of party inspired neither by the model of the Third International nor by that of the Second International.

Return to Associations

That is what must be preserved and developed, but together with that, comrades--and I emphasize what was advocated in the Central Committee's report--party democracy, in order to be full, requires that we communists return to the associations to revitalize them, that we communists ensure that this debate takes place throughout the party, and that our associations penetrate, work on, create and develop mass movements. I am convinced that if we do this, the doors of our party will indeed not open for anybody to leave, although we cannot deny anybody the right, either, to leave if he disagrees with the party.

The doors of our party will open so that those who have left can return and to admit many people who are still in a position to join the party and who will join it when our party's internal life revives and develops with that policy of strengthening the grassroots organization.

What is hampering a more general agreement at this congress, in my opinion, is a certain conception of the party that we want. No sooner is there talk of currents and tendencies than there is talk--and, for my part, this is the first time that I have heard this expression--of "pluralism within the party." Comrades, it may be that this business about pluralism in the party means nothing unusual or

alarming, but in any event, if we take what pluralism means literally, I frankly do not see a monolithic party, but neither do I see a pluralist communist party, and let those who speak of pluralism not accuse me of Manichaeism when I said that there were those who advocated a party which would be a reflection of present-day society, because in fact that conception of pluralism is identified with a party which is a reflection of present-day society.

The Minorities and Unity of Action

There is also talk of the right of the minorities, and I believe that terrible confusion is being created in which we will end up by not knowing very clearly what we are discussing, although in fact and at bottom there are those who know very well what they are discussing and what they want.

I believe that the rights of the minorities are fully guaranteed at this congress, and that the minorities are able to express and defend their stances. The minorities are acting with complete freedom, and nobody could say that the right of the minorities is being denied here; but, comrades [it is a question of the] right of the minorities until the debate ends and until the debate results in specific decisions, but after the debate results in specific decisions, can the minorities continue to defend their minority stances publicly against those of the majority?

Seemingly, a formal democratic viewpoint would appear to say "yes," and it would be "yes" if this party and this party's decisions were for the purpose of constructing canals, roads, bridges, buildings, and, in general, conducting politics, and politics are conducted by writing and speaking, in addition to organizing and working, and if after the congress the minority continues to defend its stances in the press and verbally outside the party, what is clear is that the minority will be conducting a policy other than the one congress decided on, and that, comrades, is not democracy [sentence as published].

What is democratic is for the minority to give way to the majority, and when they raise again in another precongress process or at a party congress or Central Committee meeting issues which are contentious, fine; everybody reassumes his stances in that debate, defends them, and again, when the debate ends and resolutions are adopted, everybody implements the policy determined by the majority.

Otherwise, comrades, this would not be one party; it would be two or three parties, and this is what we said in the Central Committee's report; three different parties can never coexist within a single party. Does that mean that there are no permanent free forums and that on matters of theory, of theoretical formulation, there is no freedom and a permanent debate without bounds, without limits, within the party? No, we are not in favor of such a permanent debate without bounds and without limits within the party.

However, I believe that the great problem of our theoretical formulation is not only whether we will be a party with tendencies or factions; I believe that Eurocommunism, Spain's multifaceted situation, social and economic problems and the prospect for progress toward socialism require many theoretical formulations which unfortunately do not have today the place which they should have within the framework of our party's theoretical activity.

I believe, comrades, that we must say clearly that this is the majority opinion of the outgoing Central Committee which I am expressing and defending here; we must say clearly that if we do not stop the steps which have been taken toward the organized formation of tendencies--and I am not threatening anybody here; I am saying this to everybody, to all those who in one way or another have taken part, consciously or otherwise--if we do not stop this, if all of us are not determined to end this, so that there will be freedom of debate, so that there will be debate, but not factions, this party could destroy itself within a very brief space of time.

Process of Disintegration of Democratic Forces

I am not attempting to impress anybody, but I tell you that in the democratic forces of this Spanish society we are witnessing a process of disintegration which coincides with a process of recomposition of the extreme rightwing forces, which are venturing to make public statements such as those which we heard a very few days ago from the lips of a current military authority, and we are not countering the processes of disintegration which are taking place in Spanish society, and if we communists do not set an example against those processes of disintegration, we will be objectively contributing to our country's turning back, and to the possibilities of a coup, of a regression, being confirmed. We must be aware of this, and I am not using it as a means of pressure but as a fact which exists and which we must bear in mind if we do not wish democracy in this country to go to hell.

After this congress we must all strive to ensure that with an awareness on the part of each of us--and I am speaking of those who are on one side and those who are on another--we end factions, currents and groups in this party.

Autonomy Initiatives

It has been stated in a criticism of the report that a specific treatment of the issue of the state of the autonomies is necessary. Concerning this issue, I wish to say that we are in favor of the parties of the nationalities and regions having the fullest autonomy in formulating and implementing their policy in the regions and nationalities in which they operate, and what is at issue more really is not that there has been centralist pressure from Madrid to determine the policy of this or that party in this or that nation or region; but, rather, that the parties of the nationalities and regions--although not all of them--have not yet thoroughly used that real autonomy which they have had, which they have, from the party. In some instances we have encouraged political initiatives which had nothing exactly to do with party policy at the state level and which took into account the peculiarities of a nationality or region. I believe that that capacity for initiative, for political decisionmaking and for adjusting communist or Eurocommunist policy is the same; nobody will call its nationalities or regions into question in the PCE. But at the same time, we want a PCE which will have a personality as such and a capacity for decisionmaking as such, and not a federation of parties which would place us in a position of inferiority in this country's political life and would achieve nothing.

The tone of my speech has been criticized. It has been said that it was a rally-type speech, and this has been said in a rally-type manner, likewise. Comrades, I know my own shortcomings; at least, some of them. I am not a kind of paternalist chairman in this party who spends his time flattering everybody,

applying balm to everybody's wounds, reassuring everbody and attempting to agree with everybody.

I am not like that; I am a man who makes decisions; I am a man who has ideas and who defends them. That I have done and that I will do throughout my life, and in defending them I express the passion which I am bound to express. And here we are conducting a debate of ideas--at least, as far as I am concerned, what is being conducted is a debate of ideas--but afterward I am capable of working jointly, without any bitterness and resentment, with those who have opposed me, provided that we both accept the decisions and cooperate sincerely in that work.

I am not a man for bitterness; I am not a man who consigns to a ghetto or to Hell somebody because he has disagreed with me at some point; but at the same time I am not a man for pacts within the party. On behalf of the party I may make pacts with the union of the Democratic Center, with Democratic Coalition or with the PSCE; I may make pacts with other parties, but I do not make pacts within the party, because I believe that the debate here is a debate of ideas and the only pact possible is respect for the decisions of the majority and cooperation afterward to implement the decisions of the majority.

There has been a great deal of talk about respect for the minorities, comrades. It sometimes happens that under the pretext of respecting the minorities, the minorities are flattered and buttered up, and that is what is happening in the party today. When some people hold a majority somewhere, they flatter the others and allow them a small say, but they keep, and remove, them from any party representation.

I would appeal to all those who adopt one stance or another and those who agree with the stances which the Central Committee is upholding also; I would appeal to them all that the minorities should really be respected and those who talk most about respect for the minorities should not be those who are paving the way for a split in the party through a sectarian stance which is in fact the most flagrant violation of the minorities' rights.

A Regenerated and United Party

We will emerge from this congress with a regenerated party, with a party which will really advance along the path of its democratization, but only if the outgoing Central Committee's stance has a majority, with a party which will not have factions, tendencies or groups of any kind. We will emerge with a party in which we have passionately, vehemently and vigorously argued, and polemicized, sometimes even having gut reactions, but I believe that nobody among our opponents should build up false hopes. We will emerge with a united party and we will emerge with a party which will open its doors so that former members can return and new members can enter, and which will not close them if somebody does not feel ill at ease, treating him with the utmost respect. A party which will become stronger and a party in which, I hope, those who have seen us polemicizing here, sometimes passionately, will see us again, at least in most instances, working together and cooperating to implement this congress's decisions and to make a Communist Party which will remain a factor of consolidation, which is greatly needed, of democracy in our country. A Communist Party which will remain a guarantee of progress and of advancement in this society toward the resolution of the grave and acute problems of the masses; a party which will offer the hope of a socialist and communist society in Spain.

Foreign Greetings

Madrid MUNDO OBRERO in Spanish 7-13 Aug 81 pp 34-37

[Text] In this issue we begin publishing excerpts from the numerous greetings that Communist and workers parties and progressive forces from all over the world sent the the 10th PCE Congress.

Korean Labor Party

After sending a warm and brotherly greeting to the congress delegates and to all Spanish communists, the message underscores the importance of this 10th Congress. It then summarizes the PCE's more than 50-year history, a history of struggles and victories. In the current complex situation in Western Europe, your party has firmly maintained its independence and acted energetically against foreign interference. It is struggling to prevent the imperialist powers around the world from unleashing another world war. It is supporting the movement of nonaligned countries, which is one of the main contributors to peace, as well as the liberation struggle of the international working class and of the world's oppressed nations against imperialism and colonialism. Because of the "two Koreas" scheme devised by American imperialism and its South Korean puppets, we have not yet achieved nationwide sovereignty, and South Korea is gradually becoming a permament colony and a springboard for aggression. Tensions are not lessening, and the danger of another war is mounting day after day. The only way to eliminate tensions and guarantee a lasting peace in Korea is to reunify the country and to get the United States to conclude a peace treaty with us and withdraw its aggressor troops and nuclear weapons from South Korea. The current situation urgently demands that all anti-imperialist and independent forces in the world form a broad united front, safeguard peace and wage a vigorous common struggle for democracy and the victory of the socialist cause. Central Committee

Cuban Communist Party

This congress meets at a time when the enemies of democracy and peace are working with obsessive tenacity to close down the road to detente and plunge the peoples of Europe and the world into a fanatical arms race whose goal is military confrontation, destruction and death. As our first secretary, Comrade Fidel Castro, said, "unfortunately, the language of the cold war is again being heard in the most influential country in the contemporary capitalist world. Detente is cast aside, and the insane doctrine of military superiority is put forth. Today more than ever it is our unavoidable duty to unite the communist movement and join with other democratic and progressive forces in defense of peace and the indisputable right of nations to their freedom and well-being." It concludes by hoping that the congress helps to strengthen the PCE and reiterates its sentiments of friendship and solidarity. Central Committee

Chinese Communist Party

After a warm greeting to the 10th Congress, it underscores the PCE's glorious history of lengthy struggle. Over its more than 60-year history the PCE has led the working class and the people of Spain in the struggle against the fascist dictatorship, in defense of national independence and for democracy and socialism, achieving major successes. Today it exerts wideranging influence among the masses and plays a constructive role both in Spanish politics and in the struggle for the defense of world peace and for the progress of mankind. With the visit to China by a delegation of the PCE Central Committee, headed by Secretary General Santiago Carrillo, relations between the two parties have taken another step forward. We are convinced that on the basis of total equality, independence and mutual respect and trust, the relations of friendship and cooperation between the parties of China and Spain will become ever stronger. Central Committee

AKEL of Cyprus

AKEL, which recently took one-third of the votes in the Cypriot elections, thus becoming the strongest party on the island, is directing the struggle of the Cypriot people against imperialism and the Turkish occupation. We are fighting for the enforcement of the UN resolutions on Cyprus, for the withdrawal of all foreign troops, for the return of refugees (Greeks and Turks) to their homes and for a fully independent, sovereign, territorially whole, federal, nonaligned and demilitarized Cyprus. In our struggle, which is part of the struggle being waged throughout the world against imperialism, we depend to a great extent on international solidarity. We hope that your congress will express solidarity with our struggle and in anticipation of this we offer you our thanks. On behalf of the AKEL Central Committee, Donis Christofinis, head of the International Department

Chilean Communist Party

We have been following attentively and with great interest your party's struggle to preserve social gains and public freedoms in the face of threats by the vestiges of Francoism, as well as your ongoing opposition to Spain's membership in NATO. We feel that in addition to serving the interests of your people, this is a valuable contribution to the cause of peace and our common ideals. The support that the Soviet Union's new peace proposals, which the other countries in the socialist community endorse, have garnered among wideranging segments of world opinion shows that the peoples on all continents desire the road to peace. We vividly remember the solidarity that your party, the working class and the Spanish people expressed to the Chilean people in their struggle against fascism. We are certain that you will continue this support for the liberation of the Chilean people because of the internationalist spirit that is so deeply rooted in the hearts of Spanish communists and because of the antifascist sentiments of the Spanish people. We are exerting every effort to wage our struggle and forge unity so as to topple the Pinochet dictatorship. Luis Corvalan, secretary general of the Chilean Communist Party

Danish Communist Party

We have been following the development of your struggle and we wish you success in your future efforts for peace, social progress and socialism in your country. We Danish communists are pursuing initiatives and activities for peace, detente and social progress in Europe. We support the initiatives of the Soviet Union and the socialist countries in connection with the establishment of denuclearized zones in Europe. Peace and progress are indivisible, and therefore we communists play an increasingly important role in the struggle for peace, against the imperialist efforts to unleash a new cold war, against monopolies and for democratic rights. We hope that your 10th Congress helps to expand the democratic rights and further the social progress of the working classes in your country. Central Committee of the Danish Communist Party

Finnish Communist Party

The position papers drafted by your congress reflect the common desire of all communists and of all peace-loving persons to prevent the worsening of tensions and the ongoing acceleration of the arms race that imperialist circles are promoting everywhere. We Finnish communists have made every effort in our struggle to see to it that the final document of the historic Conference on European Cooperation and Security does not become just a collection of polite phrases in relations among governments and peoples but instead that its principles are put into practice in world politics. We know that we are still far from this goal. But we also know that the peace movement throughout the world is once again gaining strength and attaining unprecedented manifestations. It is of the utmost importance to do everything possible to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We have actively supported President Kekkonen's initiative to make northern Europe a nuclear weapons-free zone. Mankind's technological, cultural and scientific progress has brought this contradiction: automation and technological development signify unemployment and insecurity for the masses. We communists do not have a prescription that will in itself cause all problems to disappear. But we have demonstrated that we are candidly searching for solutions to mankind's major problems. Oliva Bjorbacka, from the Secretariat of the Finnish Communist Party

French Communist Party

Your congress is taking place amid a complex situation. Imperialism is seeking to once again launch a policy of blocs, is perpetuating zones of tensions and pockets of war and is pursuing an arms race. This counter-offensive cannot, however, conceal the direction in which the world is evolving, a direction favorable to the forces of social, national and human liberation. The significance of nations' struggle for peace and disarmament, as well as the extensive demonstrations and firm stands in many European countries against the decision to deploy more nuclear missiles on our continent and for the immediate opening of negotiations on all medium-range missiles and on the reduction of all arms, attest to this. It is also attested to in your country by opposition to Spain's membership in NATO.

The victory of the Left has created a radically new situation in France. Our party made a decisive contribution to change and to the defeat of the Right. Amid this new situation that has opened up with the victory of the Left and the entry of communist ministers into the government, we are working for the success of the democratic change that the French people wanted. By resolutely pursuing the strategy of our 22nd and 23rd congresses, we are fighting for a social transformation that will move democracy further than ever along the road to democratic, self-managing socialism. To us this election was a modern and realistic response to the needs of French society. Given this outlook, we are working to join together all grassroots forces in the struggle, to support every step forward and to move forward towards our objectives. It is our deeply-felt desire to strengthen the longstanding bonds of solidarity between our two parties on the basis of mutual respect and in the interest of our two peoples, of peace, of social progress and of democracy. Secretariat of the Central Committee of the PCF.

Panhellenic Socialist Party (PASOK)

PASOK has followed and is following with keen attention the democratic process in Spain and the struggle of the progressive forces in your country to preserve the spirit of democracy and democratic gains. At a time when Spain's march to democracy is the target of irrational destabilizing assaults, the congress that you are now opening could be an important vehicle for reflection and analysis and to rekindle the collective hopes of a prosperous, democratic future. PASOK wishes to convey to you its solidarity and support and its conviction that you will be able to meet the challenge that your country's contemporary history has placed before you. PASOK

Dutch Communist Party

New democratic approaches, in a revolutionary spirit, are of the utmost importance today. We support the activist alliances for peace and detente, and against military confrontation, in the capitalist countries of Europe, solidarity with the peoples of the Third World and their liberation struggles, and the struggle for the material and political interests of the working masses in the capitalist countries (thus opening up new perspectives), as being of the utmost and decisive importance in this period of history. We support your opposition to Spain's joining NATO. Joop Wolff, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Dutch Communist Party

Hungarian Socialist Workers Party

We are convinced that the most effective weapon against the class enemy is the strengthening of our internationalist union. Acknowledging the validity of the different paths towards socialism, our party considers it especially important to bear in mind, both in theoretical and practical activities, the general laws for the construction of socialism and the particular national traits of each country.

In light of the tense international situation, effective action by Communist parties, in cooperation with all other peace-loving forces, is especially important in warding off the grave perils menacing mankind, in halting the arms race, in promoting disarmament and in safeguarding the accomplishments of detente.

Our party has constantly strived to maintain and bolster our ties of comradeship with our brothers in the PCE, as well as to clearly express our solidarity with the selfless struggle that Spanish communists have waged under difficult conditions. Our efforts will continue to be guided by this sincere desire and willingness. The Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party

Italian Communist Party

In its warm and brotherly greetings, the Central Committee of the PCI recalls the longstanding and deep ties between the two parties, strengthened by the great common struggles against fascism and imperialism, for peace, for the development of democracy and for the building of new paths of democratic progress towards socialism. Today we are faced with a serious crisis that is hitting hard at Western capitalist societies. Conservative forces are trying to regain complete freedom of action, and Europe is feeling the onslaught of the new American leadership. In our country we are struggling to blunt the conservative offensive, for a European initiative to encourage negotiations between the two superpowers, for arms reduction based on a balance on the European continent. We are fighting for a government housecleaning that will democratize its workings. This transformation of State structures is also necessary to defeat antidemocratic subversion, to sever the roots of terrorism and violence and to make democratic institutions attractive. The sharp turn to the Left in France, the strong rebirth in many European countries of movements for peace and against nuclear catastrophe, the critical debate that has also begun within many European socialist and social democratic forces, the major victory by progressive forces in Italy over clerical sectors in the 17 May referendum and the overall gains by the Left and the fading of the Christian Democrats at the 21 June elections in our country, are developments that evidence the great potential that exists. We have also hailed with great interest the spirited process of renewal that has begun in Poland. Present-day struggles are helping to establish the principle that a socialist society must be based on the consensus of the people and on deep-seated and wideranging political and civil liberties. It is with great sympathy and heed that we follow your efforts and your struggle. When a "coup" was attempted against Spain's young democracy, our people forcefully expressed their indignation and their profound friendship for the democratic Spain of the people. We are in favor of full-fledged membership for Spain in the EEC. We are convinced that Eurocommunism can and must play a great role in the building of a democratic Europe. Long live the friendship between our two peoples! Long live the PCE! Central Committee of the PCI

Japanese Communist Party

We sincerely hope that you achieve major successes in surmounting the hurdles on the road of democratization, in defending the fundamental interests of the working class and all worker sectors, in the struggle to prevent Spain from joining NATO and for a neutral, nonaligned Spain, as well as in the furthering of unity among democratic forces and in the construction of a

powerful party, the driving force behind these efforts. Our party has fought against various attacks by reactionary forces and resolutely turned back big power meddling aimed at hegemony. It operates as an independent party that properly combines true patriotism with internationalism. The Japanese Communist Party is fighting for a peaceful, neutral, nonaligned Japan, for the defense and expansion of democracy and for the unity of progressive forces. The vicious circle of the arms race between the military blocs is spiraling upwards without end, and the development of new nuclear weapons has reached an unprecedented stage. We are fighting against the policy of aggression and war being pursued by American imperialism and at the same time we do not accept aggression by certain socialist countries against other nations. We reject the arms race that is being spurred on in the name of a "military balance." The fundamental objectives of the international forces against imperialism and for peace are: the simultaneous dissolution of military blocs, a complete ban on nuclear weapons, a substantial reduction of conventional military forces and the withdrawal of all foreign troops. It concludes by recalling the joint declaration of the Spanish and Japanese Communist parties in April 1976, which says: "Respecting and acknowledging the independence of Communist parties is the only way that the international communist movement can satisfy today's demands, and it is also a premise for creatively developing the theory of scientific socialism under the new and complex conditions of society today." Central Committee

Mexican Communist Party

We in the Mexican Communist Party (PCM) value highly the efforts that the PCE is making in pursuing a bold policy that is in keeping with reality and that meets the demands that the current situation poses. We hold in esteem the struggle that Spanish communists are waging to achieve a series of meaningful changes in government, especially the culmination of the autonomy process, which will lead to a Spain in which its peoples can enjoy full and equal rights. We support Spanish communists in their struggle to set up a broad battlefront for peace and disarmament, against the policy of blocs and, therefore, against Spain's entry into NATO, and against the aggressive policy that the new American administration is pursuing today in a bid to once again impose a warlike course of action that runs counter to the interests of the world's peoples. We are preparing at the moment for the 1982 election campaign.

We can now disclose that the conditions are right to forge a broader electoral alliance than the coalition that ran in the 1979 elections on the Communist party ticket. We will conclude this greeting by reiterating our willingness to strengthen the relations of friendship and solidarity that exist between our parties and by most heartily wishing the 10th PCE Congress success. On behalf of the Central Committee of the PCM, Marcos Leonel Posadas, member of the Political Committee and the Secretariat of the Central Committee

Polish Unified Workers Party

It underscores the ardent support in Poland for the struggle of Spanish communists and all progressive forces in Spain for the consolidation and furtherance of democracy. It then indicates that "during the building of socialism in Poland, a difficult stage arose as a result of mistakes that were made and of violations of the principles of socialism. The Polish Unified Workers Party is resolutely continuing the process of socialist renewal on the basis of indestructible friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union and the entire socialist community and is resisting the threat of domestic reactionaries and the imperialist forces. This is the course charted in the resolutions of the Ninth Special Congress of the Polish Unified Workers Party. It hopes for a constructive culmination to the Madrid Conference and for an immediate implementation of the peace initiatives presented by the socialist countries, including a conference in Warsaw on military detente and disarmament in Europe. Communists are a fundamental force in the struggle for peace and social progress. This is why the unity of the communist and labor movement is of vital importance, a unity based on the common ideas of Marxism-Leninism. Central Committee

Romanian Communist Party (RCP)

Its greeting begins by underscoring the ties of solid friendship, solidarity and cooperation between the PCE and PCR, which have been greatly strengthened by the meetings and fruitful talks between Comrade Nicolae Ceaucescu, the secretary general of the PCR, and Dolores Ibarruri, president of the PCE, and Comrade Santiago Carrillo, secretary general. It emphasizes the accomplishments of the Romanian people, whose socialist country today has an industrial output 50 times greater than in 1938. Your congress is taking place in an extremely complex and contradictory international situation. Europe today is the site of the greatest concentration of troops and weapons of mass destruction. Everything possible must be done to halt the deployment and development of new nuclear missiles on the continent. The arms race is the main threat to peace and even to the existence of mankind. Before it is too late we must take specific steps towards disarmament, and above all nuclear disarmament. We must intensify efforts to establish a new international economic order and more equitable cooperation among all States, based on fully equal relations that enable all peoples but especially the most backward ones to develop as quickly as possible. Our party attaches great importance to the continuous strengthening of cooperation and solidarity with communist and workers parties and to the forging of a new unity whose solid underpinning is strict respect for the right of each party to independenetly decide its own political line and revolutionary tactics and strategy in keeping with the demands and specific realities in each country, free from any outside interference. At the same time, the PCR is developing cooperation with socialist and social democratic parties, with democratic, progressive parties in new independent States, with national liberation movements and with advanced, anti-imperialist forces throughout the world. It concludes by wishing the PCE much success in carrying out the decisions of the 10th Congress. Virgil Cazacu, secretary of the Central Committee

More Greetings

Madrid MUNDO OBRERO in Spanish 14-20 Aug 81 pp 34-37

[Text] German Communist Party

Your congress is taking place at a time when the international situation has become critical, because of imperialism's endeavor to attain military supremacy and its policy of confrontation and blackmail. Imperialism's intention of installing new medium-range nuclear weapons in various European countries is also a direct threat to our peoples and to peace. The foremost issue today is to make every effort to prevent new American nuclear missiles from being deployed in Western European countries. In connection with this, the Pay Program drafted by the 26th Congress of the CPSU deserves your full support because it serves and is conducive to the national interests of our peoples and the interests as peace as well. There is nothing more important to us than doing everything we can to prevent war from ever starting on German soil again. The peoples of the world and especially the Soviet people have made great sacrifices in the struggle against fascism and war. We particularly thank the Soviet people for liberating us from fascism. We have been and we are closely linked in the struggle to guarantee peace and to oppose fascism and war. Thousands of German communists fought shoulder-to-shoulder with you in the International Brigades. Today, faced with imperialism's great threat to peace, the unity of action of the international communist and labor movement is an urgent duty. Hermann Gautier, vice president of the German Communist Party

MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola]-Labor Party

Ever since its founding, the PCE has always shown itself to be an indomitable fighter for the supreme aspirations of Spain's working masses. In 1975, after long years of incessant struggle for national liberation, the Angolan people, under the direction of the MPLA, put an end to Portuguese fascist colonization, which subjugated it for five centuries, and won its freedom and independence. Since then our people have made much progress in national reconstruction and in laying the technical and material groundwork for a new society, a socialist society. This rapid progress of our revolution and our consistency with the socialist choice we have made mean that we must never waver in honoring the sacred principle of proletarian internationalism towards the peoples in the midst of struggle, in particular the peoples of southern Africa. At the present international juncture, at the same time that mankind is witnessing increasingly irreversible gains by the forces of peace and progress, we are seeing unprecedented aggressiveness and the wildest of attempts by imperialism to destabilize the countries that are proceeding along the socialist path of economic and social development. Such maneuvers, which seek to delay the inevitable downfall of their reactionary system, are an insane effort to surmount the constant cyclical crises that are inherent to it. In this regard, we support without reservations the peace and detente proposals advanced by Comrade Leonid Brezhnev and we salute your party for its contribution to the struggle for peace and detente on the European continent and throughout the world. We express our unconditional support for the struggle of the

peoples of the Western Sahara, led by their vanguard, the Polisario Front; for the heroic people of Palestine, guided by the PLO; for the people of Timor, led by FRETILIN, and for the peoples of Chile, Uruguay and El Salvador, and we vehemently denounce the ill-fated role of the Reagan administration on the Latin American continent.

Algerian National Liberation Front

No one doubts that the congress will greatly help to strengthen and further the struggle of the workers and people of Spain for fresh gains along the road of peace, democracy, liberty and justice. Our two parties, which have a history brimming with struggles, sacrifices and victories, are working for common objectives: developing man, promoting peace and emancipating peoples. These basic points of agreement should convince us, were this necessary, of the need for contacts, dialogue and cooperation between our two parties, as well as with all of the progressive forces around the Mediterranean. Imperialism's mounting aggressiveness and the resulting threats to the peace and security of our region, and our joint rejection of the policy of blocs, as well as our shared desire to bring as many countries as possible into world decision-making and to forge a new international economic order, make this need more urgent than ever. We are convinced that the alliance between the West's democratic and progressive forces and the peoples of the Third World will enable us to forge a future of solidarity that will put an end to the current system of domination that is compromising international relations, heightening contradictions and intensifying the threats to peace and to the security and independence of countries. Foreign Relations Committee of the Algerian National Liberation Front Party

Argentine Communist Party

In the complicated situation in which Spain, its working class and its people find themselves, it is with the keenest interest that we are observing your experiences, your approach to problems and your programs for political action in the immediate future. We hope that the deliberations of your 10th Congress help to further and strengthen world peace and close, fraternal relations within the international communist movement. We also hope that this congress represents another step upward in the development and strengthening of the PCE's programs, ideology and organization. This will be a powerful influence not only in the working class's struggle for its historic class objectives but also in the general democratic struggle that the Spanish people are engaged in and that the party is heading up as their vanguard, and it will also spur on those same plans at the international level. Leonardo Paso, alternate member of the Central Committee of the Argentine Communist Party

Belgian Communist Party

Belgian communists are following with the keenest interest your battle to prevent Spain from joining NATO, to halt the arms race and to overcome the policy of blocs and your tenacious struggle to consolidate democracy and

meet the autonomy needs of the regions and nationalities. For many years now the Belgian Communist Party has viewed the march to socialism as a peaceful march that must be marked by democratic gains and based on a broad grassroots consensus that is possible only through the union of all progressive forces. It is in this spirit, anxious to guarantee within pluralism the identity of all anticapitalist forces and respectful of the particular traits of each country and each people, that we have endorsed the concept of Eurocommunism. To us, it is associated with constant efforts to democratize the party itself. The victory of the Left in France has also given us new grounds for confidence in the future as well as in the emergence of a democratic, independent Europe that can play an effective role for detente, progress and socialism, a Europe in which the Spanish people have an important place.

Australian Communist Party

Our two parties do not only share numerous political ideas; we also maintain growing labor relations because of the presence of almost 200,000 Spaniards in Australia. Like the PCE, the Australian Communist Party feels that it is essential for Marxist parties to pursue a strategy based on a search for a real socialist democracy that is different from the social democratic and Soviet models. The Australian Communist Party bases its strategy on the concept of worker self-management, extended throughout economic and social life, and combined with the main cultural and political rights of peoples, including the right to form other political parties. This is why we totally support the struggle of Polish workers for full-fledged socialist democracy and self-management. Any attempt to crush the Polish workers would be a crime against socialism. The Australian Communist Party thinks highly of the PCE's campaign against the American bases in Spain and against the attempt to make Spain part of NATO, as well as your stand of nonalignment and opposition to military blocs. We are also struggling against U.S. bases in Australia and for a nonaligned foreign policy. We share your stands on the duty of communist parties to support national independence struggles and we think especially highly of your aid for the Saharan people's struggle for independence and for the heroic struggle of the Salvadoran people. In conclusion, we would like to express our revolutionary solidarity with the Spanish people's struggle against the attempts at a fascist coup. Dennis Freney, member of the National Committee of the Australian Communist Party

Bulgarian Communist Party

Bulgarian communists are following with keen interest and express their joy at the successes of Spanish communists, who are struggling under difficult and complex conditions to defend, bolster and further democracy, unite their ranks and strengthen the unity of the working class and all workers in the struggle for sweeping social change, peace and socialism. We want to take this opportunity to express once again our solidarity with the communists and all of the progressive and democratic forces of Spain who are resolutely opposed to the continual attempts by reactionaries to overthrow the constitutional order. The traditional relations of friendship and cooperation between

Bulgarian and Spanish communists, firmly consolidated by the blood that we both shed during the Spanish people's revolutionary national war, have felt the deep and permanent imprint of remarkable figures like Jorge Dimitrov, Jose Diaz and Dolores Ibarruri. After underscoring the successes achieved by the Bulgarian people in all spheres of developed socialist society, the message calls attention to the basic task of saving the world from thermonuclear catastrophe and of preventing a new stage in the nuclear missile arms race. It stresses the consistent peace policy pursued by the Bulgarian Communist Party and the People's Republic of Bulgaria to transform the Balkan Peninsula into a stable region of detente. It concludes by pointing out its contribution to strengthening the cohesiveness and unity of the socialist community and the international communist and labor movement, as well as its vigorous support for all progressive forces struggling against imperialists and reactionaries. Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party

Greek Communist Party

We are attentively following your party's activities and the struggles of the working class and all Spanish workers for their vital interests, their union and democratic freedoms and rights and for social progress and socialism. Because of our bitter experience of Greek membership in imperialist NATO, which has imposed the tyranny of colonels for 6 years and led to the Cyprus tragedy, we warmly back your struggle against Spain's membership in NATO, which would have negative overall consequences for peace. We believe that today, at a time when imperialism, especially American imperialism, is dangerously aggravating the international situation, especially along the eastern Mediterranean and in the Near and Middle East, through its agent Israel, with its interventions against other countries and its arms buildup, your congress will contribute to the struggles for preserving detente and peace, for disarmament and the application of the principles in the final Helsinki document, for the successful outcome of the Madrid Conference and for an immediate start to negotiations on medium-range nuclear weapons. Our party supports the USSR's recent peace proposals. The current world situation necessitates more than ever increased unity of action among sister communist parties, workers parties and all democratic, anti-imperialist forces in the struggle to preserve peace and progress for mankind. The Greek Communist Party, always faithful to the principles of proletarian internationalism, makes common cause with the Polish communists in their efforts to safeguard social gains; with the struggle of the Afghan people to defend their revolutionary gains; with the struggle of the Cypriot people, of the Arab peoples, of the Palestinian people, of the people of Lebanon, Namibia and El Salvador and of all peoples struggling against imperialism, fascism, Zionism and racism and for peace, national independence, democracy and socialism. Central Committee of the Greek Communist Party

African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde (APICV)

By being present among you we wish, on the one hand, to attest to our desire to strengthen the ties of friendship between our countries, parties and peoples

and, to the extent possible, to familiarize ourselves with your experiences in building your party and democracy, and on the other, to express our backing for the democratic process under way in Spain, of which the PCE is an integral part. We have followed with interest the principal events in your country, especially the attempts by reactionary forces to turn back the tide of history. We are convinced, however, that the Spanish people, which possesses a lengthy tradition of struggle, will be able to defend its achievements. Our people won their independence just 6 years ago, after five centuries of Portuguese colonial domination and a heroic political and armed struggle. We have achieved major victories in national reconstruction. Grassroots mobilization and commitment are based on the domestic policy advocated by the party, which is taking shape as the incipient construction of a system of revolutionary national democracy that enables the people to have an increasingly direct involvement in running the country through the organizations for grassroots participation. In keeping with our principles, we support the struggle of the people of Namibia for their independence and the struggle of the South African people against the illegal, racist Pretoria regime, which in addition to imposing the hateful system of apartheid on the black majority, violates the borders of neighboring countries, Angola and Mozambique in particular. We likewise defend the right to self-determination and independence for the peoples of the Sahara and East Timor and we unreservedly support the struggle of the Palestinian people, led by the PLO, and of the Arab world in general against Israeli Zionism. As members of the Nonaligned Movement, we are advocates of international detente and disarmament, the preservation of world peace and the establishment of just relations between countries, which are indispensable factors for the progress of all mankind. Less than a year ago, a grave development forced a radical change in our plan to achieve unity between Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde. It was a mortal blow to the party that headed up our two countries' struggle for more than 20 years. The founding of the APICV is a logical outcome of the process that struck at the APIGC. Carrying on the political and ideological legacy of the APIGC, the APICV proclaims its faithfulness to the principle of African unity.

Greek Communist Party (interior)

Our countries, Spain and Greece, are joined by strong bonds. They border the Mediterranean, the common birthplace of ancient civilizations, and today they are faced with a common problem we must struggle to resolve: the U.S. military bases on Greek and Spanish soil. We want the Mediterranean to be a sea of peace, free from military blocs and nuclear weapons and with relations of friendship and cooperation among all the countries that border it. Our two countries are also part of Europe. We support Spain's membership, with guarantees, in the EEC. We support the struggles paving the way to transform the Europe of monopolies into the Europe of the workers, of the people, a Europe that plays a larger and more independent role in world politics by helping to dissolve military blocs and contributing to progress towards socialism in democracy and freedom, a socialism constructed by the workers of each country. We endorse your struggle against Spain's membership in NATO,

a military bloc that in our country was decisively instrumental in setting up the dictatorship of the colonels. The Greek Communist Party (interior) is against leadership centers in the international communist movement and is developing its own concept of the revolutionary process. It thinks highly of the PCE's contribution to the development of Spain's own individual course, based on its specific circumstances. The Greek Communist Party (interior) stands beside the PCE in the great Eurocommunist movement, a movement that gives new luster to the ideas of socialism and opens up promising prospects for the struggle of the workers in our two countries. Babis Dracopulos, secretary of the Central Committee of the Greek Communist Party (interior)

Luxembourg Communist Party

We are attentively following the struggle of the Spanish people for democracy and social progress, in which Spain's communists, as the finest representatives of the working class, are playing an outstanding role. Our party energetically denounces all attempts by reactionary and fascist elements in Spain to return to the dictatorship, the backdrop for which is the worldwide danger of a return to the cold war and a reinstigation of the arms race by the United States and the most reactionary forces of imperialism. In light of this situation, all forces for peace in Europe and throughout the world have a duty to unite. The solidarity of the international communist movement will surely be a major factor for success in this struggle. We hope that the 10th Congress is a landmark for Spanish communists in your struggle for peace, democracy and social progress. Rene Urbany, chairman, on behalf of the Central Committee of the Luxembourg Communist Party

Norwegian Socialist Left Party

Your congress convenes amid a difficult situation for all European forces that are struggling against the economic crisis of capitalism, for democratic socialism, peace and independence, and against the large military blocs. We want to underscore the important ideological role that the PCE has played among the leftwing forces throughout Europe. We are thinking about the PCE's emphasis on the concept of Eurocommunism and the efforts to seek a new course between social democracy and the Soviet model. In the long run, this contribution should be the most important ideological innovation to take place in the socialist camp in decades. Our party and many other political movements in northern Europe are engaged in a great campaign for peace, disarmament and a ban on nuclear weapons in the northern region. The irresponsible policy of the Reagan administration and the decision by NATO to install 572 new Pershing and Cruise missiles in Western Europe are symptoms of the grave situation that Europe faces in the 1980's. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has also been instrumental in creating a situation of greater danger for peace and independence. We support the PCE's struggle against Spain's membership in NATO. After 32 years as a member country of NATO, we know what joining this military bloc means to a not very large country. It has adverse repercussions both for independence and foreign policy and for national culture and a

country's domestic political climate. We view with great concern the attempted coup of 23 February, which demonstrates that the transition to democracy in Spain is not yet complete. We hope that the 10th Congress resolves the problems submitted for discussion and represents a step forward for socialism in freedom in Spain. Fraternally, the Norwegian Socialist Left Party

Portuguese Communist Party

After conveying the fraternal greetings of Portuguese communists, the message says: Today, as we witness the flareup of terrorism and fascist coup plots in Spain, as the working class and the working masses are being hard hit by the reactionary policies of the UCD government, as Spain's prepares to join the aggressive military bloc called NATO, we want to reaffirm to the communists, the working class and to all peoples in your country our brotherly solidarity with your struggle in defense of democratic freedoms, for social progress and in defense of national independence. In an all-out attempt to head off the rapid development of the revolutionary process and to impose their hegemony in world affairs, American imperialism and the most warlike circles in NATO are unleashing a dangerous counteroffensive that threatens the peace and security of peoples. We must counter it with vigor, determination and confidence. Of fundamental importance in halting and ultimately defeating the imperialist counteroffensive is the teamwork of the international communist and labor movement, based on the strongest unity and solidarity with the revolutionary forces of our times: the socialist countries, the progressive countries, the working class in the capitalist countries and the national liberation movement. In spite of the virulent attacks that it has suffered, the Portuguese revolution is still alive in the nationalizations, the agrarian reform and in other democratic gains that our people are strongly determined to defend. Firmly opposing the antiworking class and antinationalistic policies of the reactionary government of the Democratic Alliance, the PCP is constantly striving to rally the working class and the masses, especially communists and socialists, in spite of the persistent refusals in this regard by Socialist Party leaders. With the narrowing of the social and political base that supports the Democratic Alliance government and with the acute crisis that the reactionary alliance is going through, the conditions are being created for the fall of the current government and for a democratic alternative in keeping with the interests of the workers and of the people. With its 187,000 members, the PCP is an indispensable force in the defense of democracy and in resolving the people's and the country's problems. The message concludes by expressing "our determination to continue efforts to further the relations of friendship and solidarity between the PCP and the PCE." Central Committee of the PCP

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